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2Abstract.
This work aims to be part of the developing body of public law which seeks to
combine empirical research with a theoretical framework. It uses the example of the
privatisation of the rail network and the deregulation of the bus industry to this end.
- Each phenomenonjs "'~mined through both library research and direct interview.
Throughout )!-his/ reference is made to the overall framework of public law and the
essential concept of accountability. The work concludes by drawing the two
processes together and putting forward the thesis thatjin the sphere of public transport)
for public lawyers the question of public accountability cannot be separated from
ownership.
Chapter I is an examination of public law and the theoretical assumptions behind it.
It explores how the subject has developed since Dicey and the competing frameworks
which now exist amongst public law academics. Chapters 2 and 3 are general studies
of nationalisation and privatisation in the twentieth century . They show hOVJ using
different mechanisms the British State could claim to be enhancing accountability.
Chapter 2 explores the public corporation in particular and how that phenomenon
coincided with the general developm ent of the state and a system of administrative
law. EEjuaJly-lll the following chapter ,it is shown how privatisation coincided with a
disenchantment as to the arrangements of the state especially on the right. The
contradictory rationale behind each concept is also explored .
Chapters 4 and 5 study bus deregulation. This includes a study of how bus transport
was regulated, how deregulati on came about and what the consequences of this were.
It explores both the experience of public ownership and privatisation and how both
were unsatisfactory in delivering accountabi lity. Chapter 5 concludes with a case
study of the Glasgow bus market which is seen as a microcosm for broader
developments in the bus industry.
Chapters 6 and 7 study rail privatisation. These study how British Rail operated as a
nationalised industry and how privatisation came about and worked in practise.
Further the intellectual underpinning of railway privatisation is critically examined.
AgainIth ese chapters highlight the difficulty in achieving accountability in both of
these arrangements.
Chapter 8 draws together the conclusions of these two studies and re-emphasises the
public law framework in which the work was carried out. It concludes that public law
should resist creating a system of accountability through privatisation particularly in
transport and that the link between public accountability and ownership which was
broken by the public corporation should be re-established.
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4CHAPTER ONE' INTRODUCTION.
"Constitutional principles and forms do not operate in a
vacuum of Abstract Reason"
Harold Laski, 1936.1
When studying Britain's state institutions one is acutely aware of their peculiar
traditions. These traditions may be seen in the pomp and circumstance of the state
opening of Parliament; the continual existence of a feudal monarchy (albeit
bourgeoisified) or the entire process of making law. These structural anachronisms
produce their own effects in legal studies; particularly in law that relates to the British
state: administrative law and practice. In an immediate way these unique problems
are shown in the absence of a written constitution which itself is an international
anomaly.' But in general these traditions' effects are more subtle and sophisticated as
in the case of the state's intervention in the economy. Although nationalisation and,
latterly privatisation were by no means solely British concepts,' the form they took in
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Britain had a peculiar identity as I shall demonstrate below. They were haphazard in
developing, their rationale was unclear and largely unspoken and the primary
legislation that initially started the privatisation and nationalisation process was based
solely on issues of transfers of ownership rather than accountability.
5Any area of state power is of interest to public lawyers especially one as fluid as the
state and economy. Yet such a statement (although plainly true) would have been
severely frowned upon if made by a British academic lawyer thirty years ago. This
again is representative of the British state, how it operates and the ideologies it uses
for underpinning itself. It is the purpose of this work to study the processes of
nationalisation, privatisation and deregulation whilst exploring the theoretical
underpinning of modem academic public lawyers. This is not a purely intellectual
exercise, it is necessary to clear the air before the implications of this are utilised to
develop more empirical work.
A NEW APPROACH?
It is my contention in this introduction that Dicey's legacy has divided all academic
public lawyers. As a result of this, to quote Martin Loughlin, "Public law is a
hopelessly fragmented subject with little in terms of an authoritative structure"."
During the eighties and nineties many academics have sought to challenge the
hegemony of Dicey's work and have tried to replace it. Within this body of work
however there are major discrepancies. Nevertheless, it will be argued that there is a
common trend: each seeks to construct a framework with reference to some type of
external principles. That is, in the absence of one document or statement identifiable
as "The Constitution", public lawyers have had to use different reference points to
give their work coherence. This is not a new observation; one of the purposes of
Dicey's work was to construct a coherent structure for public law. But recently
academic public lawyers have spread their net further. Some have found their
6structure from within Dicey's work and sought to reclaim it; others have brought
concepts from other disciplines, while others have sought to study the subject
believing the only principle is that there are no principles. This introduction will look
at each of these trends and contend that none on its own is an adequate model for
administrative law. In particular the idea now propounded by two senior public law
academics that contract and the market - within certain limitations - provide a system
of accountability which has evaded us in the traditional state' will be challenged.
This work will attempt to argue that accountability is central to any administrative law
system: the state in its many guises must have some form of structure which is open
accessible and answerable to ordinary members of society. This should involve
citizens who live as consumers of utilities or workers in the relevant industries so as to
encourage their participation within the modem state." In the context of transport,
participation and accountability will provide an effective way of co-ordinating
activities within the state's operation. This seems straightforward and many "new"
public lawyers would have no problem with the principles mentioned here. Many
have suggested policy measures which would go a long way to achieve this for
example: a Freedom of Information Act or openness in drafting regulations and rules.
However, it will be this work's contention that without a notion of public ownership
all of these worthy concepts will not fulfil their real potential.
The best way to illustrate this is through empirical research into the process of the
privatisation and deregulation of transport, notably the bus and rail industries over the
7last fifteen years. This area of state intervention has had many problems both before
and after privatisation and deregulation: lack of accountability, alienation of ordinary
people from its operation and a lack of co-ordination in its working all of which will
be evidenced below. Through this work it will be shown how these problems have
continued since privatisation and deregulation took place. It will be shown that both
traditional nationalisation and modem deregulatory structures have not worked.
Administrative law must learn from these historical examples and seek to construct
new solutions. It will be this work's contention that any new authoritative structure of
administrative law needs a concept of public ownership which could be capable of
fulfilling the traditional tests of accountability so familiar to administrative lawyers.
At the time of nationalisation this notion was relatively common amongst radical
administrative lawyers7 who rejected Dicey's traditional approach." Yet now it barely
features. This may be due to extraneous political factors such as the experience of
Thatcherism or more widely the collapse of the command economies in Eastern
Europe and Russia. An example of these external factors influencing public lawyers
comes with Norman Lewis' questionable statement: "Market economies saw their
greatest triumph of the century during the 1980s".9 However the absence of any
notion of public ownership as part of the concept of accountability, it will be argued,
leaves a hole in the search for a coherent administrative legal structure.
6 For an earlier exposition of this idea see Prosser(1982).
7 Robson (1951) who saw nationalisation as tied to the general growth in public administration and in
8Other differences aside, a great debt is owed to the academic public lawyers of the last
fifteen years. They have begun to make more acceptable the combination of empirical
work with an explicitly theoretical framework that was once sneered at as "un-legal".
The traditional approach was accurately summarised in the early eighties by Terence
Daintith, "[it] analyses constitutional principles and structures largely to the exclusion
of any consideration of the activities in which the organs of government are engaged
or the purposes with which they pursue them"." This is much less the case now but
still occurs in some writing and this will be dealt with later. However, important as
these scholars have been in developing the discipline of public law this gap mentioned
by Daintith is still prevalent when public ownership is concerned. The question of
accountability in the theoretical context of constitutional and administrative law is
often removed from a real consideration of what 'accountability' means to the public
for example in the case of transport.
This introduction, then, will attempt to explore the roots of the traditional approach to
administrative law and why it has proven to be an obstacle to analysing and
understanding the modem state. This will then be contrasted with the approach of the
'new' public lawyers which has come to the fore recently. The work will then
introduce its own concept of accountability through public ownership and explain
how it differs from the other academic positions. This will also be combined with an
explanation of why the privatisation and deregulation of transport is a useful example
for administrative lawyers and is suitable for study in order to test their principles.
9Thus the intersection of the modem state with the economy will be subjected to
analysis worthy of its importance.
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THE LEGACY OF DICEY: THE TIME-LAG
As is so often the case, to understand the battles of today one must examine the recent
past. The diffuse nature of public power in Britain is related to the state's historical
development. Indeed one could argue that the absence of a coherent concept of the
state" in British legal and political literature unifying all public activities and
traditions has impeded the development of critical thought in all disciplines, not least
in public law. It may also be true that membership of the European Union with its
specific conceptions of states in relation to aid and economic convergence has begun
to alter this. 12 But to understand Dicey's position it is necessary to examine this
tradition of conceiving the state as diffuse rather than as a coherent entity. The
English settlement of 1688 between feudalism and capitalism was based on an
understanding - an "operational code'?"- which allowed the birth of a modem
capitalist society within the structures of the feudal system. This was clearly
anomalous: "while the monarchical tradition remained there was a gradual shift to the
idea that the executive power was an emanation of, or an agency of Parliament"."
Thus, this shifting of the sands of constitutional power did not allow the executive to
create a distinct image for itself as separate from the monarchy, at least in legal terms.
With no clear concept of executive power other concepts were required to try and
categorise the state such as the Crown or the Nation. It was within such a tradition
that Dicey worked.
II This theory is clearly expounded in Dyson(1980).
12 For example in the area of State aid there are a number of cases which have dealt with the issue of
UTh"JIt ("'nnC't-itntp.C" '.::l ~t':1tp. hr.rlu P (T J(,~,olrovii £:'OhV/lorloyC' '1ITM AoY' J(nn" RT/ ...f,.. nthorC' lJ rflYVIYVIi("('!i/lYJ
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The publication of Dicey's "Introduction to the Study of the Law of the
Constitution"I5 in 1885 was an attempt to create an autonomous subject of
constitutiona11aw. Dicey saw the two enduring aspects of the Constitution to be the
rule of law and the sovereignty of Parliament. The work was not designed to provide
an examination of the new powers which the British state was starting to exercise.
Indeed, one of the purposes of the work was to counter the development of a distinct
corpus of law dealing with the administration: an equivalent to the French 'droit
administratif. Thus he argued that all institutions or individuals were and should be
subject to the same common law." This work was a clear attempt to check the
development of executive power whilst at the same time classifying the state as
equivalent to any other individual. But if it were only this then Dicey's work would
hardly be as significant in the public law field as it remains.
Beyond this, it was the first attempt to grapple with the problems of constitutional law
in a country with an unwritten constitution and to lay down a model for its study. To
do this he labelled his work as expressly legal, to contrast it with the historical and
political approaches. In the opening chapter he explicitly distances himself from the
"antiquarianism" of historians and political theorists who concern themselves
primarily with "constitutional conventions"." This process was not solely self
justification" although Loughlin's jibe of the "need for academic lawyers to fashion
distinctive market niches?" probably had a degree of truth even then. Its main object
14 ibid., p40.
15 10th edition.
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was to place judge-made law and the common law tradition in the centre of the British
state and not to allow any exceptions. He "construed the subject in the image of the
common law mind"." In doing this he also sought to expel the vagaries of politics
from the legal study of the British constitution by giving the political aspects the title
of "constitutional conventions". These could be chronicled, of course, but such work
was not for the legal mind: "as a lawyer, I find these matters too high for me"." He
regarded the conventions of the constitution as ranking below the two main areas of
his study - the sovereignty of Parliament and the rule oflaw. Dicey's work aimed to
be 'positivist' in the sense that it dealt only with the law and removed the
uncertainties of political thought. This corresponds with his adherence to Austin's
philosophy. As his biographer wrote, "Dicey followed in the footsteps of Austin by
subjecting Constitutional law to scientific study"." Yet the claims for a neutral vision
of the law are dubious for two main reasons. Firstly, his distaste for the growth of the
state and executive power could not be removed from his legal work. One legal
academic wrote at the time of the centenary of the publication of Dicey's work that,
"the abstraction of simple principles from complex problems was the work of a lawyer
but under the influence of a politician"." Secondly, as will be illustrated below when
examining modem scholars who attempt to salvage some concepts from Dicey there
were tensions even within the constraints of his own model of the rule of law aligned
with the sovereignty ofParliament.
20 T A1"1,....."hl';-n f1 00")\ -nAQ
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It is clear that, nearing the end of the nineteenth century, Dicey wanted to stamp his
authority of the common law on the ever developing British state. At this time the
state was beginning to expand its powers as a precursor to the rapid development in
the fields of welfare and the economy which occurred in the early twentieth century
and between the two world wars. Also as a corollary to this political expansion of the
new state there was an increased level of labour disruption with newly formed trade
unions. This also found a political manifestation in the birth of the Labour Party
which/at the time,upset the established British state institutions.
This was a world far removed from the certainties of the common law and one which
Dicey did not much care for. Above all else Dicey was a conservative thinker. This is
true if use is made of Loughlin's ideal type division of conservative normativism" or
even in the narrower political sense - although he was a life-long Whig. He was also a
staunch opponent of Home Rule for Ireland" and the extension of the franchise to
women. Significantly he believed both these policies should be put to referenda -
setting aside the central concept of the Sovereignty of Parliament. In his defence he
did believe latterly that Parliament had been debased by the growth of the party
system. Loughlin quotes from Dicey's introduction to the tenth edition of his seminal
work published in 1915 - a year prior to the Irish Easter uprising, two years before the
Russian Revolution and four years before the tanks were sent in to put down an
insurrection in Glasgow - "faith in parliamentary government has suffered to an
extraordinary degree". 26
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For Dicey the twentieth century threatened a betrayal of his values. He undertook a
letter writing campaign to the Times in opposition to the Trade Disputes Act 1906
which exempted trade unions from delictual actions in some circumstances. This
could be viewed as in line with his legal belief that no institution was 'above' the law
and should be subject to the same common law as anyone else. During the 1912
miners' strike he urged enforcement of the law even if it meant bloodshed. He argued
that trade unionists "must be fought by the force of the state"." According to his
biographer he believed Lloyd George's settlement with the miners in 1920 to have
"inaugurated the rule of revolution by caving into the unions"." From these practical
examples we can see an illustration of his ideological beliefs. Even his work, "The
Law of the Constitution" begins with a quote from Burke, the conservative political
philosopher." Yet, this is only part of the story, for if there was nothing else to his
work it would be unlikely that Dicey would be studied at all other than as an
archetypal nineteenth century academic. Thus to describe Dicey's work as an
"outbreak of Anglo-Saxon parochialism?" is only partially correct. It does not
illuminate the whole picture.
To comprehend fully the significance of Dicey's work it is necessary to return to the
peculiar legal and political tradition of Britain with its distinction between form and
content. Although taking the form of a "dispassionate conclusion of academic legal
25 He wrote more about Ireland than about any other issue. See McEldowney op.cit.
26 Dicey (1915), plviii.
27 Cosgrove op. cit., p210. For all these points see Cosgrove's biography.
28 ihit! n?{)R
15
science?" its content was shaped by Dicey's own conservative viewpoint. It sought to
be a modem approach yet it still supported the 'pre-modem' form. In doing this it was
very much in line with the British constitutional tradition as outlined at the beginning
of this work. That is to say, the dynamic of change within the British state has always
taken place beneath the auspices of the ancient constitution. Dicey appreciated this
and although he was trying to carry out a new project for constitutional law by
creating a structured subject he was careful not to challenge any element of the
'ancient' tradition. Although he had created an autonomous discipline of
constitutional law he had done so with conservative values entwined through it. In
particular his concept of the rule of law was attractive to legal scholars and remains so
as will be illustrated when examining the work of modem academics. Yet, this
supposedly positivist work had a very developed political underpinning. In
supporting the traditional approach to the State he was clearly condemning those who
wished to reform the structures. This was an exceptionally important political issue at
that time with the ferment in Ireland and the growth of trade unions and the suffrage
movement. These were all issues Dicey felt strongly about and although they were not
dealt with directly by his work on the British Constitution they certainly directed his
support for tradition and the 'rule of law'.
However, the legal establishment throughout England particularly in legal education
at the universities accepted Dicey's work. His shadow hung over legal thought for
most of the twentieth century. Academic lawyers accepted Dicey's implicit values as
part of the discipline of constitutional law, although there was opposition earlier this
16
century notably by William Robson and Ivor Jennings. These writers could be seen in
some senses as the forerunners of the 'new' approach to public law. However their
sympathies lay with the expansion of government much more than in the case of the
modem academics. The expanded executive was according to Robson, "the most
significant expression of democracy in our time"." This debate was not merely
academic as legal students became practitioners and judges. The Lord Chief Justice
of England and Wales Hewart wrote a Diceyan work "The New Despotism?" which
attacked the new formations of the state as lawless. In Robson's words, "Lord
Hewart's attitude represented 99% of the opinion then held by the bench, the bar and
the solicitors' branch of the profession"."
Politically Dicey's work had a considerable effect. The two official reviews of the
new formations of the state, the Donoughmore Committee on Ministers Powers
(1929) and the Franks Committee on Administrative Tribunals (1955) were very
influenced by his work. Again using Robson's words the 192935 report had "the dead
hand of Dicey lying frozen on its neck"." Both reports were aptly described as a
"typically medieval confusion of private and public responsibility"." Through his
legal work Dicey placed conservative thought at the centre of constitutional law and
its academic tradition.
32 Robson op.cit, at p421.
33 Hewart (1929).
34 Dnhcn.,.., nn /'tif 'JIf-nL1,,) 1
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This is also reflected in the torpor in which a system of administrative law was
developed in this country. Moreover, when it began to develop, its structure still felt
Dicey's influence. One of Dicey's express desires was to counter the moves to a
French model of 'droit administratif. As explained above, to emphasise the
difference from France he argued that all subjects were liable to the common law
including public authorities. This precluded until relatively recently the development
of a body of principles that could be applied specifically to administrative bodies.
There was a tendency to look to pragmatic solutions and to apply existing remedies to
administrative problems. In many ways then Dicey was one of the most influential
British conservative thinkers because he tied his work in with the concept of the
autonomy of law. By pushing the development of public law away from a principled
structure it distanced it from other academic disciplines. In a sense it was shunted out
of significance in the broader academic world.
Even more importantly, it meant that the growth of the modem state was not met with
any exacting legal analysis as the growth developed rapidly in the early decades of
this century. Obviously there were some exceptions, witness Robson's encyclopaedic
examination of the new tribunals in "Justice and Administrative Law".38 Nevertheless
it could be said that this work and others like it at the time were not really analytical
works and were more concerned with documenting the growth of an administrative
system which the legal establishment was loath to admit existed. It will be argued that
the absence of a legally analytical approach exacerbated two problems inherent within
18
the British Constitution, namely a lack of accountability and an abundance of secrecy.
It prevented these concepts being fully explored by lawyers.
Perhaps the most damaging legacy was the effect on public law. It became viewed as
a slightly archaic system because of this Diceyan 'time-lag', for much of the writing
on public law was influenced by this anti-collectivist view of the modem state, even
when this no longer coincided with the reality of the situation. A good example of
this would be Wade's work on administrative law. Dicey's individualist view of the
state was one which even some thinkers of the nineteenth century establishment were
trying to distance themselves from. As will be shown, by the thirties the leadership of
the Conservative and Liberal Parties accepted a collectivist structure of some form,
which was an implicit recognition of a concept of public ownership. Yet the tentative
moves away from Dicey's model of the state were not echoed in the legal
establishment, although there were some dissenting voices such as Robson and
Jennings. In many universities today his work still remains the starting block for
studies of Constitutional and Administrative law, in some cases even dictating its
structure.
19
THE 'NEW' PUBLIC LAWYERS.
Clearly there has been an attempt to move away from Dicey's work and to adopt a
more theoretical approach. This has been particularly intense in the last fifteen years,
perhaps due to the pressure cooker of Thatcherism which has forced many to examine
previously unthinkable concepts. Loughlin, however, dates the new public law to the
birth of the new universities in the sixties when they were looking for new ways to
study and examine public law. This was reflected in a more empirical style of work
with certain areas of state activity being put under detailed scrutiny e.g. local
government, planning law, the economy. Whatever the roots of this development a
number of legal academics saw the limits of Dicey's framework and attempted to
remedy it. However within that extremely broad grouping there was no unanimity as
to the correct direction. This to some extent reflected the complexities and tensions of
Dicey's work itself. But the principal reason was the lack of consensus over a
theoretical framework into which to put public law. This has resulted in a degree of
passionate debate between different schools of thought." Perhaps this became
inevitable when it became broadly accepted that public law required more than a
simple empirical approach. As argued above Dicey's claim to create a value free fact
based system were spurious and ignored the concepts which he sought to introduce to
public law. From the time of the publication of Dicey's work the way in which
empirical work and sources were interpreted became extremely significant.
20
That many different sources of administrative law stretch far beyond court cases and
Parliamentary statutes is now broadly accepted. Furthermore, the way in which these
sources are presented is integral to the theoretical approach of public lawyers. Which
are the most important? Which should be highlighted? Which ignored? All of these
nominally structural questions actually represent theoretical positions. The difference
seems to be that this is now accepted and most public lawyers now understand that the
framework adopted for their own study will be strongly influenced by a theoretical
approach. To illustrate this we can examine the work of a number of different
academic lawyers who adopt a different approach. Space prohibits a fuller exposition
of their positions in the current academic debate but it is hoped the summaries below
do not pass into the realm of caricature.
A 'DIFFERENT DICEY': ALLAN
A new age will sometimes have to exploit the benefits of the old era. This epithet
could be used as a description of the development of the British Constitution. So too
in law. Although generally there is a consciousness in public law of Dicey's
limitations his work still held attractions for some. As an example we can examine
the writings ofT.R.S. Allan. He subscribes to a rights-based view of public law; that
is, reference must be had to a coherent structure of rights. To some extent he believes
the roots of these rights can be found within Dicey. In another public law academic's
words rights are central because "Their role is to articulate a number of principles
which should guide the exercise of administrative action and to interpret legislation in
the light of the principles"." Beyond Dicey, Allan is influenced by liberal thinkers,
21
notably Ronald Dworkin. He makes this link explicit in his book" "Law, Liberty and
Justice" which expands on a previous article of his: "Dicey and Dworkin: the Rule of
Law as Integrity"." But why use the work of Dicey for this exercise? Allan believes
that there has been a misconception of Dicey's work as lawyers have taken it too
"literally" and "confused the nature of public law"." This in part is due to the
confusion inherent in linking the sovereignty of Parliament with the Rule of Law. In
fact Allan's claim is that "it is impossible to reconcile his emphasis on the rule of law
with the unlimited sovereignty ofParliament","
Allan believes the Rule of Law should be the starting point for public lawyers. In a
sense it "serves as a form of constitution"." In an English context the rule of law can
be equated with the common law which itself embodies equality and fairness and
traditional concepts of individual rights. Thus judges are the central defenders of the
constitution, and, this 'different Dicey' is reinterpreted in the light of the benefits of
the system of the common law. Reference is also made to Hayek who is quoted as
seeing the state as a "superstructure erected over a pre-existing system of law"." This
is parallel to the rule of law as there are broadly accepted 'rules of just conduct'
equivalent to the common law which must not be broken by anyone, particularly not
Government. Allan accepts that Dicey and Hayek both prove inadequate to the task of
examining the modem state, the former because of rapid developments in the
twentieth century and the latter because his life was dedicated to limiting the state and
41 Allan (1993).
42 Allan (1988).
43 A 11 __ f1 (\{\"')'\ .:.. _10
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the use of its powers. This is when the work of Dworkin is introduced as an aid to
defining the nature and limits of public law. A particular aid to the judges" will be
his distinction between principle and policy. That is matters of principle should be
decided by the courts; policy by the political branches of the constitution. Wary that
this sounds ominously like the merits/legality distinction used often in judicial review
cases Allan argues that this will be much easier to apply where there is a clear set of
rights to which judges can refer. The best place to develop such rights and apply them
is within the courts. Thus, "the common law must be developed with imagination to
meet the needs ofmodem constitutionalism".48
So Allan attempts, as Harden points out in his review, to "rescue and defend a version
of Dicey that is freed from positivist assumption"." Indeed, Allan argues that his
'different Dicey' was struggling to escape from Austinian thought." Again the
difference in Allan's work is that all is stated explicitly. It is because the common law
- or rule of law - represents the best defence of a liberal" notion of rights that it should
be the basis of a public law system. There are no unspoken assumptions as to the
apparently innate and self-evident superiority of common law to all other systems. In
Craig's words, "Any attempt to discuss particular topics without considering these
background ideas evidences a series of implicit assumptions about such ideas which
are concealed and untested"." The difficulty with this model is that it becomes court-
centred and relies on an over-idealised view of the 'common law', although Allan is
47 Who are central to Allan's project.
48 Allan(1993) op. cit., p12.
49 Harderu l <)<)')) M n?<)R
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critical of the role the courts are playing at the present time by not realising their
sovereign position. His re-interpretation ofDicey as a rights based thinker depends on
an acceptance ofDicey's nineteenth century individualism.
Furthermore, the reliance on the common law depends on the belief that it was built
on consensus and accepted by all in the community. This is a matter of historical
dispute which is rejected by some who could argue that the common law was a
weapon used by the courts in order to destroy collective endeavour such as, in Dicey's
time, the building of the trade unions. Another criticism highlighted by Harden is that
if the common law can challenge statute because it represents the rules ofjust conduct
broadly accepted by society, why has this never been attempted? Allan attempts to re-
emphasise Dicey's importance by over-emphasising one area of his work- namely the
superior nature of common law. But this argument could be seen as historically
specific to the nineteenth century and not one which is broadly accepted now. By
emphasising the court-made common law Allan inevitably downplays other sources
and ignores the benefits of collective action. In other words, if the state can only ever
be judged in court or in a way analogous to the treatment of private individuals this
theory suggests it has no specifically collective role allocated to it as state. Thus the
attempt to find a rights-based constitution in Dicey's work and use this as a model for
modem public law (albeit added to by more modem liberal thinkers) is not wholly
convmcmg.
NO PRINCIPLES ARE GOOD PRINCIPLES: LOUGHLIN
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A counter-point to the re-invention of Dicey in contemporary liberal clothes is the
work of Martin Loughlin." He is extremely critical of almost all other legal
academics, none of whom he believes provide an adequate base for a new look at
public law. With his book "Public Law and Political Theory" he attempted to create a
new interpretative theory for public law. This would recognise public law as a form
of political discourse which, to borrow Gadamer's phrase," produces a "fusion of
horizons". He is influenced strongly by post modernist thinkers and schools of
thought like hermeneutics. He claims there is no consensus in British public law but
creates two ideal type theories which dominate: the normativist and functionalist. The
normativist school is further subdivided into conservative and liberal camps. His aim
in undertaking this study was not to provide an exhaustive textbook on modem
political theory but rather to highlight the difficulties in establishing a single rational
structure for public law, difficulties, incidentally, which he seems to feel every other
legal academic has failed to overcome.
The problem with Loughlin's work, rich though it is in historical and political
information, is revealed clearly in a recent essay (though perhaps only latently in his
book). In the later work he rejects any reference to normative principles as a guide to
the public law model; he claims there are "too many principles in the world"." Such a
conclusion is perhaps an inevitable consequence of allying yourself closely with post-
modem political thought. Post-modernism, by its very nature, is diffuse; yet one of its
lowest common denominators is that society is inherently fractious. Thus it is hard if
not impossible to lay down truths that are accepted by general society: all that exists
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are smaller sub-divisions in society. By accepting these strictures one implicitly
rejects the notion of collectivism in any form: it is a post-collectivist individualism.
This differs from Allan's work because Allan seeks to define a sense of normative
principles from within Dicey explicitly, and one of these principles may be a rejection
of collectivism. On the other hand Loughlin rejects reference to any set of principles
regardless of content. All Loughlin would regard as valid in the study of public law
is the interpretation of existing principles.
This post-modernist approach has been utilised in politics, arts and literature but in
British public law it has further implications. For the rejection ofnormative principles
by a public lawyer takes us back in a certain sense to Dicey - although not in the
manner of Allan. Although Dicey's creation of an autonomous 'law' apart from the
vagaries of politics and theory has been exposed as bogus and has been further
rejected by his contemporary supporters in favour of an explicit defence of principles,
Loughlin's rejection of principles to some degree corresponds to the 'positivist'
reading ofDicey's public law as a collation of common law - the other side ofthe coin
to Allan. Dicey can then be seen as espousing a pre-collectivist individualism as
opposed to Loughlin's post-collectivist model.
EXTERNAL INFLUENCES
26
The argument up to this point has been that in the new era of public law, new
frameworks are being built in order to construct an acceptable model of administrative
and constitutional law. This differs from the work ofprevious public law thinkers like
Dicey and his followers because they tried to compose the subject in exclusively legal
terms eschewing political theory even though the purpose of Dicey's work had a clear
political content. Both of the modem examples examined so far can be seen to
derive from the work of Dicey in contradictory ways. Allan explicitly states this and
reinterprets the work within a liberal framework. Loughlin on the other hand denies
any reference to normative principles and in so doing links the discipline of public law
back to the dubious positivism ofDicey.
Having said that, both of these examples draw heavily on outside thinkers in coming
to their own conclusions. This points the way to other possible frameworks for public
law which draw on external influences. This definition of 'external' would mean
from outside the traditional ambit of British public law. Significantly, Loughlin is
extremely critical of those who attempt to import principles from different traditions
in order to remedy the British deficiencies. His particular ire has been aimed at
Harden and Lewis and to a lesser extent Prosser. Loughlin gave an extremely critical
review of the former's book", "The Noble Lie,,57 which was replied to by the
authors." All three of these academics believe that administrative law is a vital
instrument in transforming the British state. Indeed, their whole framework of
administrative law depends on a large amount of institutional reform. Their early
work also shares an influence of the Frankfurt School of critical theory. Clearly these
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thinkers use elements of this school to provide their framework for public law. This,
however is not static. From similar bases these academics have moved in different
directions. Harden and Lewis in particular have moved to a position of citing the
benefits of the market and contract for use in a system of public law; this will be
explored below. More recently there also seems to be a division between Harden and
Lewis with the latter taking an even more enthusiastic position on the benefits of the
'market' for public law." Again this divergence shows the difficulty of constructing
a broadly accepted framework for public law even within similar traditions. However
it will be clearer if they are studied separately.
CRITICAL' PUBLIC LAW: PROSSER.
In Prosser's studies of privatisation and nationalisation there is much reference to
institutional design. The importance of this in the field of the state's intervention in
the economy will be dealt with when examining the justification for the ambit of this
work. The design of the British state has often been the concern of public lawyers,
even though in many cases it was with describing what existed rather than prescribing
what would be preferable. What makes this work more original is its explicit use of
the Frankfurt School's method. It shall be shown how Harden and Lewis use the test
of "immanent critique" in their work" whereas Prosser seeks to use the twin tests of
participation and accountability in his own model ofpublic law."
57 Harden/Lewis (1986).
58 Harden/I .ewis (19RR)
28
The relevance of this school of thought and the peculiar British experience of state
relations is worthy of note. The Frankfurt School stood in a tradition of Marxist
analysis but rejected determinism. For them the state itself was a source of power not
simply one determined by the economic structures of society. Other thinkers linked to
the school, like Habermas, also rejected revolutionary change "[he] saw the motive
force of social development in technology rather than class relations"." These
thinkers seek to create a more sophisticated analysis of the advanced capitalist state
through the employment of concepts like 'legitimation' and 'immanent critique'.
It can be seen how such an analysis can be used by left leaning academics to discredit
the individualist view of the state implicit in Dicey's work. As has been argued, this
model had strong political overtones and did not conform to the real situation in the
British state. But it can also be used to attack "crude" Marxists who refuse to
recognise the multifarious ways in which the new state operates and subscribe to an
"over-simplified monolithic view of the state"."
In Britain the absence of any developed theory of the state" has allowed the form of
the British constitution not to distinguish state from society. This means that the state
has no clear identity, its limits are undefined and its legal position ambiguous. The
interpenetration with the European Union may be beginning to alter this but the
vagueness still exists. The dominant legal tradition, as seen above, has aided this state
of affairs; for example, Dicey's refusal to recognise the state other than as a legal
person - the same as any other individual. Throughout his work he uses examples of
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individuals when exammmg the state: "With us every official, from the Prime
Minister down to a constable or a collector of taxes is under the same responsibility
for every act done without legal justification as any other citizen"." But this form
contradicts the reality which is even admitted by scholars like Allan who seek to re-
interpret Dicey's work. In this context the critical method could be useful in exposing
the reality of autonomous state power in Britain. Prosser argues that if the study of
public law is to be "intellectually coherent" it needs to "take the form of a
fundamental reassessment of the theoretical basis for its study"." This can be aided by
a critical analysis which subjects the form of the British state to tests from a coherent
framework. Hence the tests of "participation" and "accountability".
However criticism of this method has come from another legal academic who claims
it is a misapplication of Habermas' work.67 Murphy states that Habermas' work
depends upon a distinction between the system and the lifeworld, both of which have
their own logic and communication. He believes that British public lawyers are
putting forward lifeworld solutions to problems ofthe system. For example, Prosser's
emphasis on participation and accountability as mentioned above. Murphy takes these
as being derived from the "communicative rationality" of Habermas which is the
logic of the lifeworld whereas the system only understands power and money. This
misapplication creates some anomalies such as "the bizarre proposal that the English
Courts can or should become the site of some rejuvenated public sphere"." Indeed, by
63 Prosser op. cit., p13.
64 As argued in Dyson op. cit.
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proposing inappropriate reforms one is not simply making a categorical mistake but
"such neglect of system imperatives will almost certainly lead to a diminution in the
efficiency and the effectiveness of systems"." This aside, the use of the critical
method is beneficial when examining British public law. It takes this external method
and applies it to the contradictory system which exists within the British state. Thus a
new framework can begin to be constructed by critically examining that which exists
already. Prosser has been arguing this since the early eighties, a relatively long time
to hold to one approach in the new public law as the next example illustrates.
'REINVENTING' PUBLIC LAW: HARDEN AND LEWIS
From a similar tradition come Ian Harden and Norman Lewis who wrote in the
introduction to their work "The Noble Lie" 70 that their concept of 'immanent critique'
owes a great deal to the critical thinkers Adorno and Horkheimer.71 In this work they
use Dicey's concept of the 'rule of law', yet in a different way to Allan. Rather than
praising the common law tradition of England they argue that the concept is
unrea1isab1e under the current constitutional arrangements in Britain. The "rule of
law's" strength lies in its appeal to the British people who have expectations of
openness, democracy and public accountability. In Britain this has lead to a
"remarkably stable social order"." This expectation clearly contradicts the reality and
will ultimately reflect itself in disaffection with the current system. Thus "immanent
critique" becomes relevant as it is used as a tool to contrast the actual situation with
people's expectations.
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Drawing from this they draw up a list of institutional reforms which draw heavily on
the American Constitutional model. That is, a Freedom of Information Act and an
Administrative Procedure Act with openness and statutory consultation procedures
before drawing up regulations. This model was criticised by Loughlin in his review.
However the writers claim: "the proposals here canvassed are for the most part not
alien to the British traditions, but simply contemporary accompaniments to them"."
Loughlin rejects this approach because they draw on principles alien to British
tradition. Following his argument their proposals for institutional reform will not be
able to establish themselves within the British state. However it could be argued that
this framework represents a combination of external factors with the traditional
approach. They combine their use of critical method with a use of a concept of the
rule of law. For them, the "rule of law, when closely scrutinised, requires that we
oppose arbitrary and untrammelled behaviour whatever its provenance and whatever
conceptual shape it assumes"." They argue that this is different from Dicey's
approach because his fundamental flaw was to ignore the way in which the modem
state was developing. This had an effect in terms of his definition of the rule of law:
"not only was his analysis defective and short sighted but it was accompanied by the
stated belief that individuals would be well protected by the English Constitution"."
So, their use of the traditional concept is different from Dicey but it is still traditional
72 i/,iA ,-,11
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in the literal sense, for them "constitutional constancy is represented by the 'rule of
law"?" ; it has a transcendental quality over the actual constitutional institutions.
The effectiveness of this method is questionable. It relies on the idea that there is a
concept of the 'rule oflaw' shared throughout society. Although it is not as parochial
as Dicey's view even their definition of the concept as a limiting of arbitrary state
power is not one which could gain a societal consensus. Their historical argument
explores how the courts built up an "autonomy of the legal order" which could "playa
role in legitimating capitalist society"." This could also be seen to derive from the
historian E.P.Thompson's argument over the rule of law which he saw as "the
imposing of effective inhibitions upon power and the defence of the citizen from
power's all intrusive claim" and as an "unqualified human good"." This definition
became a point of much dispute amongst the Left in the seventies." Harden and
Lewis use Thompson as an authority. But in the polarised society of nineteen nineties
Britain can such a concept of the 'rule of law" be regarded as universally shared?
Surely different people have different definitions of what the 'rule of law' is? During
the miner's strike of 1984-85 the use of the police to attack picket-lines was seen by
some as a breach of the 'rule of law' - an arbitrary use of state power - to others they
were upholding the state against an organisation determined to flout the 'rule of law' .
To sections of society benefit fraud is an open flouting of the 'rule of law' in society
to others it is vital for survival. Amongst young people the use of illegal drugs is very
76 ibid nR
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widespread and perhaps even the norm. Many examples could be given they merely
show the divisions in society which cannot be breached by such a vague concept.
Perhaps historically it was possible to identify shared transcendental values. It is
questionable to what extent there has been a "stable social order't" in British History.
There have been times when the British people have been involved in great struggles
and acts of militancy, not least at the time of Dicey in industrial struggles which
created trade unions and over the right to vote involving the Chartists and the
Suffragettes which is mentioned above. Indeed it could be argued that part of the
driving force behind Dicey's work was an attempt to stifle strong social movements.
But now the disaffection with the state and its workings which Harden and Lewis
presciently described is a reality and it also includes the courts and the 'law'. For
these reasons it is not clear whether the 'rule of law' is the best form in the nineties
from which to construct a framework of public law. Indeed even in Harden and
Lewis' own more recent writing they use the concept less readily.
In the nineteen-nineties as shall be explored when looking at the development of the
privatisation process in all academic circles examining the state there has been a turn
to the question of the quality of public services. Harden and Lewis in a sense try and
adapt this thinking for public law in Britain. Harden labels this era "the decade of
public services?" and Lewis published a lecture which shares much, including a title,
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with an influential American text "Reinventing Government"." Again this should be
put in the context of developing a framework from which to study public law.
Post-Thatcher, they take the idea of the state as having a minimal role in ownership as
a constant. That accepted it is argued that the state must develop in new ways to make
its role relevant. In many instances this means introducing the market - which can
best match the citizens demand for quality with a "stable budget".83 Allied with this is
the notion of contract. Nominally this is a legal document but again, like the 'rule of
law', it has a transcendental quality: a "moral promise?" which is accepted by the
community. Clearly the introduction of these concepts to public law is in response to
the rapidly changing way in which the state has developed in the last twenty years,
changes which (albeit in a guarded way) to a greater or lesser extent are welcomed by
the writers. In Harden's study of Compulsory Competitive Tendering, the NHS
reforms and the Next Steps Agencies the introduction of the concept of contract is
presented as a positive step; in particular the purchaser/provider split inherent in many
of these contracts, "enhances both individual rights and the accountability of
government".85
Yet this is not enough; there is a need to develop a clear concept of a public law
contract which combines "the values which underlie the symbolic appeal of
contract?" with a commitment to quality public services. He argues that the NHS
82 Gaeb1er/Osbome(1992). Lewis's lecture provided one of the basis for his longer work op. cit.
(1996).
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contract could perhaps become a model for this." He claims that this does not imply
an acceptance of the policies of the ThatcherlMajor Governments. "It is a mistake to
identify the framework with the particular purposes that happen to be pursued through
it.?" thus, in effect, use must be made of the beneficial aspects of Thatcherism. The
word 'contract' should not "become the exclusive property of opponents of public
services"." So it could be argued that contract now becomes an external influence
which forms part of this framework ofpublic law.
Lewis in his 1993 lecture" and his 1996 book welcomes Harden's work but probably
goes further in embracing the new state as a progressive step to developing a
framework of public law. "Privatisation, contracting out, the Citizen's Charter, the
purchaser-provider split are all important ingredients of reinvented government"."
Again this is not an endorsement of the Conservative administration as, "some of the
emerging pattern of new government is above party and resides in the grain of the
constitution itself"." However the institutional reform which Lewis argues for here as
he did in the 1986 work takes the concept of free-markets and puts them centre stage.
The claims he makes for these are very high, "The justification for markets is choice
and freedom; it is a human rights justification't." This rhetoric is familiar to students
of privatisation as a justification for that process in the eighties when it was just
beginning."
87 ibid., p74.
88 ibid., p71.
89 ibid., p78.
90 See above.
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For public lawyers this is a relatively new approach for a novel framework is now
being stated explicitly. Thus for these writers the public's expectation of the 'rule of
law' has begun to be realised by the marketisation of the modern state although it
needs to be combined with further institutional reform. However in recent writing
Harden has been a little more critical of the formations of the modern state and
possibly of Lewis's work, "To win ... public confidence in government as a positive
instrument for serving the interest of the community requires more than fashionable
slogans about 'reinventing' government"." He has recently argued that more
government is not necessarily wrong but it needs to be regulated better. In his 1996
work Lewis also seems to have a similar side-swipe at Harden's work, "The currently
fashionable preference for 'the contract state'" (my italics)." This phrase occurs in
the passage of his work which defends Osborne/Gaebler's work as part of a literature
which in the late twentieth century seeks to determine what (minimal) role the state
should play. These mutual criticisms illustrate the difficulty of gaining a consensus
over public law even amongst writers which work in the same tradition.
If, then, these academics are given as examples of the diverging trends present in
modern public law there is a difficulty in reconciling them. All are influenced to
some extent by Dicey albeit some only in a minimal way and all are trying to
construct a new framework. Drawing on these works it will be argued that a work of
administrative law does indeed need to make reference to external principles. This is
almost inevitable given the peculiar British constitutional tradition. However it will
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be argued that the use of the terms 'markets' and 'contracts' will not provide a useful
basis for this framework. In other words the "marketisation" of the modern British
state should not be accepted by academic public lawyers as providing answers to the
questions of accountability which have troubled administrative lawyers for most of
this century.
So, to summarise, one link between public law and the study of privatisation and
deregulation is the common concept of accountability. Within the disciplines of
constitutional and administrative law the question of how to hold the state to account
has been fundamental. However as illustrated above the model of Dicey, which relied
on the traditional 'common law' approach, has been heavily criticised, particularly in
the last thirty years. Moving away from Dicey has not meant that there is less
emphasis on accountability. On the contrary it is argued by the "new" public lawyers
that within the modern state that accountability cannot be delivered without moving
away from Dicey's "pure" model. It is also clear that a group of public law academics
believe that accountability can be delivered using the devices which have arisen due to
the processes of privatisation and deregulation. That is illustrated above by the work
of Ian Harden and especially Norman Lewis. It is one of the arguments of this work
that it is wrong for public law to associate the trend towards privatisation in the
modern state with the delivering of more accountability. In the field of public
transport - which this work examines - it is further argued that accountability can only
be delivered by a form ofpublic ownership.
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ACCOUNTABILITY - THE CENTRAL CONCEPT.
In the study of the British state there are many phrases which are deliberately
ambiguous. For example labelling any arm of central Government the 'Crown' has
proved particularly troublesome in the development of a system of administrative law.
It would seem that the concept of accountability may also fall into this category.
Indeed, it could be argued that accountability is only really defined by its absence.
So, in the nationalised industries, it was broadly accepted they were unaccountable
both to the public and to Parliament because of the particular structure of the public
corporation, although as shall be shown this structure was adopted because it was
thought to combine "the best of both worlds" between the public and private sector."
Moreover the establishment of independent boards was bound to create tensions with
the archaic Parliamentary structures of Westminster. Generally, then, the public had
no sense of owning these industries and saw them as unaccountable." As explained in
Chapter 3 this alienation was exploited in the early days of Thatcherism and
privatisation. Thus accountability was defined by its absence.
This negative approach has difficulties for public lawyers, for there is no positive
structure against which to measure a model of public law. In a sense this is part of a
more general problem for public lawyers:" the absence of an authoritative framework
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for their study. But it also means that any definition of accountability may not be
authoritative but simply the approach of a particular academic. As explained above
Dicey began this trend but thought his own approach to be universal. This was
broadly accepted in the realm of public law'?" until the nineteen-sixties. Moving away
from Dicey led to a number of competing frameworks. Part of this debate revolved
around the concept of accountability. Thus there is the creation of new constitutional
structures proposed by Harden and Lewis, the 'return' to the common law of Allan or
the post-modernist approach of Loughlin. No one academic, then, can produce a clear
picture of what accountability would be. The concept can vary from person to person
but it also depends on the context.
A relatively new development in public law theory although perhaps not in other
social science disciplines has been the support for the "reinvented"!" state. It is
mentioned above that the changes made to the British state under the influence of
Thatcherism have been seen by Harden and Lewis especially as a means of delivering
their concept of accountability. It is the argument of this work that this faith in the
market is misplaced and that in the context of transport services which have been
privatised and deregulated where once they were publicly owned a model of
accountability can only truly be delivered with public ownership. For such an
argument to be justified it will be necessary to clarify exactly what is meant by
accountability.
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In attempting any definition one must be aware of the multifarious ways in which the
word accountability can be used. This work is an attempt to explore the interface
between the state and its intervention in the economy through nationalisation and
privatisation. As a result it means examining the work of both public lawyers and to
some extent economists and within this broad field there will be several differing and
perhaps contradictory concepts of accountability. This leaves aside the disputes
within public law itself. Further, as shall be argued below, both nationalisation and
privatisation were seen as means of increasing accountability even though they were
diametrically opposed in other respects . This is again due to the different definitions
of this concept.
->:
A useful academic comparison is with the nineteen-eighties work of Day and Klein
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who undertook a study of various British public services and measured them against
their standards of accountability. Although they were more concerned with political
science and social policy their definitions are intriguing. They point out that
"accountability ... presupposes agreement both about what constitutes an acceptable
performance and about the language of justification to be used" .':" This is significant
for this work because it identifies the problem of a public law that relies so heavily on
the concept of accountability but as explained above has no consensus behind it.
Furthermore in a broader sense proponents of privatisation and nationalisation will
clearly not share a consensus on what amounts to accountability. Thus subjective
factors become critical as each analyst will have their own definition. This tension is
outlined below with the different definitions summarised.
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As an aside it is worthwhile to note that Klein and Day see a tension in public services
between the political accountability of the British state and the managerial
accountability of delivering a public service.!" In a sense this summarises the
essential tensions which will be examined in this work. That is both privatisation and
nationalisation emphasised their "new-ness" removing the traditional structures of
political accountability and replacing it with either the "market" or the public
corporation. However as discussed above both failed in this approach and neither
provided a substitute concept of accountability that is generally satisfactory.
At this stage of the Introduction it may be appropriate to consider the VarIOUS
definitions of accountability that will be used in this work. This will then conclude
with a statement as to which model the writer feels is most appropriate.
Traditional Constitutional Accountability
It is unsurprising that the traditional constitutional view of accountability is centred
around Parliament given the unitary nature of the British State. As the House of
Commons was elected it alone could hold the executive to account which it did
through its elaborate procedures of debates, questioning and committees. If the House
did not do its job correctly the members could be removed by election. Harden and
Lewis labelled this "ex post accountabilityr.l'" However this view of Parliamentary
accountability has been largely discredited in the twentieth century. The dominance
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of political parties, the system of government whips and the electoral system have
meant that the Government necessarily dominates Parliament. In the context of this
work this was clear even at the time of the Morrisonian nationalisations and one of the
purposes of the particular structure of the public corporation was to remove the need
for Parliamentary accountability. As shall be shown any attempt for Parliament to
intervene was resisted but there was compromise eventually with the creation of a
Select Committee on Nationalised Industries in 1956. So in this work the traditional
model of Parliament delivering accountability is not as important for, in the era of
/
nationalisationthere was a desire to move away from traditional structures whereas
i
privatisation was intended to limit political arrangements for accountability.
Another traditional tenet of accountability in the British state is through Government
ministers. In a sense this is part of Parliamentary accountability as ministers will be
responsible to Parliament. This model of accountability was also important for
nationalisation as Government ministers had a close relationship with the relevant
nationalised industries. Again this model of accountability was inappropriate given
the structure of the public corporation which in formal terms relied on independence.
Moreover, Ministers were prevented from answering questions on the daily operation
of the industries which prevented the industries being called to account.105 In the
process of nationalisation the model whereby the industry became part of a
Government department and hence solely answerable to the minister was rejected
except in the case of the Post Office until the late 1960s.
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Another traditional concept of constitutional accountability which was utilised to
some degree was the use of audit. Again this was only used to a limited extent for the
new nationalised industries as it was also seen as inappropriate to the new form of the
public corporation which relied on financial independence. Thus the traditional
models for holding a public body to account were not utilised in the process of
nationalisation. However as shall be shown in Chapter 2 they were not completely
removed so there was a lack of clarity about exactly where accountability did lie. As
an aside it was the main argument of Harden & Lewis's work "The Noble Lie" that
the above models of accountability were inappropriate for all areas of the state - not
solely the nationalised industries - and they argued for a greater degree of openness
and "sunshine" regulation instead. Few now demand public accountability from the
traditional structures of Parliament.
The Accountability of the Public Corporation
If the traditional approach of accountability was rejected in Morrisonian
nationalisation what then was the appropriate model? The form of the public
corporation will be examined in detail in Chapter 2 but its new structure was meant to
be accountable to the public as a whole. Although the board of a nationalised industry
was meant to be independent it was to have a close relationship with Government
ministers over policy matters. However the Board needed to be aware that it was
running the industry for the whole "nation". In a sense it was an attempt to mimic the
growth of the joint stock company whose boards were accountable to their
shareholders although in this context the nationalised industries' shareholders were
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the whole population. Alongside this rather vague definition of public accountability
there was to be created a complaints machinery which would provide a direct link:
from the general public to the nationalised undertaking, although the strength of these
bodies was questionable.
It will be argued that the public corporation as providing a new form of accountability
as an alternative to the traditional approach failed. Its ostensible independence and
duty to society only allowed for a vague concept of accountability. When this is
mixed with an amalgam of traditional constitutional structures which were introduced
as a compromise" the result was obfuscation. Furthermore, the lack of any statutory
duty to reveal information tended to make the industries secretive. Perhaps more than
anything this lack of an information flow gave the impression that these industries
were not being properly held to account.
The Public's Perception of Accountability
This experience of public ownership would seem blatantly to contradict the argument
of this work that accountability can only be delivered through a form of public
ownership. It would seem to be inevitable that state ownership would result in an
unaccountable structure. Indeed that was one of the main arguments of Thatcherism.
This work will argue that the failure of Morrisonian nationalisation to deliver
accountable structures was due to the vague way in which the board of the public
corporation was meant to be held to account. In fact one could argue that the
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politicians at that time thought that simply taking these industries into the public
sector was sufficient, as argued above.
What these models ignored was the public's perception of a structure as accountable.
This is linked in some way to the support which the public gave to the nationalised
undertakings however it goes a little deeper. For the concept of an industry being
"independent" from the public results in a distance between the public and the
delivery of the services. This is reflected to some extent in the Annual Survey of
Social attitudes examined in Chapter 3.107 It will be argued in this work that this
aspect of accountability is fundamental to the delivery of public transport services.
One of the factors which Thatcherism could exploit in its pursuit of privatisation in
the eighties was the lack of affinity ordinary people felt with those industries. This
contradicted the feelings of the public in the forties when nationalisation was very
popular largely due to the widespread failure of the private sector in the utilities. This
turnaround was due in part to the institutional structures of the nationalised industries
which it was felt were not accountable to the public. This was compounded by the
weak machinery for dealing with complaints which as shall be shown were seen as
having a lack of independence from the industry itself and also shrouded in secrecy.
Thus in dealing with nationalisation alone we can see a considerable range of
definitions of accountability. It has been shown that in the British Constitution
accountability traditionally revolves around Parliament. Moreover the public
corporation itself had its own concept of accountability resting primarily with its
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board. An additional dimension to the question is also added when one looks at the
public's perception of the nationalised industries and whether they were held to
account.
Shareholder Accountability.
The privatisation process of the eighties and nineties allowed yet more definitions of
accountability. In general these veered more towards the economic model of
accountability that is that accountability would be determined by consumers making
their choices in a free market. But as shall be shown the creation of regulators for the
utilities allowed the output of more information which corresponded more with the
definition of accountability proffered by some public law academics.
In the early era of Thatcherism when privatisation of the utilities began accountability
was defined by the absence of state involvement. Thus the market was seen as the
midwife of accountability. This was the era of "popular capitalism". In the mid-
eighties the idea of widespread share ownership gained currency. Moreover it was
argued, as shall be shown, that this would induce a new accountability in relation to
the industries. They would be answerable to a specific group of shareholders who
would expect the company to be held to account in public. It was even said at the
time that the existence of this "shareholding" democracy would induce a greater sense
of ownership amongst the share holding public than was possible under the monolithic
Morrisonian structures of the public corporation.l" It will be argued that this measure
of accountability is necessarily directed towards a minority - that is those who own
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shares. Moreover as the privatised utilities developed it became clear that the
dividends were largely the shareholders' first interest rather than an open accountable
structure. In fact examples will be given that show if a group of shareholders were
interested in holding the industry to account they saw their aspirations thwarted by
larger institutional shareholders. It will be argued that this model of accountability
although popular in the eighties became discredited as further privatisations
developed.
Regulatory Accountability.
Another more promising model for accountability under the privatisation process was
the creation of powerful new regulators to oversee the running of the utilities. This
will be looked at in detail as it also occurred in the rail industry. These external
agencies could be seen as a new innovative measure to hold the industries to account.
In a sense this model of accountability coincides with the argument of public lawyers
like Harden, Lewis and Prosser in support of the creation of new structures to
scrutinise the British state.'?" Indeed these writers have been broadly supportive of the
new regulators. However there have been a number of difficulties with these
regulators delivering accountable structures.
Firstly, the regulatory structures were created in a piecemeal manner. This was done
as each industry was transferred into the private sector. There was no clear regulatory
rationale expounded, indeed this was also true for privatisation itself. Thus, as will be
48
argued, there was no clear philosophy underpinning the new regulatory structures that
these would provide accountability. Indeed, one could argue that the reverse was true
and that these structures were seen as a stop-gap measure until there was competition
in the field thus no long term thought went into their design.'!" This could be
confirmed by looking at the different ways in which the regulators operated. Chapter
3 will show the variety of tasks performed by the regulators of different industries
ranging from attempting to introduce competition, to monitoring the privatised
industry to providing a voice for the consumer. It will also be shown that at different
times the Conservative Government relied on different rationales. It could be argued
that a full official analysis of the role of the regulators did not occur until the New
Labour Government ordered a review in the summer of 1997.
However if the confusion in creating the structures is left aside the regulators did
allow for one aspect of an accountable structure to develop - the flow of information.
Through using their powers under statute and other external pressures it is
unquestionable that the regulators have managed to get more information from the
privatised industries than was possible under the earlier form of public ownership.
Again this change, it will be argued, is due in large part to the end of the secrecy
inherent in the public corporation form with its own vague definition of accountability
and the partial involvement of traditional constitutional arrangements. So one part of
accountability has improved in the sense of the flow of information. It will be argued
below that this is not sufficient in itself however to provide a fully accountable
structure. In another context Harden and Lewis argued that Parliamentary
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accountability only provided an ex post accountability, III that is it was reactive. The
object of accountability was to "ensure openness at all stages of the policy process and
to provide explanation for action taken and conduct reserved"?", thus an ex ante
accountability was needed. The same point could be made in relation to regulation - it
essentially responds to the industry rather than the regulator having an early input into
the framework in which it will operate.
In the context of privatisation, then, there were further definitions of accountability. It
was with the creation of new regulatory structures that a link was made with some
public lawyers' model of accountability in the sense of open external agencies.
However it is the argument that these concepts of accountability are incomplete.
What then is the paradigm of accountability for this work?
Which AccQuntability?
It has been argued that no single model of accountability examined above can be
removed from its particular context. To understand the definition of accountability
one also has to understand the views of the individuals who claim their models deliver
accountability or the political context in which it is raised. As stated above, in the
context of both nationalisation and privatisation one aspect of accountability which
was neglected was how the public perceived the new structures. Thus was the general
public aware of the structures designed to hold the industries to account and if so did
it participate in them? This aspect of accountability was particularly important for
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public ownership as it was meant to be an improvement from the previous
arrangement in the private sector. The Morrisonian model failed under this particular
model of accountability. The resulting alienation that ordinary people had from the
nationalised industries was exploited by Thatcherism as a reason for privatisation, as
will be demonstrated below.
However for all the lip-service paid to the new era of "popular capitalism" the
privatisation process also neglected this aspect of accountability. Although the
regulators provided a new forum for the production of information they were not
initially highly participatory in style. Their original rationale was not to provide a
new forum for public accountability as shall be shown in Chapter 3 when examining
the Littlechild reports. Thus it will be argued that, whereas the privatisation process
did increase one aspect of accountability it did not provide a complete solution.
Fundamentally privatisation meant the introduction of the profit motive to the
provision of utilities. Thus regardless of the regulatory framework the main priority
of the industries became the growth of dividends and creation of shareholder value
and this was particularly true where the effect of actual competition was limited.
So for this work a truly accountable structure should involve the public. This should
be coupled with an increased flow of information which was one of the advantages of
the privatisation process. This accountability should not be reactive. That is to say
any structures which promote accountability must also involve themselves closely
with the industry in question rather than simply respond to their initiatives and should
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permit a degree of formal planning not available to regulators. It will be argued that
this particular model of accountability - for public transport - would require public
ownership.
In the field of transport, it will be argued, accountability is directly linked to the
public's perception of service provision. Both bus and rail services depend heavily on
public use. This is true even though the rail network is heavily subsidised. It is
shown in Chapter 7 that each of the privatised franchises have made optimistic claims
for the cutting of subsidy based on a growth of passenger numbers. However it will
be shown that during both the deregulation of the bus network and the privatisation of
the rail industry that there was no increase in use of public transport. Particularly in
the bus market people were bewildered as to the infrequency and ever changing nature
of bus services. People's perceptions were of a service in which they were merely
passive spectators.
However such processes coexisted alongside a form of direct control in the shape of
the Passenger Transport Authorities. These will be examined later in this work. In
summary these are made up of elected councillors who are appointed to oversee the
running of local transport services. Although during the eighties and nineties their
powers became more limited as they had to divest themselves of running their own
bus services and the awarding of local rail franchises to the private sector they still
remain important actors. For example, in Scotland the awarding of the Scotrail
franchise was severely delayed largely due to the role of the Strathclyde Passenger
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in their area. This use of elected members provides a direct link between the public
and the delivery of services. Although it could also be argued that the public is not
fully aware of what the Transport Authority does the direct electoral link plus greater
publicity could counter this. This solves part of the problem of the public perception
of accountable structures and permits forward planning.
It may be argued that such a model, if it delivered accountability, would not require
any extension of public ownership, but would simply amount to a series of elected
regulators of the transport network. However it is the argument of this work that
transport services need to be returned to public ownership for reasons outlined in the
following section. Another reason for this specific to public transport is that the
process of privatisation and deregulation in the transport network has not led to a
competitive market but rather a series of dominant operators who now run both rail
and bus services. Thus the only ostensible change has been the introduction of the
profit motive which essentially drives the entire private sector. This changes priority
from providing a public service. It is the argument of this work that the model of
accountability preferred in this thesis cannot be delivered by the privatised and
deregulated structure. Harlow and Rawlings have challenged, "the efficacy and
appropriateness of market discipline as a form of accountability, particularly where ".
the extent of choice which citizens exercise is Iimited'"!" This work would also seek
to carry this out. This argument is changed slightly for the rail network where profits
are delivered by way of subsidy. However, the targets of cutting subsidy and the
53
dominance of large operators in gaining the franchises confirm the dominance of the
'market' model of accountability here as well.
It may be argued that the experience of the Morrisonian nationalisation shows that the
profit motive cannot be removed simply by the intervention of the state. But it will be
argued that the problem was the particular institutional structure adopted. In a sense
although the public corporation was seen as a new structure difficulties arose because
the 'ancient' structures of constitutional accountability or lack of it still intervened.
This was added to problems inherent in the public corporation form itself, particularly
the vagueness over how it would deliver accountability.!"
WHY LINK ACCOUNTABILITY WITH OWNERSHIP?
The assertion that an accountable structure can only be delivered by expanding public
ownership above cannot and should not go unchallenged. Although in the past there
may have been shared belief that public ownership was necessary in modem society
even amongst academics that has now vanished. Public law is not alone in academic
disciplines in emphasising the success of the market and the failure of public
ownership. In political terms this is the accepted wisdom with all the established
parties supporting to some extent reliance on the market to deliver public services. In
public law the acceptance of this notion inevitably skews notions of accountability
towards contract and market testing.
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This work will also show that neither the process of controlled privatisation nor
outright deregulation within the delivery of public transport services has delivered
accountability. The precise definition of accountability and the competing models of
this concept are dealt with above. But, having considered these definitions, how is the
leap to be made from establishing a lack of accountability to the necessity for public
ownership? Such a conclusion is reached due to the experience of both Morrisonian
nationalisation and Thatcherite privatisation. Neither process created
accountability.!" however both utilised elements which would be of great use in a
truly accountable structure. It would be useful to summarise each experience here as
it fits in to the overall argument.
Failure of the Public Corporation.
It will be argued in the next chapter that one of the driving forces behind
nationalisation in the forties was the desire to have accountable public services.
Popular experience during the Second World War and the thirties led the Labour Party
to adopt a programme of broad nationalisation. However it will be further proposed
that the structure adopted by the Labour Government was one which could not deliver
the form of accountability which was popularly expected. This is explored above
where the public's perception of accountability is examined but it is clear that the
form of the public corporation did not allow for a clear concept of accountability to be
developed. This in tum led to the intervention of more traditional methods of
delivering accountability, namely Parliamentary structures and ministerial
responsibility. Thus responsibility for accountability was dispersed between various
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institutions but not delivered by any of them. Again this led to further disillusionment
with public ownership which was later exploited in the early days ofThatcherism.
In summary these are the processes that will be explored in the next chapter. It is such
experiences with public ownership that give weight to the argument that
accountability and public ownership do not mix. It will be argued that such a
conclusion is misleading. Although the institutional form of nationalisation did not
allow for a structure of public accountability it did remove one of the obstacles which
also prevented the private sector from creating an accountable structure. That is it
replaced the maximisation of shareholder value and replaced it with the goals of
delivering decent public services. Robson, a public lawyer strongly in favour of the
public corporation, argued in the context of the coal industry that "The elimination of
private ownership was a surgical operation which had become necessary to save the
life of the patient".116 Further the railways needed to "modernise and re-equip
themselves more adequately than they were able to do under the conditions of private
enterprise"."? In summary he stated that there was a general belief that the
nationalised industries needed to be taken over "because it is too dangerous to leave
them to be exploited by private enterprise for profif.!" It is worth noting these
arguments from the forties particularly as they come from a public lawyer interested
in the concept of accountability.
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Fifty years on the current debate would argue strongly against the assumptions put
forward by Robson and others at the time.!" It is the very private sector which was
rejected after the Second World War that can deliver the elusive accountability in the
delivery of public services it is claimed. As will be argued below the experience of
rail privatisation and in particular the deregulation of the bus industry contradict this
assertion. This provides an illustration of what happens when the profit incentive is
reintroduced to the delivery of public services. Ultimately there is a consolidation of
operators who use their strength in the market to dominate and then branch out into
other areas. During the process of bus deregulation six companies gained listings on
the stock exchange. Thus the priorities of a company change from delivering services
to earning profits and the arguments of Robson from the forties become relevant
again.
So nationalisation allowed for partial accountability in the sense that the industry was
focussed on delivering the public service. However the flaw in this model was that it
was not matched with innovative new structures to open the industries out to the
public. This ultimately was to playa part in their downfall.
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Failure of Privatisation.
It is argued by some public lawyers that privatisation has created a more open and to
that extent accountable structure. Measured by one aspect of nationalisation that is
true. As is explored in Chapter Three the creation of regulators and intervention by
Government allowed an open flow of information, which did not exist under
Morrisonian nationalisation. Does increased information flow equal an accountable
structure? Bearing in mind the complex ways in which accountability can be
interpretedl" that will surely depend on your definition. But it is the argument of this
work that a definition which is based solely on this is only partially complete.
As will be explained in Chapter Three the regulators of the utilities when created had
no real rationale. This was also clear in the first years of their operation. In their
struggle to find a role they did create a climate which allowed them access to
information which was previously extremely difficult to get from the nationalised
sector. However this model of regulation will always be reacting to information given
to it rather than being involved in the industry itself. Using Harlow and Rawlings'
metaphor it is a fire-fighting device rather than a fire-watching one.!" Thus any
element of accountability will be following an event rather than prior to the event
occurring. A good example of this happened during the process of rail privatisation
and is mentioned in Chapter Seven. South West Trains could not operate its services
due to a lack of staff for several weeks in open breach of their franchise. The Rail
Regulator could do nothing but fine the train operating company several months after
the event. As the railway still operates as a subsidised network all the fine amounted
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to was a partial withholding of subsidy. An accountable railway system would not
have let the event occur in the first place.
Another element of public accountability was lost in the move towards privatisation:
the re-introduction of profit as a driving factor in the industries. At the height of the
privatisation of the utilities as explored in Chapter 3 it was argued that this was a step
forward and in different ways would provide an accountable structure.l" However
this feeling changed over the course of several years with feeling turning against the
"fat-cats" and the large profits which they garnered for providing public services.
Thus the feeling grew that industries were not being run simply to provide basic
services but rather to increase shareholder value. This is further exacerbated by the
model of British utility regulation which does not control profits but prices. So the
element of accountability which existed under nationalisation disappeared because of
privatisation and the justification for it.
To summarise, the process of privatisation - because of the creation of new regulatory
agencies - allowed for more openness and access to information. This has
strengthened the argument that de-nationalisation created a more accountable
structure. However alongside this the element of services being run simply for the
public rather than profit which was very much to the fore at the time ofnationalisation
in the forties disappeared due to privatisation. Thus an important aspect of public
accountability was lost. Moreover even the existing regulatory structures are a
reactive form ofregulation rather than being proactive.
59
Is there a solution?
The limits to the type of accountability of the Morrisonian model of nationalisation
and privatisation may be accepted. But why does it follow that full accountability can
be delivered through public ownership? The answer lies in studying the experience of
both processes and looking at the example of the privatisation and deregulation of
public transport.
Nationalisation was a step forward for accountability because it removed the drive for
private profits from the provision of public services. However the form of the public
corporation did not allow for a full model of accountability. This was due to the
vagueness of the architects of nationalisation and the intervention of the traditional
institutions of constitutional accountability: that is Parliament and Ministers.
Privatisation removed these problems of accountability by removing most
Parliamentary or Ministerial control. Moreover, through the creation of the regulators
it provided a forum for the increased flow of information. However by its very nature
it demanded that profit again became the driving force removing one important aspect
ofpublic accountability.
From this it could be argued that the ideal model of an accountable structure is one
which combines the openness of privatisation with the public accountability aspect of
nationalisation which guaranteed that providing a public service was the sole aim of
the industry. The latter half of this formulation would seem to demand that the
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service in question was removed from the private sector given that its raison d' etre is
to produce profits. This is where the element of public ownership comes in. But how
would public ownership in this context avoid the problems of Morrisonian
nationalisation?
It is clear that any model of public ownership would have to equal the openness of the
privatised utilities. The experience of nationalisation showed this was not possible
through Parliamentary structures. However in the field of transport there is a different
model which will be examined below: the Passenger Transport Authority. This is a
useful model for public ownership as it is made up of elected representatives,
councillors, not appointed members of a board. Further it is in direct control of funds
given to the train and bus operators. As well as providing an overview of the whole
transport service it runs its own operation. In this sense it combined a regulatory
structure with the delivery of services.
This would seem to combine openness and the advantage of running its own transport
service that is focused on delivering a public need rather than pursuing private profits.
Thus the advantages of both models examined above could be utilised. However the
advantages of a publicly owned transport service are limited if there is no clear
institutional requirement of accountability.
So throughout this work there will be a discussion of vanous models of
accountability. In fact one of the most important arguments between privatisation and
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debate intersects with the discussion amongst public lawyers as to the way
accountability and openness can be delivered within the British State. As discussed
above a number of academic public lawyers have constructed (or re-constructed) their
models of accountability around the privatisation process and the drive to utilise the
private sector in the delivery of public services. Ultimately it is the argument of this
work that faith in such a model is misplaced and that solutions to the problem of the
unaccountable nature of the British state will not be found there but rather in a re-
discovered model ofpublic ownership.
WHY PUBLIC LAW?
The above passage perhaps illustrates why the field of privatisation and deregulation
require to be studied by public lawyers. But this needs to be emphasised further. A
study of rail privatisation by a lawyer should be no great surprise. After all, rail
privatisation may have been the largest job for the legal profession that has been
created under Conservative administrations. A mountain of contracts has been created
which in its tum could potentially create much litigation. Finding a route through the
tortuous route of this particular privatisation may need a lawyer's eye for detail. Yet
it is not the task of this work to give a definitive exposition of the minutiae of the
privatisation process. Rather as a work of public law this text will use an empirical
study of the privatisation of the railways and the deregulation of the bus network to
explore the key issues for public lawyers.
Centrally, this will explore the need for a framework which places participation and
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for these concepts to be fully realised public ownership needs to be re-established as a
central component of an accountable state. As was previously stated this was
accepted by those who argued against Dicey earlier this century. In particular Robson
argued that the development of administrative justice was tied to the creation of a
fairer society.!" Emphasising "the age which we live in is pregnant with social
unrest,"!" he clearly saw administrative law as a tool to make a better society. This is
linked to his position at the London School of Economics which was one of the
birthplaces of Fabian Socialism. This area of thought which will be examined in
detail in the next chapter believed in major reform of the institutions of the British
state including the introduction of the public corporation. In a sense Robson was
arguing the legal comer of this case against Dicey and his disciples.
In a sense, then, academic lawyers studying nationalisation and privatisation are not
new phenomena. Indeed this area has represented one of the most fluid in terms of
organisation of the state in the last twenty years. Recently it could be argued that
public lawyers have utilised the privatisation process to explore their own framework
for public law, especially with the creation of regulators and the beginning of a British
school of work on this topic. Yet their acceptance of new modes of regulation has
ignored or played down the idea of a revitalised model of public ownership. This, it
will be argued, should be central for administrative lawyers.
Undoubtedly the British experience of nationalisation was viewed by many unhappily.
Alienation in relation to these industries did not decrease when they were taken under
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public ownership. In fact one could argue that the alienation could be more clearly
defined than in private industry. Furthermore, although there was 'ownership' there
was little if any participation in the industry by the workforce and consumers.!" This
encouraged secrecy which in tum prevented accountability which was further
obfuscated by Parliamentary structures. Thus the basic notion of "controlling what
you own" disappeared. Any future model of public ownership, then, would have to
encourage participation as a means of ensuring support for the industry but also as a
means of increasing accountability. It is argued that participation could be encouraged
with the model outlined above.
In this similarities can be seen with Macpherson's model of participatory
democracy. 126 He argues that it is in industry that such first steps must be taken as it
is here that ordinary people will stop acting as consumers and producers and start
acting as exerters. This notion is linked to the argument developed above that the
public's perception of accountability has been ignored in previous experiments of
public ownership. They are largely viewed as passive and this is reflected in the
institutional design of the structures. It is argued that this is the wrong approach to
utilise. If a structure of public transport was developed which combined openness,
democracy and the absence of a drive for profits the public would respond to this.
The interface between industry and the state is central for lawyers interested in
promoting the notion of accountability. Thus institutional change would inevitably
involve changes in public consciousness which are equally important. Some would
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argue that such experiments would fail because of low participation or apathy. But
one must not view the future with the eyes of the past: "low participation and social
inequity are so bound up with each other that a more equitable and humane society
requires a more participatory political system'":" In legal terms participation as a
concept must accept these problems or it will be lifeless. In arguing these points
examples will be drawn from the experience of the state's handling oftransport.
CONCLUSION
A study of the British state and its institutions cannot be made neutrally. Dicey's
attempt to use the common law method in constitutional legal studies has been
exposed as having internal weaknesses. The resulting vacuum has meant a number of
conflicting ideas have been used in attempts to create a new model. As has been
argued such a model needs some reference to normative principles. This differs from
Robson's approach who saw his role as a documentor of the new era of administrative
justice, paraphrasing Spinoza: "to understand the causes rather than either to condemn
or praise".128
In the specific field of state intervention in the economy, similarly neutrality cannot
exist. Even more specifically in transport the concepts of participation and
accountability are not academic points but necessities as we face a transport crisis in
the late twentieth century. A new model of public ownership fulfilling all these
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objectives may lead to the "downgrading or abandonment of market assumptions
about the nature of man and society", 129 assumptions which have become all too
prevalent even in the field of public law as argued above. Yet to enter the next
millennium with coherent concepts of participation and accountability placed in a
system of public law such assumptions must be challenged.
To this end in the next chapter the experience of nationalisation will be explored with
a study of why there was alienation and disaffection from these originally popular
measures taken in the forties, and what effect the problems of developing a system of
administrative law had on the structures of the newly nationalised industries.
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CHAPTER TWO.
"The private business form which has built Western Capitalism has become the
Public Form which is making Socialist Britain"
ELDON L JOHNSON, 1954.1
Placing the concept of ownership in the centre of a new system of public law will
invite certain criticisms. Perhaps one of the strongest will rely on historical evidence.
The history of nationalisation in Britain hardly suggest that that ownership is central
to a concept of accountability. Rather secrecy and lack of participation seemed to be
the norm in the nationalised industries. This chapter will attempt to examine how that
came about. In order to understand the problem it will be necessary to examine how
the general notion of public ownership became implemented through the particular
structure of the public corporation in Britain.
There are two sides to this argument. Firstly the development of the British state in
the twentieth century - which is so central to administrative law - and how it came to
be associated with both public ownership and the corporation structure. The process of
nationalisation corresponded to the expansion of the British state and the subsequent
development of administrative law. The second is, as most of the nationalised
industries were created by the Labour Government of 1945-51, how the labour
movement came to accept the public corporation. For public lawyers the former is
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clash of differing notions of accountability is evident. It has been shown how Robson
and others almost pioneered a sympathetic approach to new institutional formations
amongst academic lawyers. The same is true ofnationalised industries which Robson
clearly saw as part of the 'new' state. "The public corporation is in my judgement by
far the best organ so far devised in this or any other country for administering
nationalised industries or undertakings'? was part of the conclusion of Robson's work
on nationalised industries. Yet it will be argued that the notion of 'accountability'
which was argued for at the time could not be realised by the particular form of the
public corporation. As mentioned in the Introduction the precise advantage of the
public corporation in delivering accountability was always left very vague and indeed
there were competing definitions.' Further this "new" structure could not eliminate
the traditional structures of constitutional accountability through both Parliament and
Government ministers. It will be argued that the structure of the public corporation
encouraged alienation and that any accountability was obfuscated.
This is important for modem public lawyers who try to create a new framework for
the topic. At the time of the nationalisation measures of the forties most public
lawyers were still working within the constraints of Dicey's model. Thus, the design
of nationalised industries were not central to them. Further those academic lawyers
who dissented from the approach were ardent supporters of the public corporation.
Robson clearly stated "The scale of this movement is vast; its diversity bewildering,
its political, economic and social significance unquestionable'" in his sympathetic
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work on nationalisation. The 'new' public lawyers have attempted to break from both
approaches.' Yet the peculiar historical experience of nationalisation does not
necessarily mean that accountability cannot be realised by changes in ownership. For
public lawyers it is important to re-state the concept of accountability and make clear
what model of accountability they believe to be most important - learning the lessons
of history but not rejecting all its experiments. To this end the chapter will explore
how the particular form of public ownership was adopted, how it was hoped
accountability was to be realised and how the corporation operated in practice.
THE STATE AND PUBLIC OWNERSHIP.
It is clear when examining the early works on Thatcherism and statements made by
politicians of that period that the nationalisation measures brought in by the 1945-51
Labour government were later seen as the benchmarks of socialism within the British
state. Sir Keith Joseph was one of the key figures in establishing the mythology of
Thatcher's "revolution". In her own biography Thatcher quotes approvingly her
mentor on the "socialist ratchet'" which had gripped Britain since the Second World
War. In her own words this amounted to a dominance of an ideology which was
"socialist, social democrat, statist or merely Butskellite"." These directly echo the
works of Joseph notably, his speeches in the seventies: "We are now more socialist in
many ways than any other developed country outside the communist bloc".8 The
notion of public ownership was seen as inimical to free enterprise and the logic of the
5 See nrevious chanter.
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market. The mechanics of the privatisation programme will be examined more
closely in the next chapter. But, beneath the rhetoric, to what extent was
nationalisation a creation of socialism in the middle of the century?
Even before the post-war Labour administration significant parts of the economy were
under a form of public ownership. All of these were created by Conservative or
Conservative-dominated coalition governments. The Central Electricity Board in
1926 and the BBC in 1927 were both established as public corporations. One
executive of the BBC labelled it "the first 'nationalised industry:"." However he
claimed that Lord Reith, the first Director General, wished to develop a "concept of
public service which goes deeper than questions of accountability or control"."
Arguably this vision could be seen as appropriate for all publicly owned corporations
prior to the Second World War. Another example often given of a pre-war public
corporation was the Port of London Authority. This is not entirely accurate, as the
official historian of the nationalised industries points out, I I for two of the members of
this authority were directly appointed by the trade unions unlike the independent
board normally seen as part of the public corporation. Alongside these creations
there were large amounts of electricity and gas supply under municipal control. The
creation of the London Passenger Transport Board in 1933 was influenced by these
previously created models as was the senior Labour figure Herbert Morrison who
piloted the bill through Parliament. The inter-war corporation was not the first
experiment in public ownership undertaken by the state; previously Conservative
administrations had not been slow to take over companies in the 'national' interest.
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For example Churchill in 1914 had acquired a majority share holding in the Ang10-
Persian Oil Company later to become B.P. So there were established models working
in Britain of 'nationalised' industries which had no links at all with socialism. Thus,
the acceptance and co-option of a form of public ownership had a pre-history to the
post-war Labour Government. It was stretching the truth to say the least to argue that
any scheme of denationalisation was simply dismantling a bastion of 'socialism'.
Denationa1isation was clearly going to be a fundamental restructuring of the British
state as indeed was the case in the original nationa1isation programme.
Why was the structure of the public corporation accepted as the norm for
nationa1isation within the British Constitution? BelOw) the socialist case for the
corporation will be explored but what of these non-socialist measures? Clearly the
choice of the public corporation was predominantly a pragmatic response, "designed
to meet a particular situation"." Yet it also had a significance beyond this. Reith
labelled it "a new fashion of government"." Another development it closely
corresponded to was the development of the limited liability company in capitalism.
This allowed for the management of an industry to have a degree of independence
from the owners. In Chester' s words: "The separation of ownership from
management opened the way for State ownership without State management"." This
societal development was coupled with a general antipathy to direct ministerial
control of an industrial undertaking as in the case of the Post Office. Opponents of
this formation from all the main political parties believed the industry would be too
10 ibid., p33 .
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susceptible to direct political intervention, even though it was accepted that
departments would be directly accountable to Parliament" which was not true of the
public corporations as shall be explored below. Arguments were used which were
very similar to those of outright opponents of nationalisation, namely that "the
minister had no right to interfere with the running of the board"." This consensus
against the traditional model of constitutional accountability was not replaced
however with a clear picture ofhow accountability was to be delivered. Yet it is clear
that during the inter war periodthe public corporation was increasingly acceptable to
l
government as a suitable structure for the nationalised industries.
Politically this occurred in a number of ways. In the 1920s the New Liberalism of
Lloyd George and others leaned towards nationalisation. "The Liberals tolerated
public ownership in certain limited spheres pointing reassuringly to the many
examples of public concerns already in existence"." This acceptance of a limited
form of state intervention was equated with a "tidying up of capitalism".18 Their 1928
Yellow Book endorsed these values and saw boards running public enterprises as a
more efficient structure. The "Public Board points to the right line of evolution"."
This endorsement by Liberalism was integral to Morrison's own thinking. In the
Second reading of the London Passenger Transport Bill Morrison "said he had been
influenced in his choice of the public corporation form by the Yellow Book and the
14 Chester op. cit., p42.
15 Morrison (1950), p176.
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Central Electricity Board"." Amongst Conservatives, a section also supported the
form of the public corporation/albeit with reservations. One right-wing critic of the
post war consensus over nationalisation wrote that the climate for nationalisation was
established by the protectionist tum of the National Government in the 1930s.z1
Further lyoung conservative thinkers at the time like Harold Macmillan argued that in
certain instances "the socialist remedy should be accepted"." Talk like this, argues
Abel, "prepared a mental and psychological climate kindly to socialists and
socialism"."
This political climate of the inter-war period affected the functioning of the state
beyond the experimentation with the public corporation as examined above. For
example, the industries which came under public ownership in 1945-51: gas,
electricity, coal, rail transport, civil aviation and the Bank of England had to some
extent already been earmarked for public ownership by Royal Commissions. The
McGowan Committee on Electricity, the Heyworth Committee on Gas and the
Swinton plan for a public airways corporation had all favoured a form of
nationalisation." The Straker Commission in the twenties had recommended a form
of public ownership for the coal mines. Christopher Foster argues that as far as the
h ?
railways (which had always been subject to a ~ larg~ degree of regulation) were
»>
concemed)Geddes the first Minister of Transport wanted to nationalise them in 1919 -
I following the state intervention of World War One. Indeed the process goes back
further to Gladstone who took a strong interest in the railways and at one stage
20 Chester (1975), p386.
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proposed a form of nationalisation. Such interventions tend to support public l~r
/
»:
.&C.S Wade's comment that the railways represented an early interface between the
-c
public and private sector," a point which emphasises the importance for public
lawyers in examining the privatisation of the rail network. Foster has noted more
recently that more books appeared from the 1880s advocating public ownership."
However, Bonar Law - the Conservative Prime minister of the twenties - gave
assurances that new governmental powers to take possession of railway tracks were
specifically not nationalisation measures." These pressures were exacerbated with the
growth of road transport and the notion of 'wasteful' competition between different
modes of transport" which was a "constant source of public and political
complaint"." Thus .prior to the Labour government's extensive use of the public
I ,, ' \. \, ,-~"A
corporation/t is clear that there had been many precedents for~is within Britain.
This was reflected in actual experiments, the suggestions of various official
commissions and in an indirect sense in the political debate.) ,
Apart from this, the World Wars also increased the use of methods of public
ownership. This was especially true of the Second World War and to some extent the
First. Miliband, a left-wing critic of the Labour administration, argues that the 1945-
51 government can only be understood by the war experience and the "elaborate
system of State intervention and control'?" which had developed. This experience
extended the consensus surrounding the nature of public ownership which as noted
24 See generally Morgan (1984) , Chapter 3.
25 Quoted in Harden/Lewis, p58.
26 Foster(1994) ,p491.
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above was quite extensive. The most significant effect of this would be the
Conservative Party's ambivalent attitude to the nationalisation legislation in
Parliament. The exception to this was the iron and steel industry which provoked
heated controversy. Even in the case ofthe 1948 Gas Bill where 800 amendments had
been submitted: "the champions of private enterprise had only limited zest for the
fight"."
Added to this consensus over some forms of public ownership the model adopted did
not inspire much resistance especially alongside generous compensation packages
which were painstakingly negotiated between government and private industry. The
problems of the value of any compensation were multiple especially as any debt
incurred in the private sector fell on the newly nationalised industry. In the example
of transport: "the interest on the [Transport] Commission's Compensation stock would
have to be paid however bad its results"." The figures were calculated in such a way
that there was a large tendency to over-valuation. For example because the companies
would be liable for the debt the basis for valuation of the companies should be
"closely related to earnings capacity?": the so-called net maintainable revenue. Yet
this became almost impossible when examining many small companies which were
being amalgamated into one large concern; e.g. in rail and electricity. How could one
predict the future prospects of a small part of a larger operation which was being
dissolved? Thus out of a total compensation package spread over all the industries of
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£2639 million, £1150 million went on transport" which was overwhelmingly
composed of smaller operations. The industries adopted for ownership were such that
they offered no real threat to private capital: "Government intervention in economic
affairs, though in some aspects irksome to private industry ...presented no serious
challenge to the power of the men who continued to control the country's economic
resources". 35
This almost completes the examination of how the state came to accept the public
corporation in a large scale after the Second World War. By public lawyers at the
time, though, this process was hardly recognised. As explore~above the nineteenth
• I
century Whig individualist ideology iepitomised by Dicey)was becoming isolated.
However, at this point in history the legal dissenters from Dicey's view were very few.
Significantly those that did dissent had close links with the new formations of the
state" and the Fabian tradition as seen below. This time-lag between different
elements of the state offeJ:s_a_partial explanation for the difficulty that legal academics
---have had in exploring and understanding areas like these. Further the virtual absence
)
of public lawyers from the important debate over public ownership prevented their
input into the central question of accountability within the Briti sh state as shall be
explored when looking at different definitions of accountability below. Moreover it
allowed the structure of the public corporation to be deliberately vague on the
question of how accountability was to be delivered.
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However even though legally there was no clear expression of it, the new consensus
being built up around the government. intervening in the economy was a reality.
~
Indeed the argument utilised by Foster: "the forms chosen then[1945] and earlier were
adopted in large part to appease those who feared socialism?" has weight considering
the precedents of how public ownership came to be accepted by the British state and
how closely the Labour Government chose to follow them. For a clearer examination
ofhow this came about the other side of the argument must be explored.
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THE LABOUR MOVEMENT AND
PUBLIC OWNERSHIP.
Simply to examine the process of public ownership from the perspective of the state
establishment is a little one-sided. Almost of equal importance is the Labour Party's
internal grass-roots struggle over the nature of public ownership. It is simply not the
case that "there was not much debate about nationalisation within the Labour Party"."
The two attempts to reform Clause Four" by 'modernising' Labour leaders and the
internal discussion provoked almost proves this in itself. It was perhaps true to argue
in 1995 on the eve of the conference which rewrote Clause Four that it represented
nothing more than a "generalised totem of faith"." Yet in the early decades of this
century when the British state was slowly coming to terms with a model of public
ownership an important battle raged within the Labour movement. In a sense the
debate exposed Labour's relation with the state; indeed, in a sense, even highlighted
the nature of the British state.
From 1918 when Labour's first policy statement was issued the "socialisation of
industry?" was centre stage. Arguably, it was "Labour's defining policy,"? yet its
ambiguity was clear even at this early stage. No explicit structure was adopted as the
model in the early part of the century but it was clear that the Webbs' Fabian scheme
38 ibid., p75.
39 The original Clause 4 Part iv of the Constitution read: "To secure for the producers by hand or by
brain the full fruits of their industry, and the most equitable distribution thereof that may be possible,
upon the basis of the common ownership of the means of production, distribution and exchange and
- - ~ ..-
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was extremely influential." This clearly stood for a "more advanced, more regulated
form of capitalism'?" which would 'evolve' into a socialist society as the efficiencies
of such a system'I--~Zealised by the broad populace." The minimalism and inherent
denigration of revolutionary change on a large scale was seemingly contradicted by
Sidney Webb's own drafting of Clause Four (which he wrote with Arthur Henderson)
which seemed to voice the demands of many in the Labour movement for a
transformation of society. Yet the Fabian's belief was.....that in a new societYrindustry
~ )
would be run much more efficiently if administration was separated from policy.
Policy matters would be decided by the 'Social Parliament' which would set up a
standing committee monitoring each industry. Corresponding to this each industry
would have a board drawn from the administration, the 'vocations' - a phrase which
encompassed the workers and management - of the industry and the consumers. This
board would be in charge of the general administration of the industry and not seek to
represent any particular sectional interest. They also envisaged a network of advisory
committees peopled by the "disinterested profes sional expert"." This programme
effectively excluded any direct control by the working class although they did have
the vision of works committees that dealt exclusively with conditions of employment.
Any worker on the board of the public corporation would not represent any particular
interest. Indeed, the Webbs asserted that the argument "whether government of
42 Coates (1975), p2.
43 See Webb(1920).
44 Miliband OD . cit .. n62 .
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industry should be from above or below"? had no meanmg. What this referred
cryptically to was the debate raging in the labour movement over workers control.
This cut to the symbiotic nature of nationalisation for the Labour movement: was it a
chance to create a more advanced form of capitalism as also envisaged by the Liberals
and sections of the Conservative party" or the first creation of a British Socialist
state? Significantly)in both scenarios,the notion of a clear definition of accountability
f I
was not discussed.
Essentially this remained the form of the debate from 1918 to the post war Labour
Government although the form slightly changed. The battle was clearly expressed in
the early thirties where the Labour Party swung sharply to the left. This followed the
defeat ofthe 1929-31 Labour Government and the subsequent defection ofleaders like
Macdonald and Snowden to the National Government. It was during this period that
Herbert Morrison", Minister of Transport from 1929-31, piloted his scheme for the
London Passenger Transport Board through Parliament. As noted above, this
followed the structure of the public corporation which had begun to be utilised in
other areas. As Transport Minister he had been in charge of the Central Electricity
Board which he saw as extremely efficient. The creation of the LPTB was cited by
Morrison as a major victory in the field of transport and in the general 'socialisation'
of industry.
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This was further emphasised in his book Socialisation and Transport" a work which
his biographers claim established him as a "major socialist theorist"." In it he put the
socialist case for a public corporation run not by the workers but by an independent
board in consultation with the minister." The Minister "may exercise an influence
where it is proper and legitimate that he should, without in any way interfering with
the management of the undertaking"." The public corporation was the perfect
amalgamation of public ownership, accountability with operation being put on a
"sound business level"." In the words of one American admirer it was a "combination
of the governmental adjective and the business noun"." It was superior to both
ministerial or workers' control as it favoured the technical experts . This elitism
through favouring experts and the notion of an independent board revealed the extent
of Fabian influence here. But it did not allow for a tripartite model for choosing the
representatives of the board nor did it put the same emphasis on the flow of
information although the board would have the fullest autonomy and pay decent
wages so as to attract the right personne1.
A useful comparison to this vision of the independent corporation as being the ideal
model for 'socialised industry' is the structure adopted in France." Although large
scale nationalisation was brought in after the Second World War -as in Britain- rather
than depend on independent experts drawn from business the French adopted a
tripartite structure. This consisted of representatives of the state, the workforce and
50 Morrison (1933) .
5 1 Donoghue/Jones (1973) , p184.
52 Following the administration/policy distinction of the Webbs .
53 l\. K ~ ~ " .. __ "'00
81
the consumers of the industry. This plan originally came from the main federation of
trade unions in France - the CGT- and was designed to avoid the concepts of
'etatisation'. Significantly this different structure experienced many of the same
problems that the British industries did57 as shall be shown below. However, it
illustrates that this group of socialists tended to view with disfavour the idea that
business could provide sound independent managers. There may be significant
national factors at work here. As one academic of the time put it, "Nationalisation [in
France] represented the punishment of a guilty capitalism".58 Leading French
businessmen were guilty of collaborating with the Nazis during the Occupation. One
further explanation for the structure adopted was the historically strong syndicalist
movement in France. The tripartite structure was criticised openly by supporters of the
public corporation. Robson argued that the particular structure was "seriously
threatening the success of the French Experiment" and it was "wrong"."
A completely different model was also utilised in Italy in that one large holding
company (IRI) - which was later followed by others - acquired shares in other
companies. Rather than a creation of a left government the actual form came about as
a by-product of the Fascist Government's action in saving the banking system during
1933. In contrast to Britain and France! the IRI held only a small proportion of its
shares in the public utilities. Further its management was solely determined by the
government and there were no workers' representatives. These different experiments
in Western Europe underline the point that the British model advocated by Morrison
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and others within the Labour movement was firmly rooted within Britain's peculiar
traditions.
The public corporation model was fully debated at the 1932 and 1933 Labour
Conferences. The central dispute concerned Morrison's plans for autonomous boards
and the extent of trade union representation. The Transport and General Workers
Union wanted the right to nominate members to the boards - influenced by the French
model which the French trade unions had played a full part in designing - whereas
Morrison wanted the nominees to be based on proven ability and not to represent any
particular interest group. Morrison's plan was defeated at both conferences but as his
biographers points out, "he lost the skirmish in 1932 and 33 but won the battle in the
long term"." For when it came to the actual process of nationalising industry nominal
power was given to Morrison.
Labour's acceptance of the public corporation form occurred around the same time as
the British state's co-option of the scheme as examined above. This is not mere
coincidence. The debates during the early thirties represented more than an argument
about how many workers' representatives should be on the board of a nationalised
industry. In truth it reflected those leaders of the Labour movement who wished to
accommodate themselves to the British state rather than transform it. As can be seen)
the rhetoric of senior politicians from all parties took a very similar approach to public
ownership. The rift in the labour movement centred on the Fabian admiration for the
expert and belief in the independence of a board structure which drew on the best
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examples of capitalism versus a system of workers' control which was unclear in its
structure. It should be noted here that both models were largely silent on how
accountability was to be delivered.
The writings of senior figures on the right wing of the labour movement underline this
point. Snowden" had explained his preference as early as 1913 for the "best experts
and businessmen't" to man industry. Morrison continued the process with his
dismissing of worker's control with: "This buses for the busmen and dust for the
dustmen stuff is not socialism at all ... it isn't a busman's idea; it's middle class
syndicalist romanticism"." The Labour Left was opposed to the elitism inherent in
the public corporation and wanted an extension of industrial democracy. In 1944 Ian
Mikardo'" moved a composite motion at Labour Party Conference which demanded
an extension of public ownership into named industries which were "democratically
controlled and operated ... with representation of workers and consumers"." Such
forcefulness in resolutions was not however enough to prevent the Morrisonian model
becoming the norm.
Why was this the case? One academic notes the birth of a "corporate socialism"
through the Thirties 66 which allied the Neo-Keynesians on the right of the Labour
party with the Left who favoured worker's control. The end creation was a model of
bureaucratic planning epitomised by Morrison's scheme. Even though major Left
61 One of the leading defectors to the National Government from the Labour Party.
62 See Snowden (1913).
63 Eldon Barrv OD. cit.. 031.
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leaders like Bevan could argue on the eve of the Labour Government in 1944 against
"the pernicious pretence that State Control, nationalisation of some key industries and
Socialism are the same thing':", there was no clear structured alternative to counter
Morrison's spurious association of socialism with the public corporation.
Nationalisation, then, was not only a compromise between Labour and the British
state; it was also an internal compromise in the Labour movement. Furthermore, the
actual structure of the public corporation was accepted by both sides from different
perspectives. The left accepted it as a step on the road to socialism whereas the
British establishment accepted its minimal encroachment into the country's industry
and as a bold experimentation in public administration. Central to both these
perspectives is the importance of accountability. Now the different definitions of this
term in this context must be explored.
85
THE PUBLIC CORPORATION: ACCOUNTABLE?
~ /i . 'l "-..t~) ....1As was often pointed out at the time of .theynationalisation the question of
accountabi lity was not a completely new one for industry; even when it was owned by
private interests. However, as a member of the National Coal Board wrote, this
accountability is "primarily the means by which the directors seek and the
shareholders decide to accord or refuse their confidence in their directors"." Now
however the whole notion of accountabi lity was being reconstituted: the individual
enterprise was being replaced by the public corporation and the body of shareholders
was now represented by Parliament. Further, this operated alongside a more
"traditional" constitutional accountability to the Minister who had important new
powers over the Boards. Hence ownership was not seen as an end in itself to promote
accountability; further safeguards would be needed to ensure accountability. Thus, we
can see the roots of the notion in public law that questions of public versus private
ownership need not affect accountability, which again can be traced back to the
growth of the limited liability company." As previously mentioned Morri son sought
to build on the legacy of the best practices of modem capitali sm. A good summary of
his view was expressed in a trade union document of the thirtie s: "the tendency is to
secure public control and the elimination of the profit motive while keeping the actual
management in the hands of a body not susceptible to party political pressure and
interference"." However there are a number of contradictions built into this model of
accountability. Primarily how could ordinary people feel they have a stake in these
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new industries? Moreover on what was the Board's concept of accountability based?
These questions were those on which the new form of the public corporation was
silent. Although the public corporation was defined as being at arm's length from
Parliamentary structures one of the ways nationalisation could be portrayed as being
more receptive to the public was through some form of accountability from their
elected representatives. In the eyes of Vickers, a member of the National Coal Board)
Parliament "repre sented the whole community"." This traditional notion of
accountability needs to be looked at in this context.
Parliamentary accountability
As previously mentioned the public corporations were to be autonomous from
Parliament in an 'arm's length' arrangement. Thus there was no direct Parliamentary
accountability in the sense that existed for Government Departments. Morrison
himself explicitly recognised this and argued that direct Parliamentary control "would
tend to lead to excessive caution, slowness and red tape"," although he also argued he
could see the case for electricity being under direct departmental control. This
underlines the view that the public corporation provided an opportunity to deliver new
models of accountability moving away from those traditional elements of the British
Constitution.
Yet Parliament's role was not completely eliminated and the initial way in which
elected MPs could hold industries accountable was through the age-old method of a
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Parliamentary Question. However strict guidelines were laid down by the Speaker to
allow questions only on policy matters and not on the day-to-day administration
which was solely a matter for the boards. Alongside this was the possibility of
debates, which
"unfocussed"."
according to one backbencher at the time, were "rambling" and
, )
This lack of influence lead to the pressure of some MPs to create a
Select Committee, a measure that was rejected by the 1945-51 Government. Indeed
Morrison argued that all the parliamentary measures as they stood "amounted to
something substantial"." The fact that these grew up alongside a supposedly new
model for delivering accountability shows the absence of any clear alternative models.
However the return of the Conservatives into government in 1951 began the process
of establishing a Select Committee by allowing an investigation into this possibility.
Evidence in favour of establishing the Committee was given by MPs of both major
parties and senior civil servants. Morrison was again opposed to this citing the
possibility as "terrifying"." He had argued consistently that such a committee would
introduce "meticulous Parliamentary supervision by another route"." Yet the Select
Committee was finally established as a permanent force in 1956. This followed a
false start the previous year when the Committee had refused to operate under its
limited terms of reference. Again this measure was justified in terms of delivering
accountability. One member of the Committee, a Labour M.P., wrote it was a "new
vehicle for public accountability". This is quite ironic given that this was precisely
what the public corporation was supposed to deliver itself. He added "through the
73 J-In oh M"l",m MP llll"tpr! in 1?"h""n (1 Qhh\ "t nl 5n
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committee a better relationship between the boards and Parliament has been
established"." Again this committee did not intend to infringe on the autonomous
nature of the board. The committee that established the Select Committee stated it had
no wish to interfere with the "independence of enterprises which are and must remain
fundamentally commercial in character"." This corresponded to the qualification of
the administration that the committee "would not be prejudicial to the commercial
efficiency of the Boards". 79 The very need for the establishment of this committee
further illustrates the additional measures that were required to establish these
industries as accountable in the constitutional sense. Certainly the initial
investigations of the Committee seemed to allow direct questioning of the members of
the board and produced more information, although the first reports of the Committee
studied one particular nationalised undertaking rather than producing a general
overview of the whole area of industries owned by the state. Thus there was no clear
relationship created between industry and Parliament. What existed was a mixture of
limited questioning, largely uninformed debate and scrutiny by an overworked
Parliamentary committee.
A further illustration of the limits of Parliamentary accountability was that of the
limits of the jurisdiction of the Public Accounts Committee. This Parliamentary body
undertook a number of limited investigations into some of the nationalised
undertakings. However these would only be practicable if the body was wholly
dependent on finance approved by Parliament. The PAC had neither the resources nor
it would seem the inclination to undertake a full audit of the industries, which in
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Robson's words would have placed an "intolerable burden?" on its limited resources.
Hence "the PAC's enquiries are of peripheral interest to any broad conception of the
work of the nationalised industries"." All this hardly translated into a completely
accountable industry at least to Parliament. However, what of the Government? Did
the ministers have more coherent powers thus making the industries accountable?
Ministerial accQuntability.
Chester argues that one of the things which set the post-war nationalisations apart
from the earlier examples was the increased power of the minister. Nominally this
was true, although the introduction of the traditional concept of ministerial
accountability again contradicted the argument that the new structure of the public
corporation could deliver accountability itself. Every nationalisation measure
contained the power for a minister to issue general directions. However, Morrison
argued that there "need not be many cases?" when they would in normal
circumstances be utilised. They were thought of as powers held in reserve to
strengthen co-operation and negotiation. Indeed, not one direction was issued by the
Labour Government of 1945-51. The first direction was issued by the Conservative
administration on the subject of transport charges. The minister had other powers
including the power to appoint and remove the board. Again the power to remove the
entire board was seen as a 'nuclear' option and would not be utilised in normal
circumstances. Indeed the general effectiveness of these measures is questionable.
78 ibid., p378.
79 Chester OD. cit.. n999 examininz the nosition of the Home Secretarv in Mav 19'51.
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One member of the Select Committee likened it to "Damocles' sword?" suspended
over the industry. Generally the power of the minister was hoped to be a balance
between "compulsion and persuasion"." These powers were limited in practice when
dealing with a nationalised board with a well experienced management and its own
bureaucracy. As Tony Berm, a minister with considerable experience of working with
nationalised industries, put it the "whole basis of the relationship has been left too
vague to be effective"." Perhaps the clearest power ministers had was that of
controlling the purse strings in that their approval was needed for any reorganisation
or large capital outlay. But formal powers were seldom used. Hence an informal
network of contact grew up around the minister and the board. This would tend to
support the view of Tony Prosser in his examination of nationalisation that in the
constitutional tradition of the British state any informal agreements will lead to a
reduction of accountability. 86
Other means.
If the patchwork quilt of parliamentary measures and the 'big stick' approach of the
minister were not enough to hold the industries accountable, what other measures
could have been adopted? Although the board was an independent entity it was
statutorily bound to operate in the 'public interest'. This may be vague but at the very
least it should include an increased awareness of how the public perceives the new
structures and if it sees them as accountable." Again it could be argued that this
would prove difficult as.in the words of one board member the duties they had were
" :i
/
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ones for "which nobody has ever before been accountable to anyone"." But the
board utilised its power to publish annual reports with increased information which
was widely heralded as a change from the private sector. It is notable that more
information flow was gained here than by the cumbersome procedure of parliamentary
questioning or by ministerial intervention. Yet obviously the content of that
information was determined by the board and not some outside body." Morrison saw
these reports as very important together with other "public relations'?" measures such
as market research exercises. Robson felt that such information flows would be
improved if they were subject to an external efficiency audit, not 'efficiency' in being
held financially accountable but efficient as regards the use of its resources to carry
out its tasks." Thus the industries felt that releasing information within their annual
reports provided an opportunity to show they were prepared to be held accountable to
the public. But it should be remembered that there were no means of auditing the
corporations as this was outside the powers of the Comptroller and Auditor General.
Another measure which could be used to judge the public's perception of
accountability was the effect of the complaints machinery put in place by
nationalisation; how did the consumers raise their grievances with the industry. For
the most part the industries were public utilities hence the consumers' view was seen
as vital as they had no choice of supplier. Perhaps for this reason Consumers'
Councils were also created in the nationalised undertakings. Their success was to be
86 Prosser (1986). Chap 2.
87 See discussion in Chapter 1.
88 Vickers op. cit., p73.
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judged in Morrison's VIew -and in quite archaic language- that "every
housewife ...should know how she can make her complaints"." The form of the
consumer council varied between industries: in iron and steel there was one national
council whereas the electricity industry had fifteen local areas. Yet the criticisms of
them were of a similar nature. They were not seen as independent of the industries
but as "stooges'?" as one commentator put it. Furthermore they were not widely
known about by the general public thus failing Morrison's dated "housewife" test."
It can be seen that there was a general agreement at the time of nationalisation on the
need to increase public accountability. The independent public corporation was not
seen as enough in itself; further safeguards were needed. However, the opportunity to
use this new experiment to promote new institutional models for delivering
accountability was lost. Instead accountability was to be delivered by parliamentary
measures, ministerial powers, information flow and consumer complaints machinery.
It could be argued that these different sources of accountability together amounted to a
great deal, and more than was present in the private sector and in other countries
which had adopted public ownership. This was Robson's position." However the
problem of each of these exercises in accountability has been demonstrated and one
could argue that this spreading of accountability makes it more diffuse, as there was
no clear statement on what accountability was to mean. This could have explained the
relationship of the board to the rest of the community or indeed the minister. The
notion of the independent board allowed the workforce to feel a distance from it - it
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was not 'their' industry and this was not compensated by any additional structures to
provide a link with the workforce and the industry. The existence of the consumer
councils which so clearly failed the consumer increased the consumer's scepticism of
the 'accountable' nationalised industry. Thus the overwhelming contradiction of the
public corporation plan was that accountability was everywhere in words but nowhere
in action. This can be further emphasised by examining how the industries operated
in practice until the advent of the first Thatcher administration.
IN PRACTICE: THE NATIONALISED INDUSTRY.
Clearly Labour's landslide post-war victory raised expectations amongst many people,
not least of its plans for nationalisation. The structures created Morrison's visions of
boards that would operate in the 'public interest'. As has been explored above the
Fabian distinction between the administration of an industry and the policy of a
Government when translated directly into the British constitutional structure resulted
in a collection of disparate relationships. There was no clear settlement as to the
relationship of the state with industry. In the absence of such a settlement the space
was largely filled with informal contacts.
A further failure of the Government was not to allow the industries to become part of
a broader economic plan. The intention may have been there but the autonomy of the
boards seemed to contradict any use of the industries in macro-economic policy. In
1949 the Attorney-General gave an opinion that government could not direct the
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board of a nationalised industry in possible breach of its statutory obligation to break:
even." This was further supported by the legal opinion in Tamlin v Hannaford" that
stated "in the eyes of the law the corporation is its own master". This concerned the
particular case of Crown liability yet in a sense reflects the arcane way that members
of the legal establishment viewed new developments in the state. They preferred to
classify it in terms of an older era that was more clearly understood by lawyers.
The contradictions of the rhetoric of Labour's nationalisation programme as opposed
to the reality were clear. This can be explained by using the definition of
accountability and its vagueness as regards the public corporation," or examining the
constitutional forms adopted and why they proved difficult to apply in practice. This
meant that the nationalisation measures adopted in the 45-51 administration were not
likely to be expanded to include new industries. This was an about-tum from the high
point of 1945 when public ownership was immensely popular. In 1951 Labour
leaders were almost scared to utter the word 'nationalisation'. This is confirmed by
politicians' own recollection of the 1951 campaign" and statistical information. For
example in a psephologists guide to that election"? the number of Labour candidates
who mentioned nationalisation was 20% ~own from 56% in the 1950 election. This
can be explained in part by the processes outlined above of the strengthening of the
board's autonomy and the absence of open access to information or other means of
accountability.
96 Foster (1992), p79.
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Other factors include the lack of change in personnel in the management of the
industries. The National Coal Board was chaired by Lord Hyndley - a private pit
owner. As far as board members drawn from the trade unions went, in 1951 9 out of
47 full time and 7 out of 48 part time members came from the unions. Five boards
had no union representation at all.101 This came on top of large compensation
payments which crippled the finances of a section of the industries as they were liable
to repay the debts regardless of their own performance. In Miliband's words the effect
was to "saddle the nationalised industries with a burden of debt which materially
contributed to difficulties that were later ascribed to the immanent character of public
ownership". 102
Moreover the industries chosen for public ownership were in the parlance of the time
I
"Great Foundation Industries". More cynically as one socialist commentator put it ,
"capitalism's derelict industries". 103 As The Economist said, the scope of
nationalisation was "almost the least it could do without violating its election
pledges". 104 This was significant as it allowed the Conservative Party to make
'socialism' synonymous with inefficiency; a claim later repeated by Thatcher. Any
attempt to nationalise profitable sectors of manufacturing industry were fiercely
resisted. The proposed plan to nationalise the sugar industry was met by a huge
advertising campaign of opposition funded by Aims of Industry. These problems at
the birth of post-war public ownership are significant because .alongside the important
questions of accountability they laid the basis for alienation from nationalised)
100 Butler/Pinto-Duschinsky(1971).
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industry. This allowed politicians of the left and right to claim nationa1isation was
unpopular hence preventing any serious extension of public ownership and allowing
privatisation to take hold.
This is not to say that nationalised industries remained static from the mid-forties until
their transfer to the private sector. Indeed, according to Foster l uring the sixties it
appeared that ministerial power rather than being minimal was reaching new levels.
Yet this was set in the context of the industries themselves setting the agenda. This
followed the publication of two white papers dealing with the nationalised industries
in 1961 and 1967 both of which sought to put the industries on a sound commercial
basis. However such attempts foundered partly because of the state's 'stop-go' attitude
towards investment during this period, but also because of deeper structural faults; as
Prosser points out: "by giving an appearance of economic rationality ... they drew
attention away from the means of government intervention which they did not
cover". l OS Thus, although there were attempts to redefine economic criteria for the
industries 106 there was still no attempt to examine the structures as they related to the
state or indeed its workforce, although there was an attempt by the Select Committee
'"
. I
of Nationalised Industry)under Mikardo to carry out an across-the-board study of the
} . / (~~. r- (101 ' .."
../,~ ", .
relationship between the Minister and the;Industries.107 T~ wanted to create a
Ministry for Nationalised Industries with less emphasis on the 'arm's length'
relationship. The Minister should have the power to issue specific directions that
would allow him to have a greater input into the running of the board. However the
104 ibid. p55.
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Committee did also want to prevent overt 'politicisation' of the relationship and
wanted to utilise new econometric techniques to improve the economic efficiency of
the industries. In a study of the Report one academic saw it as a return to the
"Webbsian specifics of 'measurement and publicity':'.'?' Once again questions of
accountability arose because the structures adopted by the public corporation were
deficient in creating accountability.
Another partial remedy to the structural malaise of the industries was raised in the
NEDO document of 1976 which argued for a more participatory approach to
management. Each board would be supervised by a policy council; similar again to
the Webbs' early design, which would represent all 'interested' parties in the industry.
These would set clearer objectives than existed under the 'arms length' relationship
with the ministers. This met a response in a Government White Paper'?" which
rejected any institutional reform. It relied more on the increased use of corporate
plans and more financial controls to be used with the introduction of External Finance
Limits(EFL). Thus once again there was no re-examination of the flawed institutional
i
relationship which prevented a satisfactory definition of accountability being realised.
Further, this relatively radical plan by the NEDO coincided with the IMF crisis in
Britain which heralded the limiting of public expenditure and the birth of a tight
monetary policy. The re-alignment of the right in the Conservative Party with the
Chicago School of economists from America created a new school of thought toward
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the structures of public ownership .110 The Morrisonian model of 'socialised industry'
was soon to receive a severe shock.
CONCLUSION.
Before exammmg privatisation and deregulation, what can public lawyers ~a e
/
learned from the experiment with public ownership carried out in Britain in the
forties? Holding the state to account is a central premise of most systems of public
law. In the experience of the growth of public corporations, no radical new approach
to accountability was offered in contradiction to the radical philosophy of some of
their architects . Instead there seemed to be a reliance on old types of accountability -
parliamentary structures, ministerial discretion etc. For what amounted to quite a
radical restructuring of the British state there seemed to be quite a conservatism over
such questions. This can be partially explained as the result of the absence of public
lawyers from the design of the new industries . As explained the Diceyan notion of the
constitution precluded a close involvement with new institutional design. Those
public lawyers who did involve themselves were strong supporters of the public
corporation form. For modem public lawyers there is a tendency to distance
themselves from the Robson approach of support for the new forms of government
whilst equally rejecting the thought of Dicey. Yet it is important not to throw the
baby out with the bathwater. The notion of public accountability is central to public
ownership, but what is critical is the type of accountability seen as important. In the
Introduction it was pointed out that one aspect of accountability that was neglected by
the Morrisonian model was how the public would perceive the new institutions. This I
99
absence broke the link with the public and as a consequence broke the link between
accountability and public ownership. So one consequence of the nationalisation
experiments of the forties was to squander the chance to build a new model of
accountability with a structure to achieve this. That ownership and accountability
were not closely linked can be explained by the particular institutional structures
adopted. The reliance on the 'independence' of the board of the public corporation
proved a barrier to effective accountability with the general public. Moreover the
constitutional tradition in Britain of accountability through Parliament and
Government ministers proved incapable of coping with these new structures without
utilising its own traditional methods. These points will be fully explored and justified
when the particular case of transport is studied. Before that is done there must be a
general overview of the privatisation and deregulation process to see if it was more
effective in dealing with questions of accountability.
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CHAPTER THREE.
"The golden rule about privatising is always to give people greater advantage
than they previously enjoyed".
Madsen Pirie, 1988.1
The experience of public ownership in Britain clearly leaves a lot to be desired. The
structure of the public corporations did not allow for openness. Moreover although
the new structure was believed by its creators to be more accountable to the public
following the example of the joint stock company this did not prove to be the case.
Some possible reasons for this were outlined in the introduction and the previous
chapter; one of the problems was the vagueness over how accountability was to be
delivered. This allowed a large degree of alienation to develop between nationalised
industries and the public, a trend which was skilfully exploited by Thatcherism, as
shall be shown. In this chapter the success of the privatisation programme III
addressing these issues of accountability will be judged. Firstly the roots of
privatisation will be examined: how it began and developed. Then how far the quest
for achieving more accountability was realised will be assessed. Clearly, if
accountability is simply measured in comparison with the nationalised sector then this
101
standard will be quite low. Also as shall be shown the type of accountability which
was seen as important differed sharply from the competing models used in the forties.
The role of public lawyers in this process will then be assessed, as it was largely in the
eighties that public lawyers turned their attention to the question of privatisation and
nationalisation as subjects vital for administrative law. In general these questions of
accountability have merged into examinations of the regulatory structures set up in the
wake of the privatisation of the utilities which will also be examined. The chapter
will then conclude with an examination of how these questions will lead into the
empirical study of bus deregulation and rail privatisation.
It will be argued here that questions of accountability within the British state which
were distorted by the peculiar experience of the public corporation were not solved by
the privatisation process. Moreover, although the general lack of openness
experienced under nationalisation could be exploited by the prophets of privatisation ~
/
the ensuing regulatory confusion did not initially provide an overall improvement on
the previous situation. It will be argued that this is due again to the questions of
ownership which were turned on their heads by Thatcherism. Thus the peculiar
experience of accountability under the Morrisonian institutions was portrayed as
inevitable if the state was involved through public ownership . Also it will be
suggested that some public law academics have been affected by this general process
to down play notions of ownership as central and place more faith in new regulatory
structures . These new structures will be judged by their changing role in the nineties
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THE ORIGINS OF PRIVATISATION.
For many privatisation remains one of the greatest achievements of the eighties. In
the many political obituaries written for Lady Thatcher after her political demise in
1990 her role in changing the way the state intervened in the economy was seen as her
most lasting memorial. One writer claimed the process was "likely ... to make the
Thatcher years historic rather than historical".' A further academic study stated "The
privatisation programme was, in its scale, a revolution".' Supporters of privatisation
like Michael Beesley and Madsen Pirie were invited all around the world to promote
their ideas. This international wave increased after the 1989 revolts in Eastern Europe
and Russia where governments were returned committed to diminishing the role of the
state in the economy. In the developing world the international financial institutions
made privatisation a central part of the Structural Adjustment Programmes in certain
countries. For example between 1988-92 25 developing countries undertook
privatisations worth $61bn.4 However the use of privatisation as a generic term
creates more problems than is first realised. Certainly the British experience has
unique features and is probably more advanced than any other Western European
country. In a Parliamentary Answer in 1992 it was revealed that the government had
disposed of £41.5 bn of state assets since 1979. But as shall be shown below the
notion of privatisation having a uniform character within Britain is untrue.
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However, the origins of the privatisation programme could be said to follow the
British constitutional tradition in that it was developed on a largely ad hoc basis. That
is, in the early days of Thatcherism there was no grand detailed plan unveiled that
pointed the way over the next decade. The manifestos of the first two Thatcher
administrations made scant mention of their 'Jewel in the Crown".' Indeed the large-
scale debates on the nature of nationalisation in the labour movement had no such
equivalent in the Conservative Party. This was apparent when a list of proposed
privatisations was published in 1983 yet there was "nothing to indicate the role which
privatisation would come to play in the second phase of Thatcherism".6
In a forthright three chapters of his political biography Nigel Lawson" rejects the
notion that the policy was improvised or to use an academic's words "stumbled
upon"." Rather he claims that the proponents of this programme were silenced to
prevent alienating 'floating voters'. However Lawson's biography illustrates the
chaotic way in which each sell-off proceeded. This seems to suggest that the
programme was inchoate at this time and amounted only to the general idea of
transferring ownership of the nationalised industries into the private sector.
Certainly the intellectual basis for this can be easily established in the Conservative
Party of the seventies. During this period the right wing was strengthened. Keith
Joseph, Thatcher's self-confessed "mentor'" presented a series of published lectures
4 See Financial Times, 20th June 1994.
5 A term first used in Riddell (1991) but utilised by Lawson (1992) in his biography.
6 Jenkins (19R7) n17i
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defining the "humanity of capitalism". 10 His phrase "too much socialism?" could be
seen as a summation of his arguments. His work at this time, although short of
specifics had a central theme. He had served as a minister in the Heath
Administration and he felt his hands had been tied by the public sector that completely
dominated the British economy. Further, this sector was the reason for the national
decline of Britain. Thus a 'new consensus' was needed. In line with this radical
reversal he linked his own conversion: "I have only recently become a
Conservative". 12
These ideas were not solely Joseph's. They were heavily influenced by Alfred
Sherman, an economist and director of the Centre for Policy Studies, who helped draft
some of the series of speeches. Forceful arguments were put against public ownership
and in defence of the 'free' market which, to be truly liberated.needed to remove the
burden of public enterprise. This was new thinking for the Conservatives who had
generally supported the nationalised industries during their period of government
since the Second World War." As argued in the previous chapter even during the
legislative passage of the nationalisation bills the Conservatives' opposition was
largely rhetorical, with the general exception of the attempt to take the profitable iron
and steel industry into public ownership in 1949. Facing Joseph's general derision the
'old' Conservative Party had found it impractical to "reverse the vast bulk of the
accumulating detritus of socialism"." Thus one of the roots of the privatisation
10 See Joseph (1975) and (1976).
11 Joseph (1975) op. cit., at p6.
12 Onnted in his nhituarv Financial Times 1?Jh December 1994
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programme can be found in this intellectual dismantling of the post-war structure of
the British state.
This is where there is a significant interface with some trends in public law at that
time. For Joseph's expression of this ideology reflected a malaise within the ruling
elite in the seventies that found another outlet in constitutional writings. For example
during the seventies a number of works from the conservative tradition were
published which questioned the constitutional make-up of the British state." In many
ways these works revisited the period of Dicey with his works' criticism of the
modem state. Hailsham warned of "elective dictatorship?" similar to Hewart's "New
Despotism"." Nevil Johnson, another who published a critique of the British
Constitution in the seventies, was also a close follower of Dicey as shall be explored
later."
This use of public law will be examined more closely when the question of public law
academics assessing privatisation is looked at. Yet its significance here can be seen as
placing the intellectual roots of privatisation within a general discourse of the
restructuring of the state at least amongst a small section of public law academics.
However there were other rationales resting on economic grounds. In Lawson's glib
phrase there needed to be a "restoration of the market?" within the British state. That
is to say privatisation would bring back the more natural arrangement of economic
behaviour which had been distorted by the intervention of the public sector. This led
15 For Example, Johnson (1977) and Hailsham (1978).
106
to imbalances and inefficiencies that the 'market' would not tolerate. Yet both this
desire for 'efficiency' and the wish to restructure the state could not envisage the rapid
changes of the Thatcher administration and the momentum which would gather
behind the process of privatisation.
IN PRACTICE: PRIVATISATION.
After the 1979 election the state's relationship with industry was clearly going to be
different. However the vague nature of the plans and the secrecy which surrounded
their development" prevented any full discussion of the proposals. An example of this
was the leaked Ridley report in the seventies, which .along with analysing a future
!
confrontation with the miners" considered the possibility of privatisation in the
vaguest possible terms though removing the state's role in a limited number of
economic areas." Instead the programme began in a haphazard manner; dealing
mainly with industries operating in a competitive environment. In the words of one
expert commentator on privatisation the sales of this first period were "essentially
peripheral to the public sector"."
Arguably this is where lessons were learned for the larger scale utility sell-offs. There
was experimentation between fixed price share offers and tendering. The success rate
of these privatisations was by no means uniform. For example, the Amersham
19 Lawson(1988), p9.
20 In the period 1979-81 Lawson mentions three distinct committees which considered the question of
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International offer was 24 times oversubscribed because of a major underpricing of
the share whereas Britoil was massively undersubscribed. Other sales of this period
included the management buy-out of the National Freight Corporation, a trade sale of
shares in ICL and a disposal of 5% of the assets in RP. Yet, this was small beer.
The revenue raised by privatisation from 1979-83 was 4% of the total raised from
1983-92.
This situation changed, however, when attention turned to the public utilities. This
began with the disposal of British Telecom in 1984. Ostensibly this was to allow the
industry funds to invest in developments in telecommunications, which were speeding
up at this time. The sale was carried out by an offer to the public to invest. 2.3
million applications were received and it raised £3.9 bn. This total was 7 times
greater than any other sale up until that point." Although not a utility; the T.S.B,
during 1986, was sold even though it was held in court that the question of ownership
was extremely complex and the benefits of privatisation should not all pass to the
Government. 25 This was followed by the disposal of British Gas which again was a
"people's share issue'?" this time receiving 4.6 million applications.
The process continued through 1987 the year of the Conservatives' third consecutive
electoral victory. British Airways, Rolls Royce and the British Airports Authority
were all sold. One of BP's sell-offs coincided with the October crash of the world's
stock markets resulting in a massive underwriting of the sale. The immediate
23 K:w(lQR7) n l ?
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afterglow of the 1987 victory seemed to represent the zenith of the Thatcher era and
almost all public sector industry was earmarked for privatisation. This period was
when the privatisation of the rail network was seriously considered for the first time."
Further the sale of previously untouchable public services were carried out with the
water industry in 1989 and the electricity companies during 1990. Thus in the period
1983-92 nearly all the utilities were disposed of by Government. Alongside these
particular privatisations there was also a strong deregulatory ethic which resulted in
the partial deregulation of the financial services industry and the almost complete
deregulation of bus services." But what was the impetus behind it?
There is no officially sanctioned reason available as there has never been a
government statement on privatisation." One explanation is that of increasing the
accountability of the industries to the public in general." This is the test adopted in
this work to examine the structures both of privatisation and nationalisation. As has
been shown the experiment in the form of the public corporation did not increase
accountability or the public perception of it. But other explanations have been offered
as an alternative or an addition to this. These, too, should also be briefly examined.
One of the most common accounts of the programme is that it was done to improve
faltering Government finances by reducing the PSBR. Indeed during 1986-87 the
PSBR halved as a result ofprivatisation.
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There is support for this argument in the problems that arose after the sales over
questions of accountability and regulation. Here it seems that these issues were not
studied fully before the sales were carried out. Thus this would seem to support the
idea that the "desire to maximise returns to the Exchequer from disposals of public
enterprises has consistently outweighed issues of competition and efficiency in the
design of specific privatisation projects"." Indeed Nigel Lawson argues "[it was]
important to privatise as much as possible as quickly as possible"." He quotes
Pliatsky approvingly who claimed: "The prime motives for privatisation were not
Exchequer gain but an ideological belief in free markets"." However in practice the
lack of thought over regulatory structures and the introduction of competition after
privatisation suggests that the hastiness was due to a desire to gain financial
advantage. As an argument the inherent superiority of the free market has much in
cornmon with Norman Lewis' linking of the arrangement of the state, freedom and the
market as shall be illustrated later. Here another parallel can be drawn with the
nationalisation programme, that is an absence of coherent institutional design for the
post-privatisation environment. This has implications for the questions of public
accountability, as shall be examined, below. Furthermore, the question of reducing
the PSBR appears again during the process of rail privatisation and specifically the
privatisation ofRailtrack.
Even if this rationale is put to one side what of the 'efficiency' argument? That is that
the privatisation process was linked with the revival of industry: making it more
efficient. Indeed an early defence of the process of privatisation by a Government
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minister concluded "If competition cannot be achieved, an historic opportunity will be
10st".34 However the haste with which the sell-offs were completedas suggested by
Lawson did not allow for these new competitive markets to be completed or at least
not initially.
If the field of telecommunications is taken as an example a chance for immediate
complete liberalisation was lost with the controlled entry of Mercury into the market:
creating a 'cosy' duopoly. However, the process has speeded up considerably in the
nineties. Following the Government's 'duopoly' review of 1991 British Telecom was
prevented from delivering entertainment services until 2001. This has allowed cable
services to make a substantial imoad into the delivery of phone services as part of an
overall entertainment package. These companies have attempted to buy into local
markets 35 and even the American telecoms giant AT&T has taken a stake in smaller
telecommunications companies." Significantly cable operators now have more
subscribers for their phone services rather than their television channels. Britain has
now become the general model for the rest of the European Union's liberalisation
programme: almost the whole ofthe European network was liberalised in 1998.
This process is agam seen if we examme the gas industry. In the eyes of the
advocates of increased competition the 1986 disposal of British Gas was seen as the
32 Lawson(1992), p239.
33 Pliatsky (1991), p .
34 M onre (] QRit n 11
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nadir of the whole privatisation programme." In Christopher Foster's words it was the
"least satisfactory?" privatisation. For it was transferred to the private sector
wholesale - keeping its monopoly of supply and transmission. None of the problems
of nationalisation were solved and the consumer remained at the mercy of a large
vertically integrated corporation. Thus, the lack of competition negated the positive
effects of introducing gas to the rigours of the private sector. But this situation did not
remain static indeed British Gas's size and monopoly position caused tensions
between the industry and its statutory regulatorr-Ofgas, In the words of the Financial
I
Times this led to a "decade of bitter conflict"." Competition was introduced in a
protracted fashion. This illustrates how difficult it is for Central Government simply
to end political intervention in previously nationalised industries, although this is
often cited as another rationale for privatisation.
There were two monopoly inquiries in 1988 looking at the industrial market and 1992
that examined the domestic monopoly. Competition was first seen among industrial
users using more than 25,000 therms a year." In 1996 in this area British Gas's share
of this market has fallen to 35%. The process of competition in the much larger
domestic market was hastened by the Gas Act in 1995. This forced the corporation to
separate its transmission arm from its supply. Its intention was for full competition to
exist for domestic users by 1998. This complete liberalisation was to be preceded by
competition being adopted in trial areas. Thus, in April 1996 competition was
introduced in SouthWest England among 500,000 consumers. As there is only one
37 At least prior to 1992.
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network for the transmission of Gas - operated by the new arm of British Gas Transco
- / I
- suppliers have to have access, which they are charged for. ' In this area a number ofJ ___
different companies tried to establish themselves with 'hard' selling techniques in the
area. The local Electricity Company, SWEB, claimed up to 60,000 consumers would
register with them for gas supply. This raised the vision of a 'super-utility'
developing, a process also illustrated by the spate of mergers and take-overs in the
utility sector in the mid-nineties .
The travails of the gas industry are significant because they seem to explore all the
tensions that exist within the whole privatisation programme. Indeed; following a
hefty pay increase for the Chairman of British Gas which ignited significant public
anger and caused an inquiry into executive pay .the corporation came to symbolise the
/
excesses of privatisation. During the eighties the transfer of monopolies from the
public to the private sector was criticised by ardent advocates of competition. Yet, at
the time, Government seemed to support it: "we firmly believe that where competition
is impractical privatisation policies have now been developed to such an extent that
regulation of private natural monopolies is preferable to nationalisation"."
The 'efficiency' justification for privatisation, then, is not simply a question of
introducing competition. In the case of gas and telecommunications this has been a
long and laboured process involving the industry, its regulator and central
government. Efficiency improvements come about through new regulatory structures
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that are more effective in policing these industries than the structure of the public
corporation. This brings the debate back to the Zeit-motif of accountability. Before
the effectiveness ofnew structures of regulation is examined it is worthwhile to note a
tension here between different rationales ofprivatisation.
One commentator has claimed that the tension between complete liberalisation and a
policed privatisation with new regulators is not a conflict but a "rout"." That is the
idea of ex-nationalised industries competing in a completely free market place with
minimal government involvement is completely unrealised. In an extension of the
argument: "Denationalisation now appears to take precedence over or even to be
carried out at the expense of, the promotion of competition"." Thus the significance
of transferring ownership is according to these commentators much greater than that
of introducing competition." Government, to them, is more interested in gaining a
quick fix of funds to pacify the Exchequer and solve the problem of the PSBR,45 albeit
temporarily. As a result the new regulatory structures were not clearly thought out
and the benefits of privatisation were lost. As has been shown, this has been disputed
sharply by the leading protagonists. This debate may have moved on a little
particularly in the mid-nineties with the further 1ibera1isation in the electricity and gas
industries. But the length of time it took to develop these processes and now the
growth of 'mega- utilities' which compete in many different sectors illustrate the point
on the lack of a clear rationale for the regulators. That is they tend to react to events
and have pursued contradictory objectives at different paces.
42 Introduction in Kay, Mayer and Thompson op. cit., p29.
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A useful counter point to the contradiction of privatising sections of the state whilst
maintaining regulatory structures" is the deregulation project carried out in the United
States under Carter and Reagan. America, having no significant history of state
ownership, decided instead to cut back its powerful regulatory agencies. Yet the
Thatcher administration with its privatisation of the utilities and the creation of new
regulators seemed to adopt a different emphasis. This seems puzzling given the
ideological links between the two administrations. However Sir Christopher Foster
claims that this apparent paradox does not exist in reality. Thus although "because of
the vagueness and incoherence of nationalisation?" the British privatisation
programme looked less like deregulation, deregulation in fact occurred. This
argument is expanded by two of the architects of privatisation: "U.S. regulation
embodies a philosophy similar to nationalisation with similar effects"." This may be
true but the creation of new regulatory agencies remained a fact, with the partial
exception of the 'deregulated' bus industry as shall be fully explored in later chapters.
Even the financial services industry that was so central to the programme of
Thatcherism has a number of boards which regulate their members alongside the
statutory role of the Securities and Investment Board." Thus the existence of the
regulators alters the nature of privatisation in Britain. They can be used as a vehicle
of intervention in the 'privatised' industry whether to protect the consumer or to
introduce competition. So, the privatisation programme although sharing an
45 With a degree of prescience given the increase of the PSBR in the nineties Heald and Steel, ibid.,
claimed the gains could be negated by "the possible loss of future income", p7.
46 Alheit unsatisfactorv.
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intellectual credo with deregulation created a complex hybrid of liberalisation and
denationalisation. How accountable are the new arrangements?
PRIVATISATION: ACCOUNTABLE?
As was suggested in the preceding chapters accountability can be disparate in nature;
it is often spread between different institutions which weakens its overall
effectiveness. Moreover, each institution can have its own sometimes contradictory
model of accountability. This was clearly the case in the public corporation but
similar trends can be discerned in privatisation. It is critically important that the
definition one gives to accountability and the model one sees as most important is
made clear. During the first privatisations of the utilities much was made of a new
'people's capitalism' - this involved a new concept of accountability in this context: to
the shareholder. But as mentioned above one of the new roles of the regulator was to
hold the industries to account in certain areas. Thus initially we find two distinct
types of accountability. Both of these should be examined to see whether they
complement or contradict each other and whether they are an improvement on the
public ownership experience.
The accountability of "people's capitalism".
The notion of 'popular capitalism' came to the fore during the disposal of the utilities
by public sales. Nigel Lawson, with characteristic modesty, claims to have invented
the phrase following the privatisation of British Telecom: "We are seeing the birth of
change"."
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people's capitalism"." Furthermore, he stood this in the Conservative tradition traced
back to Anthony Eden of creating a 'property owning democracy' only this time
expanded to industry. It created "a society with an in-built resistance to revolutionary
\
Such high-faulting claims are matched with a perceived demographic
change.
/
In 1979 there-were 2.5 million individual shareholders (4.5% of the
population) by 1992 this had increased to 11 million (25%) .52 The creation of a share-
owning democracy with the Conservative Party permanently in power was seen as a
realisable notion. The 1987 Conservative Manifesto said a widening of share
ownership let people "feel part of the system by which wealth is created"." This can
be seen as a Schumpeterian notion: that is giving the working class a material interest
in capitalism. Moore labelled the process an 'extraordinary' success" whilst many in
right wing think tanks thought its political impact to be irreversible."
These exaggerated claims have been strongly tested by recent studies of share-
ownership . The Saunders/Harris study shows that share ownership is "wide but
J "'~,x'L./I-,v(-J
shallow"," and 10 million only own shares in one or two companies. Many relinquish
t\.
their shares only after a few years. Further the trend in share ownership is to the
increased dominance of institutions. In Britain this is primarily true because of the
ft: , . ,V'"v,~
(~_.l"'\~
growth of the pension funds. This has lead to a diminution of individual shareholders;
"-
50 Lawson (1992) op. cit., p224 .
51 Lawson ibid., p206.
52 SaunderslHarris op. cit., p4.
53 Quoted at ibid., p26.
54 M""rp nn rit nQ<;
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in 1957 66% of shares on the Stock Exchange were owned by individuals whereas
now it stands at 20.2%.57
This lack of actual influence within the structures of the privatised industries is also
accompanied by only a limited change in societal attitudes. The conclusion of
Saunders/Harris state "the sociological effects of this programme has been muted"."
------In contrast to the claims made during the eighties they say the belief that privatisation
had fundamentally altered society was "much ado about nothing"." In support for this
they cite the annual survey of British Attitudes which appear to have actually moved
to the left during the period of mass privatisations. It will be shown below when rail
privatisation is studied that these attitudes were important in the perception of that
particular privatisation and the model that was adopted. This more sober assessment
of privatisation' s success in altering society is generally supported by Sir Christopher
Foster. " It altered the political structure to the point where that alteration contributed
to Conservative victories in several general elections't." This is the sole extent to
which he believes privatisation altered the British polity. The Economist in its usually
frank language perhaps best summarises the changed attitude towards 'popular
capitalism': "A share-owning democracy is a neat political phrase- but the market tells
against it" .61
These examples are significant when the question of accountability is examined. A
centra l tenet of privatisation was that being accountable to an identifiable group of
57 ibid., p3.
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shareholders was preferable to a more amorphous accountability to an unidentifiable
'public'. Again the vague way in which accountability was initially characterised for
the public corporation is shown here. Although the public corporation attempted to
mimic the accountability of the joint stock company it was never made clear how the
board was to be directly accountable to the public." Lawson talked of a sense of "real
ownership" following privatisation where shareholders followed the price of their
shares in the newspaper, received regular information from the company and attended
the AGM.63 Thus the ability of the shareholders to hold their board to account would
be an improvement on the indirect control a member of the public could exert through
their MP. The zeitgeist of the times was that of the 'Sid' generation" controlling
these industries.
If we set aside the statistical evidence of the limited weight of the individual
shareholder this view of accountability still raises problems. These are due to the
conflict between the shareholder and the consumer. A parallel can again be drawn
with public ownership where there was a claim that a conflict existed between the
workforce and the consumers in the nationalised industries. But is it inevitable that
the consumer is penalised at the expense of the shareholder or vice versa? Clearly one
of the regulator's roles is to prevent this happening as shall be shown below. Yet the
notion of 'popular capitalism' cannot be easily squared with accountability to the
consumer. Is it fair in a utility to have accountability to be defined by reference to the
61 ThF' Fr.()n()mi~t 11thNov 1Q<n
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'minority' -the shareholders - rather than the general population which uses the
service?
An example to illustrate this can again be drawn from the gas industry. In a recent
ruling the gas regulator outlined tough new price controls on the transmission arm of
British Gas Transco. This would involve the prices charged to gas suppliers being cut
by 20-28%. The charges make up 43% of an average gas bill thus any limit would
clearly benefit the average gas user. However, this affects the profitability of the
industry, which directly affects the shareholder. In the words ofthe Financial Times it
was a "very black day for 1.7 million Sids".65 Yet even this view is a little dated as
the Chief Executive of British Gas, Richard Giordano, recently stated his desire to
"ease Aunt Maud out ...without any pain"." This means, to remove any remaining
small shareholders.
So, even if the notion of shareholders having power to hold privatised companies to
account is accepted this is an accountability of the few. Yet even within this limited
vision of accountability what power do disparate shareholders have against the
organised force of institutions? Any potential shareholder revolt" can be easily
thwarted by the sheer size of the institutions. There is a current argument that the
dominance of pension and insurance funds in the ownership of shares" means that
indirectly the British people do own these industries." This again is spurious given
both the limited control that ordinary people have over their pension and insurance
65 Financial Times, 14th May 1996.
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funds, and thus the control which these bodies do exercise is normally to support the
boards of the industry. In total, this is an extremely indirect form of control.
If then accountability by owning shares is seen as bogus can enhanced accountability
through privatisation be provided by the new regulatory structures? Will this be an
improvement on the structures of the nationalised industries?
Accountability and the new Regulators.
If it is accepted that the privatisation programme took an idiosyncratic route in its
creation then the same can be said for the regulatory agencies that came into being to
monitor each utility. Once more there was no one definitive statement as to the
rationale for the regulators. In its absence, different rationales were used to define the
regulators. Arguably the administration 1eant on different meanings at different times.
The nearest thing to a written account in the early eighties came with two relatively
short documents written by Stephen Littlechild" proposing regulatory structures for
the telecom and water industry.
The essence of Littlechild's thought in his study of the proposals for British Telecom
at this time was that regulation should act in a non-competitive environment.
"Regulation is essentially a means of preventing the worst excesses of monopoly; it is
not a substitute for competition. It is a means of 'holding the fort' until competition
arrives"." There are difficulties with this 'second-best' approach utilised at this time
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for it did not allow a full exploration of the regulatory agencies' role. In the context
of telecommunications one of the regulator's major roles was to prepare the ground
for competition. This approach altered when Littlechild examined the water industry.
As the potential for competition here was extremely limited the regulator was to take
on more of a permanent nature. "That makes it all the more important to 'get the
regulation right'"." Littlechild's approach rests on the idea that regulators must act in
an area where there is only limited competition. This role may be temporary or
permanent depending on the environment of the industry. Yet over a decade later the
regulator of telecommunications (OFTEL) looks no less permanent than the water
regulator (OFWAT) nor the other regulators in the electricity and gas industry, not to
mention the extremely detailed structure of regulation which has been created for the
rail network. It is little wonder that a leading economist said that the "unfinished
business" of designing regulatory agencies "will be a major part of the political
agenda of the nineties"."
Where does this leave the question of accountability? What linked Littlechild's two
concepts of regulation was the notion that the "primary purpose of regulation is to
protect the consumer"." Indeed Littlechild writing with another early proponent of
privatisation proposed that the basic criterion" should be a net aggregate gain to the
consumer. 76 The model of regulation would not mimic u.s regulators and attack
profits but would rather put controls on prices. They would be allowed to rise by an
72 Litt1echi1d (1987) at p5.
73 Kay in IEA (1995) at p58.
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amount relative to the rate of inflation set by the regulator; the so-called RPI-X
formula. Littlechild argued that this approach was simpler, cheaper and less
interventionist than 'rate of return' regulation. It would also introduce stability into an
industry's plans. Inherent in this approach to regulation was the fear of 'regulatory
capture'77 again similar to the American situation. The theory is that when a regulator
is closely involved in monitoring a company's profits it will tend to 'second-guess'
the company and become more defensive of its interests. In short the regulator will
end up in its pocket. This can also happen when the regulator is completely
dependent on the industry for information. It was felt that by adopting the RPI-X
formula - as was done for all the major privatisations of utilities - the consumer would
feel a direct benefit in lower prices and the government could argue that the regulation
was "light-rein?" enough to satisfy ardent proponents of liberalisation. Yet the many
contradictions within the policing of the utilities which we have often referred to were
not eliminated. Ironically the attempt to benefit consumers with the price regulation
had a quid pro quo. By adopting this approach the relationship between regulator and
industry became more adversarial and caused major difficulties over questions of
accountability.
This relationship is epitomised by the regulators and ministers' ability to issue
licences to operate in the competitive environment. Further regulators can amend the
license if the licensee agrees; if not referrals can be made to the Monopolies and
Mergers Commission. This approach was adopted in the Telecommunications Act
and followed in most of the other privatisations of the utilities. On paper it seems
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quite straight-forward but in practice the regulator will be negotiating with one large
enterprise which completely dominates all potential competitors. To threaten an
MMC referral is similar to the 'nuclear' option of the nationalised industry where the
minister could threaten to sack the whole board. In practice it is used very rarely,
although recently it has been threatened and used more often, and most changes are
negotiated between the two parties - again similar to nationalisation. In two public
lawyers' words "negotiation and bargaining are institutionalised in Britain"." Again
it could be argued that even these elements have been developed in a clearer way
since the late eighties. For example as will be shown in the case of rail privatisation
the regulator's role has a little more bite and he has statutory duties of consultation.
Even here however the limits of British-style regulation have been seen in the
attempts to ensure Railtrack makes the required amount of investment in the rail
network. 80 As noted in the chapter on public ownership secrecy does not easily allow
for accountability. However these processes are now much more open. The problem
is with the range of interests represented by the regulator and by their reactive nature
of regulatory intervention.
However perhaps the regulators can hold the industry to account when they do utilise
the mechanism of the MMC. Littlechild argued in his 1983 document that from his
own experience "the MMC is not a particularly swift or effective mechanism for
combating the market power of a dominant supplier". 81 A decade later the economist
78 This was one of the instructions given to Littlechild by the Secretary of State, Littlechild (1983) op.
rit n~Q
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John Kay argued that the MMC was the "dog that has not barked't" and that many
deals were made behind closed doors. In contrast to this the then head of the MMC
writing in the same collection of essays argued that his organisation would have a
"long-term relationship?" with the utilities. Further he adds that the MMC should be
involved more frequently. Significantly he states that "regulation was not necessarily
designed to be a long-term replacement for the competitive market?" echoing
Littlechild's earlier statement. One industry where the MMC has intervened quite
significantly" is the bus market. This role will be examined in more detail in the
relevant chapter but from the experience of other privatisations is it an effective means
of accountability? The MMC is only utilised in exceptional situations and its
mechanisms are not always transparent and often erratic. This fits in with the use of
the MMC as a distant threat to achieve deals rather than it playing a central role. All
in all it does not augur well for a system of accountability to the consumer, if
accountability is viewed from the perspective of the public and it perceives the
services it uses. For if privatisation is to be viewed as a success in increasing
accountability then a measure of this must be related to how the public view these
industries as suggested in Chapter One.
One of the major drawbacks of the system of Morrisonian nationalisation was the
inherent secrecy within the British state. A radical attempt to break with this in the
creation of the public corporation failed and more traditional concepts and institutions
came to the fore in the definition of accountability, yet these did not provide greater
82 Kav (in. cit.. at n60.
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openness in this new area of state intervention. Clearly any system of regulation
needs as much access to as much information as possible. In the privatisation statutes
there is a duty to publish the licenses of the operators in the privatised environment.
Further there are specific statutory duties for the Director Generals of the regulators to
demand information from their industry and publish it" where they deem it expedient.
This is indeed a step forward yet with no British Freedom ofInformation Act87 there is
not complete 'sunshine regulation'. Indeed Graham and Prosser argued in the late
eighties that "in practice licenses have been drafted and privatisation has taken place
in such a way as to limit the amount of information actually available"." This is done
by the industries limiting the definition of what they need to reveal although in some
cases there are harsh penalties for withholding information." Again some regulators
have tried to developing a system for recording information on their respective
industries rather than relying on information given to them by the industry.
So if accountability is defined as having more access to information then these new
structures are a partial success but this is to be weighed against the informal methods
of bargaining between regulator and regulated. Again this contradiction can be seen
to be due to the confusing rationale used when the regulators were initially designed.
However, as noted, developments in both privatisation and deregulation have
improved the situation in part. Information flow has been placed on a firmer footing
and the powers of the regulators made clearer. Yet this cannot remove the confused
rationale for their birth which still allows for overlap and the potential for
86 See Telecommunications Act 1984 s48; Gas Act 1986 s38; Water Act 1989 ss32-33: Electricity Act
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misdirection. It is also the contention of this work that the nature of an independent
regulator will by nature be on the outside looking in, and any accountability will
always be after the fact to some degree - it is a reactive regulation. As noted in the
Introduction of this work, this echoes Harden and Lewis' phrase: "ex post
accountability". This problem could only be solved with the development of a system
of public ownership with regulation an integral part of it. This stems from the
argument outlined in the Introduction that with privatisation profit necessarily
becomes the driving force, indeed that was a leading reason for the process supported
by Lawson and Thatcher. The laudable aims of providing a public service - so
important in the forties - were demoted. Although part of the new regulator's role
would be to promote these aims it does not have a nature which could be involved in
the direction of the service; rather it reacts to how the service is delivered. Admittedly
this is something the Morrisonian model never achieved. Moreover the era of
Thatcher's premiership tended to emphasise the regulators' role in introducing the
'market' in areas previously dominated by the public sector rather than promoting the
social responsibilities of the industries. However the regulator's ambiguous role can
be seen by the different emphasis in tone - perhaps not in substance as shall be seen
later - adopted by Major's new government in the early nineties.
The Citizens Charter" claimed to be a defining moment in the pursuit of 'Majorism'-
following John Major's elevation to Prime Minister in 1990. This emphasised the
citizen as consumer and challenged large companies to respect their rights. How did it
affect the regulation of the utilities? Certainly it seemed to change the emphasis from
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the shareholder to the individual consumer. This trend was confirmed by the
introduction of the Competition and Service (Utilities) Act 199291 which legislated to
give the regulators more powers to protect consumers. In the words of Peter Lilley,
then Minister at the Department of Trade and Industry it "puts the consumer first?"
J
and largely brought all the regulators into line by giving them all similar powers. It
required procedures for handling complaints, and gave more power to collect
information for performance indicators and to publish information for the consumers.
In short it emphasised and underlined the role of regulators as protectors of the
consumer backed with their powers to limit prices not profits.
The National Consumer Council, however, remams sceptical as to the beneficial
tr--" .
aspects of privatisation programme and the role of the regulators . In a report
t
published in 199393 it agrees that competition seems to be the best solution; although
it compares it to a Pandora's BOX,94 as the problems created in the regulation of
utilities and the creation of competition are more complex than first imagined.
Further the NCC claimed that debates carried out by the regulator have more to do
with "esoteric economic argument than with the legitimate concern of consumers"."
This has resulted in a wedge being driven between the consumer and competition. A
clear manifestation of this idea lies in the relatively higher bills the consumer has to
pay to meet the cost of any changes designed to bring about greater competition; for
example, in telecommunications, where bills have fallen but arguably not as quickly
90Cmnd.1599.
91 1992 c43 .
92 Hf' nph Nnvernher 1Rth 1991 col ~7
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as they should have. This cost is alienated from the actual benefits of restructuring -
the consumer is expected to wait for "jam tomorrow"." Thus, the notion that
regulators are always perceived as serving the consumers by enhancing accountability
is not completely correct. Indeed their role in attempting to introduce competition is
full of difficulties when it is carried out in specific instances.
Even the trend of the Major administration to treat the regulators as consumers'
champions has not been constant. The picture becomes more complex when we
examine the new ethics of'Majorism' -post 1992- which emphasise the 'jungle' of red
tape and the need to slash regulations. The whole process seems to have been turned
on its head: "Deregulation is the name of the game in public and private life"."
Witness the executive power given to the President of the Board of Trade in the
Deregulation and Contracting Out Act 1994.98 As Will Hutton, the popular
economist, put it: "the Government is voting itself the competence in effect to remove
regulation by decree"." The practical effects of this trend on the existing regulators
may be limited given the legislation of recent years. Indeed, the idea of deregulating
or removing the powers of the utility regulators was specifically rejected by the
National Consumer Council.!" But the fact that superficial changes in political trends
can alter the way in which regulators operate shows the ad hoc method in which the
regulators were initially created in the eighties. It seems like they were created almost
as an afterthought.
96 ibid., p12l.
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The accountability offered by the new regulators, then, seems to be incomplete.
Information flow has increased but only to a limited extent, the structures of decision-
making are still not transparent and the regulators are tied to the RPI - X formula
rather than regulating the profits of this industry. Moreover the regulation is
inherently reactive because they are regulating private industries which exist to make
profit. Thus the step forward of the public corporation promoting public service
rather than profit has been lost. The regulators are only partially more accountable in
that they promote more information flow but have less say in the overall direction of
the industries. It is argued here that this definition of accountability continues to
ignore the "public" and their perception of the new industry just as nationalisation did
in the forties. This conclusion will be measured against the actual structures of
regulation in the 'new' railways in a later chapter.
However before the evidence of deregulation and privatisation III transport is
examined, how have public lawyers adapted to the new 'accountability' of
privatisation?
THE 'NEW' PUBLIC LAWYERS RESPONSE.
In the introduction the trend towards creating a 'new' public law by leading academics
was noted. Although no consensus could be reached the conclusion was reached that
each sought reference to some type of external framework. Of particular relevance to
the area of privati sation was Harden and Lewis' use of contract and the market as new
methods of achieving accountability. Moreover, nearly all of the academics undertook
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empirical work which to some extent was influenced by the new models of regulation
and contract. Harden and Lewis undertook an early study of privatisation'?' and
moved on to studies of contracting out and market testing as noted. Loughlin studied
the changing nature of local government in the eighties and nineties which involved
the increased use of contract and new modes of regulation. Finally most of Prosser's
work has concerned privatisation, public ownership and regulatory structures.l" So
the work of these academics is of importance not simply for their new theoretical
structures but for their judgement on new administrative structures.
This situation lends itself to some ironic contradictions. All these academics are to
some extent post-Diceyan in their outlook."? Yet the era of Thatcherism really gave
their work a chance to flourish. In other words the new arrangements of the state
brought into being in the last fifteen years have proved ample scope for introducing
questions of accountability; not that all these academics necessarily agree with the
changes. But the advent of Thatcherism was meant to herald the dawn of a 'new'
individualism echoing the sentiments of Dicey and his followers earlier this century.
In this sense surely the trend of academic public law should have confirmed this by
following its traditional routes in line with Dicey.
It has been observed that the doctrine of privatisation can be traced to a time in the
seventies when a number of constitutional thinkers on the right were arguing the case
101 Harden/Lewis (1983),
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for substantial constitutional reform.'?' One of these writers was also involved in an
appreciation ofDicey at the time of the centenary of the publication ofhis work on the
constitution. Johnson argued that Dicey's work was "penetrating" had "elegant
simplicity" and "in respect of British Constitutional Law there was a gap to fill and
triumphantly he filled it".105 His words here are unsurprising given that his work was
written in a legal tradition and drew heavily on Dicey, although significantly his
support for limited government was coupled with external constraints such as a
written constitution. However Harden and Lewis also show their admiration of
Johnson's work. In the Noble Lie106 they call his work a "sentient constitutional
essay"?" and quote approvingly his words that constitutional principles are a
"necessary condition for having any discourse at all about how purposes are to be
fulfilled in that society".'?" Perhaps it would be a caricature to label Johnson a neo-
Diceyan but his influence on 'new' public lawyers like Harden and Lewis is
significant.
A further confirmation of this overlap can be seen from other contributions to the
symposium on Dicey where Johnson made his comments. Patrick McAuslan - a
public law academic who has studied planning law in quite a lot of detail - criticised
"politicians only too willing to preach Diceyan principles the better to disguise
distinctly un-Diceyan practices".'?" McAuslan was of the opinion that public law
tended to be dominated with too much "Low" constitutional law - primarily empirical
104 See above.
105 Johnson (1985), p720.
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in focus, whereas Dicey's skill was to embody the High law with his grand vision.
Perhaps we can relate this back to Harden and Lewis' model of "immanent critique"
which criticised Dicey not for the substance of the 'rule of law' but because it was
unrealisable within the British state. So, again there is shared ground with Dicey.
This is important when their attitudes to privatisation and the regulatory structures are
examined.
As was previously seen Harden and Lewis were broadly supportive of the utilising of
contract and market mechanisms within the state. It will be remembered in Lewis'
essay on Reinventing British Government for the lEA he envisaged that privatisation
is normally the best solution in the public sector. The roots of this thought in their
work can be seen again in The Noble Lie. "Indeed both contract and property rights
may be seen as the embodiment of a relatively decentralised economic order which
clearly offers some resistance to concentrations of arbitrary power"?" Thus their
description of contract fits neatly in with their definition of the rule of law seen in the
previous chapter. As previously mentioned in the introduction the idea of the
'eternal' notion of contract and the communal notion of the 'rule of law' owe a great
deal to Hayek. Among the 'new' public lawyers this link was explicitly made by
Allen. It is through these ideas perhaps that a link can be made between a section of
modem public law academics and the ideology of the ThatcherlMajor era.
However generalisations are of little use: Harden as noted in the introduction is a
slightly less enthusiastic proponent of privatisation but he does support the idea that
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contract in itself is a counterweight to arbitrariness in public authorities. This is
because it clearly delineates duties and responsibilities of parties to the contract. In a
certain sense one can draw a parallel with the licenses awarded by the utilities. Again
this approach links in to Prosser's work; he again is not an enthusiastic supporter of
the process of 'marketisation' but realises the benefits of having distinct regulatory
bodies. By their existence they raise the whole issue of regulatory control, which was
masked in the public corporation model. In addition he supports increased information
flow or rather the potential of this information being readily available even though it
falls far short of 'sunshine' regulation as there is no Freedom ofInformation Act.11I
Clearly there are some uncontroversial points among these remarks on the regulatory
bodies and the use of contract. The increase in information available and the existence
of contractual documents are a boon to the whole community. Yet as argued in this
work that this amounts to only partial accountability. The sense of creating a structure
which promotes public service rather than profit is lost, and this then maintains the
distance between the public and the industry. This will be illustrated later by the
examination of bus deregulation and rail privatisation. With other privatisations the
work of the utilities' regulators has been erratic. There has been no uniformity. The
continual existence of informal bargaining methods and distant threats of the MMC
tells against a coherent system of accountability. Further the refusal to implement a
regulatory structure which monitors profits rather than prices has also increased
alienation from these industries by the public. This has materialised in the row over
'fat cats', high profits and executive pay.
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It is the thesis of this work as mentioned both in the introduction and in the brief study
of the British experience of nationalisation that the inability to achieve this type of
accountability is because the question of ownership has been overlooked.
Privatisation has solved some of the problems of nationalisation and the public
corporation structure but cannot solve them all precisely because of the re-
introduction of the profit motive. This has been because ownership has been
transferred from the whole community - no matter how imperfect an arrangement the
actual experience was- to a private sector that exists mainly to create shareholder
value. The secrecy and inefficiency of the Morrisonian model gave the proponents of
privatisation much ammunition in their struggle to sell the utilities. This was
particularly the case in the area of enhanced accountability, and is even reflected
among a section of public lawyers who believe that accountability can only be
achieved by the private sector and the methods it uses. It will be the task of the
following chapters to refute these arguments and to show that public ownership is
central to a system of genuine accountability.
To start this exposition the process within the bus industry will be examined, as an
example of an industry where an almost complete model of deregulation was used.
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CHAPTER FOUR
"The present system of regulation which has been with us for 50 years, has stifled
the flexible and innovative approach necessary if the bus industry is to meet the
travel needs of the 1980s".
Nicholas Ridley, 1985.1
INTRODUCTION
The bus industry as it stood in the seventies seemed to be the epitome of everything
the Thatcher administration wanted to reform. Not only did it involve a highly
regulated structure which had been in place more or less unaltered for half a century
but the public sector completely dominated the provision of services. Prior to the
election of 1979 there were 101 public operators who provided 92% of stage carriage
mileage.'
This public domination was at both national and local level. The creation of seven
Passenger Transport Authorities' following local government reorganisation in the
seventies was intended to facilitate a local integrated transport network. Other bus
travel was provided by the National Bus Company and the Scottish Bus Group, both
of which were publicly owned.
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Following the May 1979 General Election, the government was not long in bringing
its first plan for the buses. This paved the way for the Transport Act 1980 which
deregulated express coach services. In the second term there was a wholesale
deregulation of local bus services under the Transport Act 1985. Thus the dismantling
of the regulatory framework for bus services was done over the eighties, largely in
two parts. The immediate effect of each piece of legislation was very chaotic and took
effect suddenly. In brief, during the early eighties there was a mushrooming of new
coach companies whilst in the mid eighties there was a series of 'bus wars'.
If the test outlined in the first three chapters is used then the bus industry would seem
to be a good example of the unaccountable structure implicit in the nationalised
model. Further, the Conservative administration's use of a completely new
deregulatory structure would seem to underline its suitability as a test for the model of
accountability. How accountable was the old system and did it improve when the old
regulatory structures were removed?
This study will place the development of the regulation of the bus industry in
historical context. Then the development of the deregulation proposals will be
examined. The process of deregulation itself will be analysed in two distinct parts; to
some degree this follows previous academic studies of bus deregulation. Most of
these empirical examinations took place one or two years after the initial deregulation
of the industry, and thus showed the initial trends and effects. However deregulation
took place a decade ago and recently there have been some rapid developments in the
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will conclude with a survey of the initial effects of deregulation. The following
chapter will have a detailed exploration of the latest trends in the deregulated arena. It
will then conclude with a detailed case study of the Glasgow bus industry which in
many ways can be seen as a microcosm of the wider trends in urban Britain. This will
be justified below. Reference throughout will be made to interviews which were
carried out with participants in the bus industry.
ENDING "UNFAIR COMPETITION" :
THE ROAD TRAFFIC ACT 1930.
It is worthwhile pointing out that the public control of the bus industry predated the
1945-51 Labour Government when most of the other nationalisation measures were
carried out; it was introduced by the second Ramsey MacDonald-led Labour
Government of 1929-31 following a Royal Commission on Transport. The Road
Traffic Act 1930 divided the country into seven areas in which the licensing of bus
routes would be administered by a Traffic Commissioner. Thus at this stage the
system of control was administered by government rather than the delivery of services
which was more varied. One observer claimed that many "bus companies owned by
the railways followed them almost accidentally into public ownership?' in the 1940s.
Furthermore, this method of acquisition meant that the "structure of ownership is
more complex than in other industries dominated by publicly owned companies"."
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For this work it is important to place legislation in context. This legislation is a good
example of the public intervention during the historical period examined in the
introduction. In the inter-war period government intervened extensively. Road Traffic
was now to be regulated by centrally appointed administrators. Moreover, there were
the beginnings of a welfare state, an increased use of delegated legislation and the
formation of new tribunals acting as a substitute for the courts in some areas. As was
shown in the legal field this process was met with open hostility by the followers of
Dicey. The Traffic Commissioners with their power to run tribunals and issue
licences are probably a good example of what Hewart would have labelled the "New
Despotism"." It is important to view the intervention of the state in traffic licensing as
part of 'new' state activity in the twentieth century which precipitated the
development of a system of public law and the debates over Dicey." Moreover the
criticism brought against the Act by the deregulators of the eighties has echoes of the
Diceyan school of public law albeit from a more overtly economic perspective. They
share a very limited view of what the state should be involved in. Significantly this
view is now shared by some modem public law thinkers who struggled against the
Diceyan norm in the discipline of public law, as detailed in Chapter 1.
However the trend of an ever increasing administrative structure in the thirties
intersected with another historical phenomenon of that time which provided more
specific reasons for public intervention. This was the rapid growth in use of the motor
vehicle and its resulting impact on the environment and the health of the nation. In
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the twenties there had been a rapid increase in road accidents which many believed
was due to the haphazard and dangerous way buses were run.
The legislation was preceded by a Royal Commission on Transport whose second
report" more or less provided the basis for the bulk of the Act. This process was not
unique, indeed as discussed in Chapter 2 most nationalisations were preceded by an
official report favouring some form of state control. However it must be restated that
the primary aim of the Act was to license the industry rather than to take over
complete ownership. Legislation had been passed in the nineteenth century, the Town
Police Acts of 1847 and 1889 for England and Wales and the Burgh Police (Scotland)
Act 1889, to regulate the growth in use of passenger carrying vehicles. However, this
was entirely discretionary and did not apply in large areas of Britain. Also the scope
of these controls was relatively limited and did not cover changes in the routes or
services. In the words of the Commission these laws were "drawn at a time when
nobody could reasonably foresee the changes which the future was to bring forth"."
The legislation was so ambiguously drafted as to allow a large body of case law to
develop around such phrases as 'plying for hire'. In Scotland it was decided in Craik
v Wood 10 that a bus could not be defined as a 'hackney carriage' thus the legislation
was not applicable to them and no licences were required. Thus the law as it stood was
in a very unsatisfactory position. Local authorities tried to regulate the services by
other means. With the power to implement the existing legislation in the hands of
local authorities bye-laws had to be passed which mostly covered very small
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geographical areas. This encouraged the Royal Commission to look at the idea of
larger Traffic Areas which were more appropriate to bus services. Of the witnesses to
the Royal Commission only the local authorities opposed this idea. Significantly, this
model had been adopted in Northern Ireland where the Home Affairs Minister was in
overall charge of the scheme under the Motor Vehicles (Traffic and Regulation) Act
(Northern Ireland) 1926. In summary the Commission believed "the present chaotic
system of licensing which is based upon obsolete laws passed long before mechanical
traction existed, must disappear and be replaced by an entirely different system more
suited to present needs". 11
Some modem transport economists and proponents of deregulation in the eighties
disputed the concepts underlying the regulatory structures created by the 1930 Act and
the findings of the Royal Commission. Glaister and Mulley argue that the legislation
was a crystallisation of the inter-war distrust of competition. It was based on the
"predominant fallacy of the era - unfair competition was synonymous with free
competition"." These economists' views can again be linked back to the right wing
thinkers of the seventies described in Chapter 3 who also labelled the inter-war period
the time when the Conservative party lost its bearings and prepared the ground for the
post-war consensus.
A major part of the Royal Commission's area of examination was indeed the wasteful
competition inherent in the unregulated bus services. These are complaints which will
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be revisited when the deregulated market of the eighties and nineties is examined. 13
This was epitomised by the 'fly-by-night' operator who could send buses on the peak
route at peak times simply to make profits. They had no need to run a network or a
consistent timetable and could cancel services at will as long as they gained customers
on the busy routes. For example one Traffic Commissioner reported on the situation
in Stoke on Trent where ninety buses operated. These were run by twenty-five
different companies who competed fiercely leap-frogging each other along busy
routes; this had resulted in many charges being brought for dangerous driving and
obstruction. 14
Opponents of introducing a regulatory structure at that time believed that, however
unpleasant scenarios like those described above were, there was no real acceptable
alternative. They argued that what was likely to develop in the case of regulation was
a monopoly structure which many viewed as an even worse alternative. In fact,
Glaister and Mulley hint that the hidden agenda of the Royal Commission was to
introduce such a monopoly. For example, the Sub-Committee which considered
quantity-licensing was dominated by those who would benefit from such an
arrangement. Further, only organised pressure groups, they argue, were heard which
effectively excluded small bus operators.
The view also gained currency in the Commission that if bus companies had to run
unremunerative but socially necessary services they should be given the benefit of
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monopolies on certain routes: obligations should be met with rights." This led
Glaister/Mulley to conclude the "development ofthe quantity licensing was motivated
more by political rationale than by reference to any economic rationale"." This view
is supported by fellow transport economist and worker in the bus industry John Hibbs
who in his lEA pamphlet on transport is critical of the Chair of the Royal
Commission's remarks that the Commission should "promote rationalisation as a
prelude to nationalisation"." These academics were in the forefront of bus
deregulation in the eighties; clearly their view of the historical development of bus
services is coloured by their support for deregulation. In a caricature of Edmund
Burke's words they were attempting to "plan the future by the past"."
Underlying this viewpoint of transport regulation is the assumption that politics
'interfered' with economics. Thus, by implication their own work is clear of such
distractions and operates on purely economic rationale. This corresponded at the time
to one of the Thatcher Government's rationales for privatisation, namely that
government should not be in the business of providing these services as political
considerations will outweigh economic ones. It echoes Sir Christopher Foster's belief
that nationalised industries become insulated from the economic realities present with
the "entrenched habits of the past"." However as has already been discussed this
remains a false and in some cases impossible distinction to make, particularly in the
field of transport. For example there is a direct link between Glaister and Mulley's
attack on the regulatory structures designed in the thirties to control the bus industry
15 ibid., p24.
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and the constitutional malaise felt by right wing commentators in the seventies. Both
were attempting to reform elements of the British state which had been taken for
granted for generations. One group concentrated on the constitutional structure of
Britain whilst the other wanted to challenge fundamentally the way in which elements
of the British economy operated. The language of the transport economists may not
have been that of greater constitutional accountability of new structures -at least not
directly - but the effect was the same, though accountability would be provided
through the market rather than a new institutional structure. In the context of the
general programme of privatisation the absence of any regulatory structure in the bus
industry meant that no claims could be made that a new more political accountable
system had been created. To some extent this has occurred with the regulation of the
utilities as the regulators have developed. A recent example of a public lawyer who
believes these developments have created a more accountable state is Norman Lewis
particularly in his most recent work." However the only claims that could be made
for the bus industry were that it could be saved with the removal of the regulatory
structures. There were no broader political or even philosophical justification.
Perhaps this was because it was a de - regulation with theoretically no continuing
influence from the state. This was unlike the utilities where as has been shown quite
complex regulatory structures were put in place. The contradiction between these two
models reached a point of conflict within the bus industry about a decade after
deregulation as shall be shown below.
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Thus economic arguments were used to support a political programme. Further, as a
corollary to this the economists could put across their opinions precisely because the
political debate swung in their favour. So, it is a little spurious to argue that pure
economics are utilised by the deregulatory economists. This was also true at the time
of the Royal Commission. Sidney Straker" was the only dissenter to the Royal
Commission's findings and his words are used by Glaister in support of his
'economic' argument. Straker defended the "pirate operators" claiming "the
commercial struggle always present or prospective leads to efficiency, economy and
progress in the best sense of the word"." It would be false to ascribe to this dissent
some higher status as if it alone recognised the "economic" reasons for resisting
regulation in the way Glaister argues. Straker himself was head of an association of
motor manufacturers involved in building buses - who would clearly suffer in the
short term if there was a clamping down on small private operators. Ironically though
a regulated bus market would have provided a steady and secure source of income
eventually. However his own position as a central player within the bus industry
hardly qualifies him as a disinterested observer in the regulatory process.
Another concept which was welcomed at the time of the Royal Commission but much
denigrated - by the deregulatory economists - in the eighties, as shall be shown, was
that of cross-subsidisation. This occurs where a company takes as much money from
the profitable routes as possible to fund the less remunerative or loss-making routes.
This concept in a sense cuts to the core of all public transport services. As will be
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illustrated in the next chapter all rail services in this country run at a 10ss23 and need
some form of subsidy which continues even after the routes are awarded to private
franchisees. Moreover cross subsidy itself will still continue to exist within the
franchises. On the other hand some bus services can take in a large amount of money
but only on particular routes and at particular times, and then they become 'cash boxes
on wheels'. Yet this changes very rapidly at off-peak times and on unremunerative
routes.
However it is these very services which provide a social service for those who have
no other means of transportation. The Royal Commission at the time understood the
benefits of a large bus network which ran both profitable and 'socially necessary'
services, yet in the eighties this became anathema and caricatured as the argument of
the monopolists who wanted to keep out the small entrepreneurial operator. But as
Gwilliarrr" pointed out the bus industry has a number of significant externalities
which need to be taken into account. Thus there are knock-on effects ofnot regulating
the bus industry in the area of the environment, road congestion and safety. Some of
these are even more important now than they were sixty years ago. However road
safety was also a consideration in the thirties. G1aisterclaims this was overplayed and
that the number of fatal accidents, for example, was levelling out before the legislation
was introduced.
This explicit support which the Commission gave to the running of social services
through the use of cross-subsidy and the granting of exclusive licences was underlined
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by the role of the Traffic Commissioners. The procedures followed in deciding to
award routes were quite complex and far-reaching and to some extent allowed for
participation from the communities affected by the bus routes. An application to
establish a new service or vary an existing one had to be submitted to the Traffic Area
office. The application was published and time was granted for any objections to be
voiced. If there were objections then the applications would be heard in a Traffic
Court: a public forum. Under the 1930 Aces the Commissioner had to take into
account:
• the suitability of the route.
• the extent to which the needs of the route are already served.
• the needs of the area as a whole as regards traffic and the co-ordination of all
forms ofpassenger transport including transport by rail.
Glaister gives an extremely detailed breakdown of how a Traffic Court functions;"
perhaps as a means of highlighting what a burdensome and bureaucratic process it
was. But the Traffic Commissioner was given such powers precisely because the
procedure prior to the 1930 Act was chaotic and discretionary. Some form of
rationalisation was needed: as noted above the legislation which existed at that time
dated from the nineteenth century and not designed for motor vehicles. Further the
law was administered erratically by local authorities. Some even claimed that there
were cases of corruption regarding local transport services. Compared to this the
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Commissioners could give some consistency and certainty to the decisions on bus
services.
Here agam it can be shown how this process fits into general administrative
developments in the twentieth century. Many tribunals were created with the premise
of determining decisions in certain areas without the recourse to courts. This is the
very thing that Hewart objected to. In a sense by highlighting the legalistic nature of
the Commissioner's decision making Glaister is arguing that this is not a place where
any form of detailed rule-making or adjudication is relevant. Rather than usurping the
role of the courts the Commissioners are going into areas where the only determinant
should be the market. This shows again the link between the deregulatory impetus
and the Diceyan school of the early part of this century and their shared view of a
limited state.
This approach to regulatory structures aside the trend in the early years of this
structure was not one of uniformity. As empirical work on the Commissioner's
decisions had shown it took a few years for a common approach to develop. A
commentator from the thirties took the three main principles behind a Commissioner's
decision to be "priority, protection and public need". One Commissioner even saw
himself as a protector of a public utility, in his words "convenient transport at
reasonable fares, is a public service as essential as an efficient water supply"." For
the deregulation advocates the existence of the Commissioners working with this kind
of ethos was the personification of the interventionist state, as the state was skewing
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the market by bringing in irrelevant considerations which had no place there. This
was the thirties viewed with Thatcherite hindsight. It is a little ironic that the Traffic
Commissioner should be characterised as a stooge of a centralising state. One of the
very reasons they were established was to have a licenser at 'arms length' from the
dominant local authorities. Thus rather than representing 'state interference' the
Commissioner was seen as an independent arbiter. This irony was continued into the
debate on privatisation" as much was made of ending the 'political' interference of
nationalisation even though the public corporation was in theory an 'arms length'
authority. Thus a link between privatisation and nationalisation using the public
corporation form can be seen here - both were at pains to claim that 'political' or 'state
interference' would end. Neither would prove to be correct.
In severely limiting the powers of the Traffic Commissioners during the eighties the
Government claimed to remove an obstacle in the way of encouraging private sector
initiative. Yet again this was rhetoric rather than reality in that a significant amount of
private bus operators existed prior to deregulation. Further the Traffic Commissioner
rarely intervened to prevent a new route being established unless there was no proven
need for it.
Thus public ownership in the bus industry took on a qualitatively different form to all
other experiments. Firstly it predated the public corporation structure and
concentrated on control through licensing rather than ownership. As was shown
public ownership of the bus industry grew in a piecemeal way and tended to be split
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between local authority provision and the national operators (the National Bus
Company and the Scottish Bus Group). Alongside this there always existed a sizeable
independent sector of private operators. In fact prior to the 1980 Act out of 5639 bus
companies 5536 were privately owned," although most of these were quite small and
only really involved in excursion and trip work. This contrasts with other forms of
nationalisation in the transport industry notably the rail network. If a test of
accountability is used then the licensing scheme has much to recommend it. The role
of the Commissioners, their use of open fora like Traffic Courts and the involvement
of local communities did allow for some participation. The process was more
transparent then many other experiments in public control.
It is significant to note that the arguments against regulation of the bus industry did
not involve the lack of openness and accountability, as was the case in many of the
utility privatisations. Rather the major argument was that regulation was not required
in this field and that bus companies could be more responsive to a free market. The
proponents of deregulation could argue that ultimately there would be accountability
to the consumer as the bus companies would ultimately deliver better services. Yet
as noted this is a different emphasis from that of the other privatisations which
established new regulatory structures.
The nature of the licensing procedure allowed for a degree of accountability.
However the system was not ideal particularly when coupled with the diffuse nature
of the bus industry. Subsidiaries of the national operator ran services almost
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alongside local operators. This form of ownership resulted in the 'bus wars'
immediately after deregulation, as shall be shown. Further there had been a terminal
decline in the use of the bus since the growth of car ownership. Patronage of the bus
industry halved between the sixties and the eighties." Little was done to promote the
use of the bus as part of an integrated transport network outside the Passenger
Transport Authority areas.
It would be worthwhile to say a little more on these authorities before the deregulation
process IS examined. The Passenger Transport Authorities operated through
executives III Strathclyde, Greater Manchester, Newcastle, Merseyside, South
Yorkshire and the West Midlands. As well as promoting co-ordinated public
transport to meet the needs of their population as it was their statutory duty to develop
a "properly integrated and efficient system of public passenger transport'?' they also
showed the use of the local authority in financially sustaining local transport. The
County Councils in England and Wales and the Regional Councils in Scotland also
supplied subsidy to bus services. What the PTEs allowed local areas to do was to
attempt some type of integrated network. This could involve buses, trains and in
some cases an underground system. With the innovative use of travel passes which
applied across the network a dent could be made into car use. This made the PTEs a
central player in urban transport as shall be seen in the study on rail privatisation,
particularly in Scotland. That study will also show that there was also tension in the
Passenger Transport Executives between rail and bus. Yet the Passenger Transport
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Executives gave a glimpse of how an integrated transport system could be owned and
controlled.
Beyond these examples there was little attempt to integrate bus with rail. Thus the rail
network worked largely independently of the bus industry where there could have
been combination to promote public transport. This again relates to the nature of the
model of public ownership that was adopted following the Second World War. The
public corporation form encouraged independence from other industries and did not
allow easily for co-operation to take place. This theme will be explored more in the
chapters on the rail industry. However it is ironic that following the awarding of
several rail franchises to bus companies they are beginning to introduce in a distorted
way a form of 'integrated' transport system, as we shall see.
In the following examination of deregulation it will be shown that the background to
each initiative was the falling use of the bus network. Each Transport Act was
preceded by speeches proclaiming that the legislation would save the bus industry.
Whether this was achieved shall be examined when the full scale effects of
deregulation are examined.
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ON THE RIGHT TRACK?
THE DEREGULATORY EIGHTIES
Norman Fowler, the first Secretary of State for Transport in the Thatcher
administration, while in opposition had written a policy document on the future of
public transport: "The Right Track"." This hardly equalled other radical tomes of the
right written at this time which called for a new constitutional settlement and the
redirection of the Conservative Party. One forceful proponent of public transport
described it as full of "unexceptional generalisations"." Yet it spoke of introducing
competition and relaxing regulations for bus services albeit in a vague way. This
illustrates well the early era of Thatcherism - a combination of high rhetoric with
relatively minor reforms. It was not until a few years later when the momentum was
established that major radical reforms were attempted. The legislation on the bus
industry followed this pattern almost identically.
The Transport Act 1980.14
The first Transport Bill of the Thatcher administration was trumpeted by Norman
Fowler as likely to "increase freedom of choice?" and encourage "Freddie Lakers of
32 Powl",rfl Q77'\
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the Coachways"." The Act itself redefined bus services and categorised them into two
different types: express and stage journeys. This was done by distance." Previously
any distinction had been made on the basis of fares. For the new express services all
quantity restrictions would be removed." Hence the Traffic Commissioners who had
previously controlled applications to enter the bus network had their brief limited to
stage services. In these stage services the onus of proof changed with the
Commissioner having to prove that any new service was not in the public interest,"
rather than the operator having to establish that the service was required.
As express services were deregulated the Government claimed to be tightening up on
the regulation of quality. Applicants had to be of good repute, professionally
competent, have adequate maintenance facilities and an annual inspection of their
vehicles." The Government also removed the right to impose any fare controls."
Thus the regulatory regime of the buses was to remain in a kind of limbo. This was
further emphasised by the creation of trial areas which could, with the permission of
the Secretary of State, suspend all regulation of bus services. In the event only three
areas applied for this status: Hereford, North Norfolk and South Devon although
Fowler claimed many more areas had been in discussion with him.
This legislation corresponded with the first era of privatisation process where
industries were sold into potentially competitive markets as outlined in Chapter 3. In
36 ibid. at 1122. This being a reference to the entrepreneur who attempted to establish a cheap air
service.
37 s3.
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fact one of the first sell-offs was carried out under part II of the 1980 Act with the
privatisation of the National Freight Corporation. Indeed this was viewed as the most
significant part of the legislation by the Financial Times."
This "partial"? deregulation was seen as an attempt to revive the entrepreneurial
spirit. After the initial deregulation there seemed to be a frenetic clamour to enter the
express market. A consortium, British Coachways, was launched to combat the
dominance of the National Bus Company's subsidiary", National Express. Six
months after deregulation it announced a major increase in services." However two
years later the entire consortium collapsed." This process was repeated in a smaller
scale all around the country. CK coaches became the first private company to close
only one year after deregulation began." Other private companies which came to the
fore in later stages of deregulation, notably Stagecoach which got its first attempt to
establish itself at this time. The lucrative commuter belt around London attracted the
initial interest of twenty-nine companies; twenty eventually ran services but only six
were still functioning one year later.48
The initial flush of apparent success allowed Fowler to claim "the public interest is
best served by a minimum of interference by the state and a maximum amount of free
competition"." The reality again proved to be somewhat different. This was
41 s6.
42 Financial Times August 8th, 1979.
43 Savage op. cit., Chap 2.
44 Times September 18th, 1980.
45 Times May 14th, 1981.
46 Fimmri"1Tim.." ~llrv..V of th .. Rns "nil Coach Indnstrv Februarv 17th. 19R3.
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established by an empirical study of East Midlands transport." In this study the main
beneficiary of deregulation was found to be National Express. It used its existing
market share to dominate the scene. Through "reorientation and responsiveness?"
National Express could increase frequencies, alter fare structures and take forceful
action against any competitors." Thus in conclusion "free competition has actually
been reinforcing specialisation in service provision and the existing structure of the
industry".53 This trend was to be repeated as shall be shown below. Although some
independent operators remained in business (mostly those engaged in running services
from the major cities to London), many of these, however, also made joint agreements
with National Express.
The mam beneficiary, then, of this particular deregulation was a nationalised
monopoly. Its passenger numbers soared with a 45% increase from 1980-81.54 In the
same period National Express's profits rocketed from £6 million to £25 million, and
by 1983 this had risen to £47 million. 55 To achieve this, and to meet the
Government's strict financial targets, routes had to be cut by 8%.56 This happened in
predominantly rural areas; Bagwell - a transport analyst - gives the example of West
Cumbria." In the first year National Express expanded its service by 50% effectively
killing off any coach competition. Within the National Bus Company, express
coaches accounted for only 7% of the business yet provided the bulk of the profits.
50 Kilvington and Cross (1986).
51 ibid., P128.
52 A strategy which is repeated when we examine the effects of full scale deregulation.
53 Kilvington/Cross, p133.
54 There was <In increase in 'nassenoer numbers from 9.2 million to 14 million in 1980-81.
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The dominance of the express market was achieved at a cost of taking passengers
away from the rail network. British Rail made heavy losses in its Inter-City network.
30-50% of the coach's new customers came from trains." Schemes such as the Super-
Saver ticket, pensioner and young people's railcards were established to stop the
exodus of passengers. Thus the main competition instigated by the 1980 Act was not
between rival bus companies but between road and rail transport, thus illustrating at a
national level in a concrete way the absence of the co-ordinated approach to transport
which was mentioned above.
The result was called "surprising'?" by one commentator but given National Express's
dominance this was not entirely unexpected. It also aggrieved many on the right who
had wanted to witness a rebirth of on-the-road competition as a result of the 1980 Act.
John Hibbs, one of the most ardent advocates of transport deregulation, wrote for the
lEA that the change in the early eighties "was more in principle than in practice"." It
was a "cautious" deregulation." His solution was to expand deregulation to all sectors
of the bus industry" whilst maintaining strict quality controls. Thus, the 1980
legislation was a curious halfway house. It angered the pro-regulation lobby as it
resulted in a net loss of services although fares did fall. It also put the Traffic
Commissioners in a difficult position with their limited brief and terms of reference
altered. For others it did not go far enough; they saw the regulatory authorities as
having a stranglehold on local services. These grievances led to the 1985 Act.
58 Kilvington/Cross op. cit., p12S.
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Further lessons can be drawn from the 1980 Act experience in the sense that when
deregulation was introduced it did not necessarily mean there would be more
competition. This was particularly true where a large publicly owned operator
functioned as in the express service sector. It was also hinted at by the experience of
the Trial Areas where in Hereford there again was a lot of on-the-road competition but
the publicly owned company managed to establish itself because of its size and its
greater resources. Thus when full-scale deregulation was introduced measures of
privatisation would be needed to introduce full competition. But as shall be shown
privatisation in itself could not prevent large operators using their resources to
dominate the market.
The question of accountability was also not completely resolved here, mainly because
the central board of the National Bus Company had more in common with other
nationalised industries and was more remote. However one unique element of the bus
services was that the Traffic Commissioners' open procedures applied. Furthermore,
it was also more decentralised with different localised operators. This may have been
due to the manner in which the NBC grew; by acquisition rather than in one fell
swoop. Indeed the Transport and General Workers' Union (TGWU) argued in its
evidence to the Transport Select Committee looking at the Buses White Paper" that
the NBC combined the "best of both worlds"?' with a national identity and local
operators. Aside from the amalgam of a centralised board with localised bus services
which did not allow for complete accountability the partial nature of the deregulation
also told against a more accountable structure. With the remit of the Commissioner
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changed and the speedy changes in the express sector the overall question of control
was in a general state of flux. Yet even this position was preferable in terms of
accountability to what was to develop in the late eighties and nineties, as shall be
established. Accountability in this context would mean a form of supervisory
specialised body which could issue sanctions against parts of the industry. This is not
a wholly satisfactory definition of accountability but in the case of the bus industry it
was definitely missed when removed in the mid eighties.
The Transport Act 1985..6.5.
This legislation was preceded by a white paper Buses" which put forward the
arguments for further deregulation. It was published a year after the Conservatives'
second electoral victory. This fits in with the general thesis that it was in this period
that the more radical reforms were attempted, with the privatisation of the utilities also
introduced in this time. The paper proposed to remove all quantity restrictions from
all stage services and to privatise the National Bus Company by breaking it into
smaller subsidiaries. These measures, as explained above, were an attempt to prevent
a repetition of both the consequences of the 1980 Act and problems in the trial areas.
This view as noted above had a number of academic supporters notably in Glaister
and Hibbs. Beyond this it is not clear who was supportive of them.
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Following its publication there were eight thousand responses to the proposals." The
vast majority were opposed. The Transport Select Committee, with a Conservative
majority, had taken considerable evidence and produced a report condemning a
complete liberalisation of bus transport. It favoured instead a system of route
franchising awarded by tender.68 Other opponents were as varied as the Brewing
Industry and the National Federation of Women's Organisations, as one Labour MP
pointed out.69 The overwhelmingly hostile response provoked the Department of
Transport to publish a justification for its policies which also answered the main
criticisms of the Select Committee."
As the 1985 Act was preceded by a White Paper and an investigation by the Transport
Committee there was now a better chance to examine the justifications for
deregulation. Before this is done in detail it is worthwhile noting the Select
Committee's conclusion to put the debate in context of this broader work. The
committee opposed a complete deregulatory model; instead it proposed a system of
franchising for routes. Significantly this model was revisited with rail privatisation -
this time with Government support.
This 'tendering within regulation' model had some academic support" as did the
deregulation system as mentioned above. In many ways the former was close to the
London system where outright deregulation had been postponed. This was, claimed
66 Cmnd 9300, 1983-4.
67 Savage op. cit., p12.
68 HC 38-1. 1984-5.
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Ridley, to allow London Transport the chance to introduce more efficiency to its
operation." Significantly the Government opposed the general introduction of this
'managed competition' outright. Franchising, they claimed would inhibit innovation.
Further, in some ways it would be more restrictive than the present regulatory model
as there would be a lengthy time limit on operating the franchise. Most importantly it
would perpetuate cross-subsidy which in its tum would accelerate the decline of the
industry. In summary the whole notion "fails to deal with the depressing effects on
patronage which any system of cross-subsidy generates"."
Yet this whole attitude contrasts strongly with the attitude during rail privatisation
which as shall be shown favoured a system of franchising. To some degree all these
arguments were turned on their head when examining the rail industry. It highlights
that during the height of Thatcherism in the mid-eighties the emphasis was not on the
fulfilment of accountability in structural form - whether public or private. Instead,
accountability had to be gained through the open market. This assertion may seem to
contradict the creation of the first regulatory agencies for the privatised utilities at this
time and seem only relevant for the bus industry. In the deregulatory model the
absence of any regulatory structures would allow the free market to establish itself and
ultimately give the consumer the best deal, showing that the companies were
accountable to their consumers in an indirect sense, as illustrated by their experiment
in bus deregulation. This notion is not as clear in the privatisation of the utilities.
Primarily because in most cases they were monopoly providers their accountability
lay with the relevant regulator rather than the utility adapting under pressure of the
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market. Yet the absence of any clear rationale for regulation at the time of their
creation and the speed with which the utilities were put forward for privatisation
illustrates that the primary reason for creating the regulators was not to promote any
form of direct accountability. Although the regulators were created after each
privatisation the emphasis was not on creating a coherent model of regulation but on
disposing of each utility. This came later when there seemed to be a greater degree of
clarity as to what a regulator's role should be and their relationship with their
industry.
The ambivalent attitude to regulation changed when the rail industry is examined, it
could be argued. This was a privatisation unlike any other. There are peculiarities in
the rail industry as following chapters will show that mean a franchising system
makes more sense than in the bus industry where it was rejected outright. But it will
be argued that this reflects a broader discrepancy between these two periods which
bus deregulation and rail privatisation reflect. Less emphasis was put at the time of
bus deregulation on questions of accountability because the emphasis was on
removing the state's involvement whether through privatisation or dismantling
regulatory structures. In the later period there was a renewed emphasis on public
service and enhanced constitutional accountability. As previously noted this trend
was noted by leading public lawyers, notably Ian Harden. 74 What this reflected was
not merely a change of emphasis on the Government's part but a larger societal
change. This change showed itself in opposition to further privatisation and indeed
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supported the extension of public ownership." Thus the government had to alter its
emphasis completely although it was limited to the degree it could carry this out as
will be illustrated in the examination of rail privatisation. The idea prevalent in the
forties of regaining a form of accountability by bringing an industry into public
ownership gained an element of support following the excesses of the privatisations of
the eighties. This again emphasises the close relationship between the public's
perception of accountability and the need for a form of public ownership. This
coloured the model adopted for the privatisation ofthe rail industry.
Having put this deregulatory legislation in context both within the eighties and as it
compared to later deregulations it will now be worthwhile to examine the arguments
used at the time to justify deregulation. The main justification clearly was that
absence of regulation would mean more innovation and more competition hence a
better service. This is seen in the language with which the Government introduced
this legislation. Nicholas Ridley MP, a close confidant of Thatcher and author of the
Ridley Report in the seventies," the Secretary of State that piloted the Bill through
Parliament, made this point during the Second Reading Debate. "There is far more to
this Bill than deregulation. Far more than privatisation. It is a full scale rescue plan
for the bus industry" [My emphasis]." Again we see the context into which bus
deregulation was always put: an industry in decline. Since the high point of 1950
where 16.7 billion bus journeys were made there had been a steady fall in numbers.
So in 1979, the year before partial deregulation was introduced, the annual tally was 7
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billion." Later it will be seen whether deregulation in the short or long term arrested
this fall in bus use.
This policy of increased consumer use through increased competition and absence of
regulation was also explained during the evidence Ridley and the DoT gave to the
Select committee." The officials at the Department stated: "I think the central policy
of the Government's White Paper is a policy of competition".80 Or as Ridley put it, a
little more bluntly, competition needed to be introduced because "there is no other
way"."
As noted above this desire to free the private entrepreneur from the chains of existing
regulatory structures was more of a rhetorical device than reality. Indeed, this was
even confirmed by evidence given by the Bus and Coach Council who claimed to
represent 98-99% of bus operators and 66% of coach operators in the United
Kingdom. "There is ample opportunity under the present licensing system for
services to be provided by any operator provided the Traffic Commissioners do not
consider that to be against the public interest"." Although the BCC would have had
an interest in promoting the form of regulatory structure it does illustrate that the
threat of competition to some extent always existed even under the regulatory model
of the 1930s.
78 Transport Statistics, Great Britain 1993 pl05.
79 Evidence ziven to Transnort Committee (1984-5), HC 38-11.
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Moreover with a degree of prescience some in response to the White Paper even
argued that the proposed solution would not succeed in its mission, and in fact have
the opposite effect. "Deregulation is likely to lead ...to less competition because it is
likely to lead to the re-establishment of territorial monopolies, of the kind we were
familiar with fifty or sixty years ago"." Thus the predominant notion at that time of
deregulation being synonymous with competition was a central philosophy behind the
restructuring of the bus industry, even if this did not fit in with the practical result.
Leading on from this theoretical justification was the more practical rationale of
saving money with a more "effective targeting" of subsidy. It has already been noted
that the reorganisation of local government in the seventies also allowed it to support
financially local bus services. According to a senior civil servant the rising cost of
subsidy to the bus industry had been a "major concern to Ministers for a number of
years"." The proposed legislation would not only end licensing for profitable routes;
it would also open up to tender routes requiring direct subsidy. Also the legislation
required local authorities to establish their bus company at arm's length which in the
long term coupled with privatisation would cut subsidy.
There was also an overwhelming desire to end cross-subsidy which Professor Michael
Beesley" described as "a tax system without representation?" in his evidence to the
Select Committee. It has been mentioned before that this was a central tenet of the
Government's thoughts; it criticised the Select Committee for not dealing with this
83 ibid.. n222_ This is from the evidence of Dr D.A.Ouarrnbv. a retired director of London Transoort.
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Issue. The Bus and Coach Council which did not support deregulation also supported
the demand for an end to this practice. It has been mentioned that there is a big gap in
profitability in the bus industry between services and routes. Two academics put it
thus; "the industry lurches in a very short space of time between periods of extreme
strain and surplus capacity"." Obviously the larger bus companies could afford only
to run unremunerative services if they made enough on the busier routes. It was never
made clear how cross-subsidy was to be ended. For example, it was often stated that
bus users in urban areas were paying more for their services than they needed to so
universality of price could be protected. Yet there was not only discrepancy between
routes but within routes at peak and off-peak times. Thus if cross-subsidy was
completely removed how could the consumer have certainty when one of the results
ofthat would be different fares being charged at different times for the same route?
Moreover the principle of cross-subsidy was not unique to the bus industry. One
witness to the Select Committee stated that "cross-subsidy was an economic fact for
most business life"." The example was given to Michael Beesley during the hearing
of the Select Committee of the cost of postage and how a universal price was paid for
a stamp even though the cost of sending to different destinations varied greatly. He
expressed his distaste for all cross-subsidy regardless of the context: "there are many,
many instances ... it does not make it more desirable". 89 He also accepted that bus
deregulation was not only unique historically in Britain but internationally.
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Cost cutting, then, was also a rationale to the whole project of deregulation. The
White Paper suggested 30% of costs could be reduced." Indeed an argument could be
made that this was the only area in which the deregulation succeeded. After the first
two years of deregulation subsidies fell by 23.4% by the PTAs and by 6.3% by other
local authorities." However it should be noted that this was almost completely due to
the introduction of tendering not because of deregulation.
The 1980 Act also gave an opportunity for the Government to use its successes- in its
eyes- as justification for the White Paper and the Bill. One of these justifications was
the much lower unit costs of private sector bus companies as compared to publicly
owned companies. This included both the National Bus Group and the services
controlled by local authorities and the PTAs. Yet it was felt by the unions that like
was not being compared to like. As far as the different in costs went one union
official put it thus "The nature of the work in the private sector, the wages and
conditions of employment are far different ... because it is accepted it is a different
type of work"." This refers to the point made above that private companies were
smaller and engaged in excursion work rather than stage carriage services. This meant
that staff could be employed on a part-time basis rather than in the case of the public
operators whose drivers had a national agreement which allowed drivers to operate
extended shifts to cover both peak services. As the majority of the costs of a bus
company is in labour (around 70%)93 this would clearly affect costs. The Government
90 Cnmd 9300 op. cit., P .
91 n"",P7_Th,mp7!Mp"pr f1 QQnI n 1"i These Am~rir.:m observers calculated these fizures bv collatinz
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used this discrepancy to press further their case for privatisation and decentralisation
ofthe National operator.
Other comparisons which the Government attempted to make with the 1980 operation
were also criticised by bus operators. Both the Bus and Coach Council and the
National Bus Company conceded that the main competition had not been between bus
companies but with other modes of transport, predominantly rail as explained above.
Also express service deregulation had involved the increased use of motorways and
trunk routes not town centre roads nor quiet rural routes. Thus the impact of a
complete deregulation of stage services was clearly going to be much greater and
more evident to the public.
The final piece of evidence was that of the trial areas established by the 1980 Act.
However Ridley was reluctant to cite them as an example; in particular he stated
Hereford was "not an entirely successful experiment"." This followed a report by the
Transport Road Research Laboratory which stated that "At this stage the situation
appears to be unstable and the final outcome is uncertain"." Although there was a
38% fall in subsidy from the County Council to the local bus operator there were
problems with road congestion and concessionary fares. The Traffic Commissioners
had to intervene over the question of the safety of one of the smaller independent
operators. From the transcript of the hearing "This is quite the worst case the
Commissioners have had to consider during the 10 years I have been Chairman of the
Traffic Commissioners for the Western Area. It is just as well that those who travel in
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some of your vehicles did not know how much their health and safety were at risk"."
On the 2nd February 1982 the Commissioners also issued seven prohibitory notices
against independent operators in the Hereford Area. Here, then, deregulation had
meant an increase in service but at the expense of safety, so the Government was
reluctant to use this part of the 1980 Act as justification. It is also unclear how good
an example of bus-using communities the trial areas were. They were all
predominantly rural with small towns. Thus their ability to act as a microcosm for
future developments was limited.
Combined with the deregulation of bus services was the privatisation and break up of
the National Bus Company. As already stated this was clearly a response to the
effects of the 1980 act and was seen as a means of preventing a large operator
dominating a deregulated market. The Scottish equivalent, the Scottish Transport
Group, was excluded until 1989.97 The trade union which represented the majority of
transport workers greeted these proposals with "horror"." It feared the sell off was
for "political considerations rather than structural"." It was evidence there had been
preparation for privatisation. The Transport Act 1982100 had introduced private capital
into the NBC by allowing it to dispose of its shares and ordered separate accounts to
be prepared for National Express. In the earlier years of Thatcherism these devices
were often used as a prelude to privatisation.
95 TRRL Report LR 1131.
96 Transcripts of hearing, quoted at ibid., p149.
97 Transoort (Scotland) Act 1989. c23.
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Priority was to be given to management and employee buy-outs of the subsidiaries.
This was reflected in the Act which stated that persons employed by the bus
companies must be afforded "reasonable opportunity of acquiring a controlling
interest in the equity share capital".'?' The NBC was split into seventy-two companies
and sold off many to management-employee lead buy-outs. No single buyer was
allowed to acquire more than three subsidiaries or two operating in contiguous areas.
Clearly, the Department of Transport did not want a similar result to the 1980 Act
when a large publicly owned company could use its position to dominate the market.
The Bill became law on the 30th October 1985, a year before deregulation was to be
introduced. One Conservative MP, Peter Fry, voted against the Bill at its third
reading. This was significant for as well as being a senior member of the Transport
Committee he co-wrote Norman Fowler's pamphlet in the seventies mentioned above.
Perhaps highlighting how fast policy had moved on the bus industry he stated "I
believe this bill is based too much on theory and insufficiently on practice".102 This
confirms the limited way in which evidence from the 1980 Act had been used by the
administration.
The Transport Act 1985, then, carried out in full the initial deregulation of the 1980
law. It more or less followed completely the preceding White Paper. Road Service
Licensing was abolishcd.I'" the role of the Traffic Commissioners redefined'?' and
101 Part TTL s4R(4)
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quality standards tightened. lOS A new system of registration was established. 106
Operators had to give 6 weeks notice to the Traffic Area office if they intended to
establish, remove or change a bus service. The NBC was to be sold off'?' and
eventually dissolved when this was complete.!" Local authorities were to form
companies to run local bus undertakings!" and tenders were to be invited for any
subsidised service."? Within seven years of office, then, the Thatcher administration
had completely restructured the bus industry.
The one area excepted from this as mentioned above was the Greater London Area.
This was originally viewed as a temporary measure to allow the abolition of the GLC
and other measures to settle. Yet continual attempts by Conservative administrations
to deregulate London's buses have failed. This process culminated in the absence of
this measure from the Deregulation and Contracting Out Act 1994;111 despite a 1992
manifesto commitment. During 1994 London Buses was broken into ten companies
and sold off, in effect selling franchises. Ironically this was very similar to the
proposals of the Transport Select Committee in response to the White Paper, which
the Government had roundly rejected.
105 s8.
106 s6.
107 Part III.
108 This was finallv completed in 1991. See S.1. 1991/510.
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THE INITIAL EFFECTS OF DEREGULATION.
If the test of deregulation is that of a "rescue plan" for the industry in Ridley's own
words then it failed. The decline in bus journeys continued in the years following
deregulation. In 1991-2 the number of bus users had fallen to 4669 million from a
pre-deregulation figure of 5641 million: the fall was more dramatic in percentage
terms in the larger cities.l" The DoT was dismissive of these figures claiming they
merely confirmed the trend of falling bus usage since the 1950s. This is a little
different to the emphasis made at the time of the White Paper which suggested that
with an end to regulatory structures the industry would be free to adopt new
innovative measures and hence increase patronage.
If these figures are not regarded as conclusive then what of the increased competition
heralded by the deregulatory process; did this not mark a measure of success? Again
similarly to the effects of the 1980 Act, after the 'big bang' deregulation date in
October 1986 there was an appearance of more on-the-road competition. The picture
of congested high streets was ensconced in the public's mind. However much of this
was similar to the process after the 1980 Act came into being. That is, there was no
significant new entry from small independent entrepreneurs.
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One study commissioned by the Scottish Office!" confirms this. It looked at the
effects of deregulation six months and one year after October 1986. It found that in
areas where two publicly owned corporations existed - that is a Scottish Bus Group
company alongside a municipally owned company - there was extensive
competition. 114 This intra-public competition was perhaps inevitable with their
domination of the market with 90% of bus journeys in Britain and 89% of Scottish
services so supplied. liS Indeed, this competition was "aggressive and widespread't.l"
When the privatisation of these industries occurred slightly different trends emerged
as shall be shown in the next chapter. However where only one SBG operator existed
there was more scope for smaller operators to enter the market. Thus in Scotland
there were "more providers of local bus services in the study areas than there were
prior to deregulation"."? But "with very few exceptions ...all operators previously
held operator licences't.!" The experience of Stagecoach confirms this as shall be
shown in the case study of the Glasgow bus market. Thus there were no entrepreneurs
champing at the bit to enter the market after the restrictions were lifted.
Thus, as in 1980 without privatisation, deregulation resulted in the dominant
monopoly surviving or entering into 'turf wars' with rival companies, for the most
part also publicly owned. These initial 'bus wars' may also account for the increase
in vehicle mileage after deregulation. In 1991/2 this stood at 2487 million km
compared to a pre-deregulation figure of 2077 million.
113 Transport Operations Research Group (TORG)(1988).
114 This was the case in Glasgow for example.
115 ibid.. nl O. 1980 figures.
However it must be
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remembered that these figures took place in the context of falling bus use. These
figures were often cited as a sign of deregulation's success yet the figures do not take
into account times when one bus shadows another. This clearly does not benefit
passengers and indeed was one of the practices that the regulatory structures were
established to avoid. The figures also reflect the growth of different buses used on
routes, particularly the use of minibuses.
In terms of increasing passenger numbers or the numbers of new competitors the
deregulation process seemed to have no initial effects. But there were two areas
where the absence of regulatory structures had quite a dramatic effect: the amount of
subsidy given to local authorities and the working conditions of bus workers. The
figures on the subsidy dropped have already been cited!" and it was also noted that
the Buses White Paper saw the cutting in subsidy as an important part of the project.
The same American observers who were taking lessons from this unique international
project also stated: "The clearest winners from the combined package of deregulation,
privatisation and subsidy cuts are British taxpayers't.?" This change caused by
deregulation only indirectly affects the bus customer.
What of the changes to working practices brought in following deregulation? At
1992 prices an average bus worker prior to deregulation earned £251.40 per week in
1991/2 they earned £234.70 121 in real terms. These falling wages confirm the
centrality of labour costs to the bus industry. The actual cuts were brought out in a
number of ways for example with the consolidation of overtime payments into basic
174
wages.!" These cuts in pay were coupled to changes in working practices like
reduction in the amount of paid non-driving time!" such as lunches and breaks and
forcing drivers to sign off during quiet periods. One academic studying industrial
relations concluded on his work within the bus industry was the "collapse of a
centralised bargaining system" and the general cut in jobs had severely "altered the
confidence ofthe trade union side".124
Thus the drastic initial impact of the first few years of deregulation was not in the
field of a dramatic increase in new bus companies nor a turnaround in the decline of
bus usage. Rather it was in the fields of the treatment of the workforce and the
subsidy paid to local authorities'" where there was a dramatic change. So to that
extent it succeeded. But as these were always secondary rationales and never the
main justification for the Government the whole deregulation process was never
trumpeted as a complete success. However the whole deregulation process was not at
an end after these first years.
The next chapter will show that it is only ten years after the initial deregulation that
we can see the full effects of deregulation. This is also affected by the privatisation
of sections of the bus industry. Taken together these trends illustrate a growing
consolidation of the market which contradicts many of the earlier rationale for
120 Gomez-Ibanez/Meyer op. cit., pIS.
121 He 1992-3 op. cit., pxvii.
122 Forrester op. cit., p225 and also see case study on Glasgow.
123 An important issue in the bus industrv because of the peaks in use.
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deregulation. This is also confirmed by a changing attitude of the state to the bus
market.
This period can also be used to examine how the deregulated market was held to
account as compared to the Traffic Commissioner's procedures which, it has been
argued, had much to recommend them. It will be argued that the changing emphasis
towards accountability and public service described above is noticeable within the bus
deregulation project. Thus the state has found it necessary to readdress questions of
accountability which it ignored or underplayed at the time of the Buses White Paper.
This will be examined in the following chapter.
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CHAPTER FIVE.
"In our rapidly consolidating industry it is in the best interests of our employees
and shareholders to become part of a larger bus group".
Andrew Gall, September 1994.1
DEREGULATION: ONE DECADE ON.
In the previous chapter the rationale for bus deregulation and privatisation was
explored. When the 'big bang' date of deregulation came on 26th October 1986 the
whole process had been signalled as the ultimate salvation for the bus industry. The
decline in bus usage would be reversed as the private commercial sector could utilise
innovative measures which were beyond the ken of the bureaucratic publicly owned
enterprises. Hand in hand with this was to go the privatisation and break up of the
nationally owned bus network. This was to bring an end to the practice of cross-
subsidy.
Yet for all the detailed rationale grven for the Buses White Paper and later the
Transport Bill and its big-bang philosophy, the immediate effects of deregulation
were apparently limited. Early empirical studies as mentioned in the previous chapter
gave ambiguous messages as to the initial effects of deregulation. As argued the main
changes were in employment relations and direct subsidy not in bus usage. Even
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ardent supporters of the project who had played a key role in the creation of the plan
recognised the limited scope of the change. For example, John Hibbs addressing a
marketing conference on buses stated on viewing transport statistics: "I would not
conclude from them that deregulation had been a 'success', neither can they be used to
support the idea that it has been a 'failure'"." This ambivalence was also reflected in
an official Parliamentary research paper published in 1995. "The impact of
deregulation seems to have been neither as disastrous as the opponents to the
legislation feared or as successful as its proponents predicted".'
However ten years after deregulation was introduced it is clear that deregulation
coupled with privatisation did have an effect on the structure of the bus industry and
indeed the nature of local bus services. These effects will be examined in this chapter
in two ways - the general trends will be studied and there will be a specific case study
ofhow these trends operated in the Glasgow area. It will be argued that the rationale
for the changes of the mid-eighties has been negated rather than confirmed by the
ultimate effects of deregulation. This has precipitated a change in attitude from the
state towards the bus industry. Questions of institutional accountability and public
service have taken on importance where once they were downplayed, as observed in
the previous chapter. This is due to the creation of several large operators in the bus
market who seek to dominate the supply of bus services. This change in attitude will
also be detectable in the privatisation of the rail network. Thus the long-term effects
of deregulation and the responses it provoked are central to a study of how the British
1 Gall was the Chief Executive of Scottish Motor Transport acquired by GRT in 1994. Financial
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state has intervened in transport. Further and more specifically, the process of rail
privatisation was directly influenced by these trends in the bus industry.
THE GOVERNMENT'S ATTITUDE:
SECOND THOUGHTS?
In April 1993 the Department of Transport issued a consultation paper'on the bus
industry and the effects of deregulation. In it there seemed to be acknowledgement of
some damaging consequences of the experiment. It said that deregulation had cut bus
operating costs, reduced local subsidy and led to increases in innovation. Yet it also
conceded that timetable changes were too frequent, the short period of notice for
alteration of service caused instability and the bunching of buses in urban centres can
cause congestion.' The publication of this document could be seen to reflect the
change in emphasis in the justification for deregulation noted above; that is a shift
from the primacy of the market to the creation of more 'accountable' structures. One
of the results of this consultation can be seen almost two years after it began with the
issuing of new regulations to permit the Traffic Commissioners to deal with road
congestion." The Confederation of Passenger Transport claimed the Government was
trying to "re-regulate the industry by the back door".' How did this situation arise?
It is not enough to explain it merely as a purely environmental action to prevent bus
congestion. It will be shown that this exercise was the Government's attempt to
4 DoT. 24th March 1994.
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establish its opposition to the effects of deregulation in the bus industry. To justify
this the processes at work within the industry will be examined and alongside this the
changing attitude of the state in its different forms. Following this the Glasgow bus
market will be used as a micro-study for the bus industry since deregulation.
THE STRUGGLE FOR MARKETS
To refer back to the previous examination of the immediate effects of deregulation
from 1985, a parallel was drawn with the 1980 Act and its initial results. However the
processes in the later deregulation were constantly developing and could not be said to
have one final result as had largely happened in the express coach industry with the
continual dominance of National Express. The most significant difference in the case
of the 1985 legislation was the coexistence of privatisation with the deregulation of
local services. This affected the privatisation of the National Bus Company (NBC)8
then latterly the Scottish Bus Group(SBG). Moreover, local authorities' bus services
in some areas controlled by Passenger Transport Authorities were established as
"arm's length" companies in order to prepare for privatisation."
The NBC was broken up into 72 compames and sold from 1986-88; many to
management buy-outs. The selling of the SBG took place later following the
Transport (Scotland) Act 198910 ; it was broken into ten companies and sold from
1990-91. Both privatisations were subject to restrictions. No one buyer could
purchase more than three companies or two operating in contiguous areas under the
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NBC sale." As noted there was little new independent interest in the bus market
which may explain the dominance ofmanagement buy-outs.
One exception to this was Stagecoach, a Perth based operator, established in 1976 as a
caravan and minibus rental service. It moved into the bus market through express
coach services in the early eighties after the initial deregulation of 1980. From
interviewing a leading executive in Stagecoach it seems its operations at this stage
were a little chaotic and were viewed disparagingly by others involved in the bus
industry. 12 However its limited success at this stage allowed it to be in place to
exploit the next wave of deregulation in 1986, this time concentrating its fire on stage
services.
In 1987 in the first wave of privatisation Stagecoach acquired three subsidiaries of the
NBC (the maximum), the first independent operator to do so. At this time the services
it ran were predominantly rural or inter-urban built around small towns. As was
shown in empirical work done by the Scottish Office" these were the main areas
where the independent operators flourished, as urban areas tended to be dominated by
either local authority operators or subsidiaries of the nationally based operations.
However these publicly owned concerns were in the process of being sold. Their
separation into a group of smaller companies was clearly done to prevent market
domination in the manner that National Express dominated express coach services
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following the 1980 Act, and so prevent a rerun of the 1980 Act and the rapid growth
of National Express. Yet it is arguable whether this succeeded and indeed if it was
possible to prevent a large operator emerging; for, as shall be shown, the large bus
companies which did emerge came from that very milieu ofthe public sector.
As deregulation and privatisation developed over the decade, then, there was a clear
struggle for survival amongst operators. The first outbursts of this were the 'bus
wars' largely between established operators. Derek Scott, the Finance Director of
Stagecoach, admits that if deregulation had developed only in this way it would have
been harder for the company to establish itself. It needed the additional element of
privatisation." Thus Stagecoach and other independent operators were largely
spectators in the first round of 'bus wars'.
However these bus wars developed largely due to the threat of privatisation. The bus
companies were trying to gamer the largest possible market. This was difficult; as
was noted earlier bus usage had been declining over the last thirty years. Thus a way
to increase the bus company's intake was to move into other geographical areas.
When this was combined with privatisation, on-the-road competition was transformed
into take-overs and mergers. Thus it became a struggle for expansion and control of
local markets - a kind of 'bus imperialism'.
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On 1994 figures nine companies control 56% ofthe bus market." This expansion and
consolidation was relatively easy to achieve in the post-1985 bus industry. The active
encouragement of MBOSl6 allowed the dominance of managers with relatively little
capital who later became easy pickings for the larger operators who offered large cash
inducements to sell." The manner of the sale also allowed for bargains to be gained.
A useful example of this is the sale of the Scottish Bus Group which took place
several years after the NBC sell-off. This privatisation was explicitly criticised by the
National Audit Office" for the amount of money raised was significantly less than
originally envisaged. The delay in the announcement of the intention to sell and the
actual disposal allowed for excessive turbulence in the bus market. For example, in
that period profits of the SBG fell from £9 million to £0.5 million. Significantly, of
the ten subsidiaries in the Group only five were sold to management employee buy-
outs. The remainder was sold to independent companies, three of which had a
national profile, and two smaller ones. The reasons for this were clear as the time-lag
between this and the NBC sale had allowed for the beginnings of a consolidation of
the bus market. During this period the beginnings of privatisation laid the seeds for
the growth of the new larger bus operators which could establish themselves in the
later sale of the SBG. The momentum of these developments was continuous as again
the Scottish industry shows: all five MBOs in the SBG were eventually sold to
national operators.
15 TA~ fiorrres oiven in MMC(l995t
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As mentioned above Stagecoach was the only significant independent operator to
make initial headway in the 1985 deregulation of stage services. The company built
on these early acquisitions by establishing operating extensive overseas services" and
acquiring more bus companies. As Chief Executive, Brian Souter concentrated on
developing these acquisitions." In this way Stagecoach expanded its market share
and turnover. From its initial three purchases until its stock market flotation it
acquired nineteen companies. In July 1993 it became the first bus company to gain a
stock market listing by becoming a public limited company. The aim of this sale was
to raise £20.6 million to fund further acquisitions. In fact Stagecoach was one of four
bus companies to date which have entered the Stock Exchange, apart from the coach
operator National Express which was floated in December 1992.
Stagecoach, in a sense, led the way by gaining a stock exchange listing. It was then
followed by Badgerline in September 1993 and GRT and Go-Ahead in May 1994.
These bus operators all differed from Stagecoach in that they had all been previously
publicly owned companies. Badgerline was a former NBC subsidiary which was
subject to a management buyout in 1987. Through acquisition of seven other NBC
subsidiaries it grew until it dominated local markets in the Midlands and Southern
England. Go-Ahead was the main NBC operator in the North-East of England which
it used as a basis for expansion in Brighton and Oxford. GRT came from a slightly
different tradition in that it was a former municipal operator in Grampian Region.
Their method was identical to that of the other operators expanding its market from
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North-East Scotland to Leicester and Northampton. Outside these quoted companies"
there stood British Bus which was also formed by the merger of two former NBC
compames.
This process of deregulation then in the bus industry coupled with privatisation has
lead to a few large operators which grow by acquiring smaller operators.
Significantly this was how the National Bus Company grew: through acquisition. It is
clear from this that the intention to prevent a monopoly developing after deregulation
failed. This was why NBC was sold by breaking it down into subsidiaries, yet is clear
that where NBC subsidiaries had a strong position they have used this to build a local
"empire". However the nature of the privatisation and acquisition process means
most operate a "patchwork" service around Britain. That however is also in a state of
flux, for the bus industry's consolidation alluded to above continues apace.
The entry of operators into the stockmarket gave them a new flow of capital which in
tum speeded up the acquisition process. For example since its flotation in 1993 to
November 1995 Stagecoach plc had acquired a further 14 companies and 20% stakes
in another two." That is only slightly less than it had acquired in the previous six
years. But Stagecoach is not the only player in this growing 'cartel'-isation of the bus
market in the mid-nineties. National Express plc, which is firmly established
following the deregulation of the coach market, has also entered the stage bus
industry. It acquired a dominant operator, West Midlands Travel, for £243.7 million
in March 1995, the single largest acquisition in the entire bus industry since 1986.
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The deputy Chief Executive of National Express called it a "third and complementary
leg?" to their business. This was almost immediately followed by the announced
merger of Badgerline with GRT to form FirstBus pIc. This company would control
13.5% of the domestic market and becomes the second largest bus operator in Britain
with a view to become "the strongest group in the sector"." The increase in
acceleration of the consolidating process has lead to increased speculation that weaker
groups will be subject to take-over, notably Go-Ahead in the North-East of England.
Thus we have the situation where several giants dominate the provision of bus
services. As was previously mentioned this scenario does not fit any of the rationales
given at the time for bus deregulation. The rapid consolidation witnessed in the
nineties was hardly the rebirth of competing independent operators. Rather as has
been commented upon" the former NBC subsidiaries as ex-public sector operators all
still have links between each other. Many of the managers of the large bus groups all
know each other as former state employees. In one sense the consolidation process
could be seen as a partial regrouping of the NBC albeit in the private sector.
Certainly, the formation of FirstBus confirms this trend although GRT was a different
type of public sector body being a municipal operator. Yet the support for
deregulation rested on the idea that the monolithic public sector could not possibly
increase bus usage.
van hire company which moved into the bus industry.
22 SB Holdinzs and Mainline Partnership. See below.
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The theoretical implications of the recent developments in the bus industry for
privatisation and a model of public ownership will be examined below. Yet again the
importance of accountability is central to this question. By removing the state's
regulatory role in the bus industry by limiting the power of the Traffic Commissioners
the notion of accountable bus services was left to the 'market'. However the absence
of the state's controls did not stop a process of consolidation and squeezing of smaller
operators into niche markets. Arguably the same process occurred under public
ownership and state regulation. The NBC grew by acquisition and a fairly large
independent sector existed in this period. Yet what was lacking in the deregulatory
era was any sense of external control. The bunching together of buses on peak routes
and at peak times was given; little could be done to alter it, much as it annoyed the
public and caused problems to the environment and to traffic congestion. In many
ways the situation was analogous to the situation prior to the 1930 legislation albeit on
a more serious level as regards environmental problems and road congestion.
However before the full implications of these observations are measured for this work
it is necessary to examine the state's contradictory approach to the question of the bus
industry. It shall be shown that although the role of the Traffic Commissioner was
limited by the deregulation legislation other forms of control have been attempted to
make the industry more 'accountable'.
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THE STATE'S REACTION: HOW TO REGULATE
DEREGULATION?
The bus industry was perhaps in a unique situation" during the Thatcher/Major years
in that it was an attempt at complete liberalisation. Thus in one 'big bang' the dead
hand of the paternalistic regulator was set aside in order for the market to thrive. In
the previous chapter on privatisation it was established that with the establishment of
the regulators of the utilities the Government caused difficulties for itself. Originally
only seen as 'holding the fort' until the arrival of competition their existence took on a
rationale of its own.
There was never a clear detailed rationale for the regulators. This lead to a period
where the regulators almost attempted to define their own role. Also the introduction
of competition occurred in a haphazard way, and in the case of gas and telecoms the
full impact of this was not felt until nearly a decade after their privatisation.
Combined with their introduction of competition in the era of the Citizen's Charter the
regulator's powers were expressly expanded to protect consumers by the Competition
and Service (Utilities) Act 1992.27 Yet these dialectical contradictions between a
deregulatory ethos and the creation of complex regulatory structures for the utilities
seemed to be avoided in the bus industry, at least initially.
However, it will be shown that particularly during the recent era of consolidation in
the bus industry the state has sought to bring it under a form of control. These
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attempts have also been perceived as inadequate and faced demands for the
introduction of a bus industry regulator, notably from the Transport Select Committee
in late 1995. It would be a misnomer to suggest there were no controls on the bus
industry post-deregulation. The Traffic Commissioners remained with increased
emphasis on quality regulation. The Passenger Transport Authorities although
required to divest their bus companies still had important supervisory and co-
ordinating powers. Furthermore, as the private sector now dominated bus services
where there was a tendency towards monopoly the existing competition authorities
were also required to police the buses. In fact, as the decade proceeded the number of
cases referred to the Office of Fair Trading (OFT) grew to an extraordinary number.
The OFT received 541 representations about the bus industry between 1987 and 1994.
Further, the Monopolies and Mergers Commission has had to rule in a large number
of cases.
This process has caused frustration amongst the competition authorities. The
consolidation process has been so rapid that there have been ever increasing numbers
of references of unfair practices and potential abuses. This process has meant the
OFT and its former Director-General Sir Bryan Carsberg led the attack on
deregulation. Giving evidence to the Transport Committee's investigation on bus
deregulation Carsberg stated, "The regulatory system is not strong enough"." This
reflects the competition authorities' frustration at having to deal with the worst
excesses of the bus industry and the emerging operators.
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Comments similar to this are peppered through various MMC reports on the bus
industry. Between 1989 and 1995 the MMC published 16 reports on the bus industry.
Some operators featured more than others. For example, Stagecoach was directly
involved in seven of those reports." Remarkably during the course of 1995 there
were five reports which all involved Stagecoach in some way either directly or in the
case of one indirectly." All found the company guilty of some form of unfair trade
practice although they varied as to the recommended remedies. Stagecoach claims it
has been "singled out for examination of its acquisitions in a way in which other
companies in the UK bus and coach industry were not"."
Derek Scott when interviewed raised his scepticism about the competition authorities'
independence from governmental structures. He believed that the OFT and MMC
could be used as ciphers for a message from the Government. In other words
Stagecoach was to be made an example of to warn the rest of the industry.
Apparently private conversations between leading figures in the authorities and
Stagecoach supports this. Stagecoach is a good candidate for this position as, once an
outsider in the industry, it became the largest operator. The competition authorities
could use Stagecoach's position to call for a general review of the bus industry
following the publication of their reports. These authorities were thus in the forefront
of calling for a new regulator for the bus industry.
29 Tn tota1the OFT and MMC have investizated Stazecoach twenty times.
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This process reached its culmination with the publication of the MMC report into the
bus industry in the North-East of England." This was a suitable microcosm of the
entire bus industry as 90% of bus services in that area were run by subsidiaries of four
larger groups. The report studied five complaints of malpractice by various bus
companies including Stagecoach's subsidiary Busways. The background to the
involvement of the MMC was the collapse of the Darlington Transport Bus Group in
November 1994 after particularly aggressive competition from Busways." The
lasting significance of this report, however, is in its concluding chapter on the whole
deregulation project and its characterisation of the tactics of Stagecoach as
"deplorable". Scott recognised this was extremely harsh language to be used by the
MMC and conceded that its subsidiary made some mistakes, particularly in the
running of free services which they did not have to register, although he argued that
the local branch of the Transport and General Workers Union supported the company
in its action, and it argued that Stagecoach provided better protection for the
workforce.
Looking at the general picture of deregulation the MMC cited the problems of
creating "congestion, pollution and instability of service"." Furthermore, the
competition created was potential rather than actual and that there was a tendency
towards "comfortable oligopoly?" between the main operators. It then listed
solutions to the excesses of deregulation including expanding the powers of the
Transport Commissioners to regulate the number of buses on the routes and to
32 Cmnd 29::\::\ : The Sunnlv ofBus Services in the North East ofEneland. 1994-5.
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monitor services. The Commissioners would also seek to curtail the ability to alter
services speedily and would be required to make more information available to the
public. Thus, the MMC did not find cause for a full re-regulation of the industry but
nevertheless it certainly pointed in the opposite direction to that of the deregulatory
road.
The British competition authorities, then, have been very dissatisfied with the effects
deregulation has had. Arguably this represented a trend within the state which
wished to counter some of the effects of consolidation within the industry whilst
stopping short of establishing a new regulator, although as will be shown the
Transport Committee supported the latter approach. As outlined at the beginning of
the chapter the new regulations in February 1995 altering the ambit of the Traffic
Commissioners seem to confirm this.
Further evidence could be seen with the abandoning of bus deregulation in London;"
the re-establishment of the bus working group within the Department of Transport"
and if we follow Stagecoach's scepticism the tacit support given to the competition
authorities' more aggressive approach. Certainly during 1995 following the
publication of the reports into Stagecoach's purchase of 20% of Mainline Transport
and SB Holdings" the Government ordered Stagecoach to sell its share in both
instances even though this was not the solution offered in the report.
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The ultimate rebuttal of the deregulatory structure from an influential voice within the
state was the Transport Committee's investigation and subsequent report into the bus
industry. Two years previously it had carried out an investigation into the London bus
industry which had included a cursory study of the effects of deregulation." After
hearing evidence from key people involved in the industry the report came out in
favour of a specialist regulator. It would not be responsible for the monitoring of
quality or pricing matters. Rather it "would acquire a specialist expertise in bus
industry matters and act as a referee, quickly on the spot, able to settle disputes in a
firm and fair manner"." It would have the power to stop 'predatory' behaviour and
impose fines. These proposed changes would operate alongside an increase in the
resources of the Traffic Commissioners and an increase in vehicle inspection. The
report drew specific attention to the "very poor quality"?' of some of the buses on the
road. In contrast to the Select Committee's response to the Buses White Paper in the
eighties it rejected the system of franchising of bus routes - which had in part been
adopted for London bus services. This would give powers to the local authority or
PTA to award a franchise for a period of time. The Committee was not convinced
that it would be effective although it accepted it was motivated by the desire to "bring
some order to the chaos"." It also heard evidence from the trade unions which argued
that "tendering drove down wages and lengthened working hours"." This approach
was confirmed by an interview carried out with a leading T&G official in Glasgow."
39 HC 623, 1992-3.
40 HC 54, 1995-6, pliv.
41 ihid
193
Surprisingly given the movement on the part of the Government on the bus industry
its response to the Committee's report reverted to a knee-jerk rejection of regulation.
It was opposed to an "increase in the regulatory burden" and argued that present
disputes could be handled within the framework of the existing competition
authorities. It went further with the statement that on promoting bus use: "The present
regime of deregulated bus services run almost entirely by private sector operators
provides the best means of delivering effectively the services that people want"."
This almost reverts to the position adopted by the Buses White Paper and hardly takes
into account the dramatic changes within the bus industry and its failure to increase
bus usage. It is even a qualification of the Government's tentative approach towards
changing elements of the structure of the industry. Again Derek Scott argued that this
change in approach of the Government witnessed in this response" and in some MMC
reports which were less critical of the bus industry could be linked to rail
privatisation. That is, at the same time as these reports were being published the first
rail franchises were being awarded. In many cases as shall be shown it involved bus
companies including Stagecoach.
In many ways the retreat of the Government into the mantra of the 'market' is
significant. It could mark the end of the tentative steps to introduce a more
'accountable' structure for the bus industry. This is evidenced by the moves outlined
above to open discussion on the effects of deregulation and to give the Commissioners
some powers to intervene. These clearly fall far short of calling for a new regulatory
agency yet seemed to show an awareness of the lack of any control within the bus
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industry. However the overall effect of retreating to the position given in the response
to the Select Committee document remains that a series of consolidating operators
dominate an industry which is still in decline. Their steady growth and prominence in
the industry has led to a feeling of complete helplessness on the part of bus users."
The dominance of a few operators means they are not really susceptible to commercial
accountability and the absence of any structural control gives the impression of a
vacuum of accountability, almost analogous to the position which existed prior to the
regulation imposed by the 1930 Act. The absence of a rigorous investigation into
necessary bus services which was once provided by the Traffic Commissioners is a
void which needs to be filled. The transfer of ownership has not compensated for this
and Government balked at re-introducing controls, although a Conservative Party
dominated Select Committee supported this.
By dismantling a national network the Government was going against the trend to
greater co-ordination of transport. As will be explained below the private sector has
begun co-ordinating services again not for a highly utilised transport network but to
create a higher level of profit. In fact the private companies have used arguments and
methods previously deployed by publicly owned bodies. This stresses the importance
in having a publicly owned transport network which is accountable and encourages
participation.
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Before some conclusions from the expenence of bus deregulation are drawn the
example of the bus market in Glasgow will be used to show wider trends in the bus
industry.
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CASE STUDY
THE BATTLE FOR GLASGOW'S BUS MARKET
To illustrate the processes at work in the deregulated bus industry it will be useful to
use a study of an area which can be used as a microcosm for the larger picture in the
urban environment. Glasgow is a good example because a whole number of themes
can be explored with its experience of the decade of deregulation. Firstly,
immediately following the "Big Bang" date of deregulation" Glasgow was one of the
urban centres which seemed to feel the full effects of this policy. Pictures of
Glasgow's main thoroughfares" jammed with buses were portrayed throughout the
Scottish media and entered the public consciousness. Secondly as the consolidation
and struggle between major operators became the dominant trend in the nineties
Glasgow became one of the key battle grounds. Thus within the space of ten years the
processes outlined above all came to fruition: a bus war "won" by a dominant operator
then as consolidation continued apace the market became a battlefield for the main
bus operators. What sets Glasgow slightly apart from some parts of Britain is the
existence of the Passenger Transport Authority and the relative high level of bus
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usage in the city, but these factors allowed the developments which were occurring in
the British bus industry to take place at a greater speed. Glasgow also illustrated
practically what the effects of these policy developments were on actual bus users.
In 1994 two competition disputes were referred to the Monopolies and Mergers
Commission (MMC) concerning the Glasgow market. These were Strathclyde Buses'
take-over of Kelvin Central Buses," a rival operator; and Stagecoach's acquisition of
20% of the shares in Strathclyde Buses." Both of these reports came at a critical point
of deregulation. Furthermore, the Government's response to them represented the
new approach which was mentioned in the previous chapter. Thus it could be argued
that all the major themes of deregulation are at work here and that this study will be a
useful accessory to my main argument on the questions of participation and
accountability in the deregulatory model.
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STRATHCLYDE BUSES
The main operator in Glasgow by a considerable margin is the former municipal
operation Strathc1yde Buses.
TABLE 1 From MMC (1995) Cmnd 2829.
SBH WESTERN OTHERS
SCOTTISH
MARKET
SHARE.
1994 (%)
STRATH 33.0
-CLYDE
G'GOW 76.2
KELVIN
18.1
11.6
C'SIDE
2000
9.4
2.8
MIDLAND
B'BIRD
NIL
0.6
7.4
0.3
32.1
8.6
The Transport Act 1985 required Passenger Transport Authorities to divest their bus
companies and allow them to operate as independent companies. Thus Strathc1yde
Buses Ltd (SBL) took over operations in 1986. In the nineties there was increasing
pressure on municipal operators to sell their bus companies. This was completed on
19 February 1993 when SBL was acquired by Strathc1yde Bus (Holdings) Ltd: a
management employee led buy-out. This later changed its name to SB Holdings Ltd
(SBH).
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Before its take-over of Kelvin SBH operated largely as a local operator not going
down the path of entering new markets, unlike, for example, one of the other Scottish
municipal operators" GRT which in forming Firstlsus" with Badger Line has become
one of the largest bus companies in Britain. In discussion with the T&G rep for
Strathc1yde Buses he said the management of SBH regretted not being involved in
aquiring subsidiary services. However it did incorporate a subsidiary Comlaw No 313
Ltd54 in August 1993. This works as a separate unit from a Glasgow Depot and
supplies mainly niche services e.g. night buses and tendering work. It also has an
older fleet and pays lower wages to its drivers.
The structures of SBH are important because it prided itself on being an employee-
owned company. 80% of the share capital was held by SBH employees who also
nominated two Directors to the Board. This Board consisted of five directors, the
remainder being Executive directors who own a minority of the share capital (18%)
but had enhanced voting rights over certain issues. This was a seeming contradiction:
a company owned by the workforce but with a powerful management at Board level
which caused industrial tension. In July 1994 the SBH board proposed a 3% wage cut
along with a package of reduced benefits. This resulted in support for industrial
action - it could have introduced scenes of workers striking against a company they
52 There are four former municipal operators in Scotland; one remains in public control while the other
three were sold off to MEBOs from 1989-93.
53 Who nltimarelv took over ownershin of SBH.
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supposedly own." However a settlement was reached by ACAS which guaranteed a
consolidated pay rise."
This dispute, perhaps not coincidentally, immediately preceded the take-over of
Kelvin Central. Having solved the problem of industrial relations the management
looked for an acquisition. This was announced as creating the "biggest employee-
owned bus company in Britain"." It again preceded by a matter of weeks the
announcement of Stagecoach purchasing a 20% stake in SBH in November 1994.
Before both these incidents and the competition authorities' response to them are
examined it will be necessary to give a briefprofile of the other companies involved.
KELVIN CENTRAL BUSES LTD
Another former public sector operator Kelvin was part of the Scottish Bus Group
(SBG). As noted in the previous chapter the SBG was privatised between 1989-91.
Based in Motherwell, Kelvin ran a number of services into Glasgow from towns
North and East of the city. It ran 500 vehicles and employed a staff of 1300. One
could argue that this company was one of the casualties of the
deregulation/privatisation ethos. Following the first flush of deregulation post-
October 1986, as noted previously, the SBG was involved in quite intense competition
with the municipal operators in Scotland. Although this caused much congestion at
the time the long-term effects were not significant. That is to say, many of the
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subsidiaries of the SBG found it hard to maintain competition with municipal
operators many ofwhom were part of an integrated network.
In Glasgow through the work of the Strathc1yde Passenger Transport Executive
(SPTE) the buses remained linked with rail services and the Underground. Moreover
there are travelcards which can be used on all modes of transport. Thus although SBG
could mount an initial challenge to the dominant position of these operators it could
not maintain a prolonged battle. This was further emphasised as these subsidiaries
prepared for privatisation. The initial "bus wars" largely ended because the SBG
retreated. Kelvin Central was actually formed in 1988 by the merger of two
companies" which were both smarting at the effects of the "bus wars". This was also
reflected in damaging industrial action which culminated in a fourteen week strike in
1989 in response to a restructuring of the company. Such turmoil affected the
saleability of the company, and uniquely in the privatisation of the SBG it only
attracted one bidder: an MEBO. It acquired the company for the princely sum of £1
on 13 February 1991.
The structure in a sense was similar to SBH; the board consisted of 4 Executive
Directors, 3 employee appointed directors and one non-executive director. The
employees, though, only owned 47% of the shares with 46% being controlled by
trusts. In a profits sense the company did badly making losses every year with the
exception of 1992. It further curtailed its services in 1993 by withdrawing services
from the East End of Glasgow. Its precarious position was perhaps best exemplified
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by the Traffic Commissioner's refusal to renew Kelvin's licence for more than one
year in 1994. Yet in September of that year SBH bought this seemingly desperate
company for £11.1 million. This was less to do with recognising a bargain and more
to do with consolidating its strength. Stagecoach was also involved in negotiations
with Kelvin Central in the summer of 1994 and was expected to launch a bid of £10
million pounds. The reasons for this will be explained below.
STAGECOACH pIc.
The history of Stagecoach has been dealt with in the previous chapter. In the context
of Glasgow it is necessary to make a few additional remarks. Brian Souter, the
Chairman of Stagecoach, said when addressing shareholders in September 1994, that
there was still "great potential for profit improvement"." He explained that the
company was in a new phase; after concentrating on predictable low risk bus
companies which would enhance the share value, it was now moving into potentially
more risky urban areas. It would now look predominantly at employee-owned, ex-
municipal and the London bus companies. Indeed along with its acquisitions of two
London bus companies and its venture into Glasgow it also entered markets in
Newcastle" and Sheffield;61 both the subjects of references to the MMC.
Glasgow is an important market for Stagecoach. It is the major urban centre in
Scotland and has a high level of bus usage." Stagecoach has attempted to consolidate
its strength in the South-West of Scotland which began with its take-over of Western
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Scottish Buses in July 1994. Following this it bought out a small company, Arran
Transport, which ran some important routes in the West of Scotland. In December
1994 Stagecoach also made a pre-Christmas announcement of its purchase of Al
Buses based in Ayr.63 This was a small co-operative which had operated since 1926
although it had problems with maintenance. Investigations by the MMC did not result
in Stagecoach's divestment of this purchase even though it was one of the main
competitors to Western. Stagecoach's consolidation in this area is significant as it
forms an almost contiguous area to Cumbria and the North-West of England where it
is the dominant operator.
With this flurry of acquisitions Glasgow remams the "jewel in the crown" for
Stagecoach. This can be illustrated by its negotiations in the summer of 1994 for the
purchase of Kelvin Central which would have given it a route into the Glasgow
market. Early on in the deregulation process Stagecoach attempted to create a niche
in the Glasgow market by establishing the Magicbus service in 1986. This was not a
success and was sold in the early nineties. Scott explained that Strathclyde Buses
easily dealt with this competition although the T&G argued that Strathclyde sustained
some losses from running extra services to combat this threat.
Following its failure to take over Kelvin and before its 20% stake in SBH was
announced Stagecoach acquired a garage in Thornliebank, in the south side of the
city. This was bought from Clydeside 2000, a small operator which had been
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recently acquired by British Bus plc," another emerging large operator. Stagecoach
then registered 19 services with the Traffic Commissioner which would cover the
main areas of Glasgow. These were withdrawn, however, after the stake in SBH was
announced. Apparently Stagecoach was approached by the Chair of SBH as he saw
the necessity of getting a large operator on board." This struggle to establish a market
in Glasgow is enormously significant both from the point of view of Stagecoach's
strategy and the deregulated approach to transport. This can be partly illustrated by
examining the official response to this process.
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THE STATE'S RESPONSE.
Why was Glasgow one of the main battlegrounds in the war of consolidating bus
markets fought mainly in 1994? One significant reason is the large amount of bus
usage.
TABLE 2: TRANSPORT USED TO GET TO WORK (my emphasis). (MMC 1995).
MODE OF TRAIN/ BUS CAR CYCLE FOOT
TRANS- UNDER-
PORT (%) GROUND
STRATH- 5.1 19.2 55.9 0.9 12.7
CLYDE
G'GOW 7.9 30.9 42.4 0.9 12.9
EAST-
WOOD
7.0 8.9 72.9 0.7 4.7
The table illustrates this point when comparing Glasgow with Eastwood, an affluent
suburb of the city. Another useful comparison is that the British average of bus usage
in this context is 10%. Glasgow also has one of the lowest rates of car ownership in
Britain. In this market the municipal operator had an obvious advantage which it
maintained through the decade of deregulation. Yet it clearly felt threatened by the
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emerging operators and had problems of its own as its restructuring programme of
1994 showed.
The take-over of Kelvin Central was referred to the MMC. The Chair of SBH
commented "Though technically a take-over, in essence it is a merger between the
two companies as there will be an equal three man split on the new board of
directors"." The report" concluded the merger was not against the public interest -
with one dissent. The actual competition between the two in the period prior to the
acquisition was very muted. As was noted above the ferocious period of the first
tranche of "bus wars" was largely over. It further stated that the real competition was
potential; that is it would have been likely that Kelvin would have been taken over by
another larger bus company. It concluded that the best controls on SBH abusing its
position came from the smaller operators; the subsidised rail and underground
services of Strathclyde Transport and the presence - albeit limited - of three national
operators in contiguous areas.
On this last point it was noted that not only Stagecoach but British Bus and GRT
operated in Strathclyde. However, it is worthwhile noting the comments of the
dissenting member: Professor S Eilon. He pointed out that the current bus industry
was resulting in the creation of a number of local monopolies that could comfortably
co-exist. Thus the present role of the MMC was to prevent damaging "bus wars"
taking place. However he felt these were transitory with only temporary effects and
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"a small price to pay if competition is not to be killed off altogether"." He argued
that the best solution in this market was a duopoly. His dissatisfaction with the entire
state of affairs is best illustrated by these words: "I agree that completely free
competition in this industry may not be possible ... the contrasting scenario of a
benevolent monopolist operating entirely in the public interest may well be a
mirage"."
What was perhaps more significant given the changed emphasis of the Government on
deregulation was the Department of Transport's response." It said that the merger
had to be placed in the wider context of what was going on in the Scottish bus market.
Thus the merger was acceptable as a counterweight to other large operators. Even the
Scottish Office, although viewing the merger as undesirable, believed that if Kelvin
was divested it would be very vulnerable.
This investigation was carried out almost simultaneously with the examination of
Stagecoach's 20% stake in SBH.71 It occurred in November 1994 with Stagecoach
acquiring an £8.3 million stake. Peter Shaw, SBH's chair commented that Stagecoach
was an "ideal associate'?" in the present bus industry, yet literally weeks before the
two companies had been involved in rival bidding for Kelvin. The MMC's report"
concluded that Stagecoach would exert a material influence on SBH and hence would
deter competition from other large operators. That was despite Stagecoach's
68 ibid., p23.
69 ibid., p24.
70 ibid.. n 58.
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argument that the arrangement was merely financial and that it would maintain the
ethos of SBH as an employee owned company.
The authorities concluded that there were benefits to the arrangement, given
Stagecoach's greater business knowledge, its wide experience of the bus industry
outside Glasgow and its particular expertise in engineering." However these benefits
on paper have to compete with the actual realities of what the relationship would
mean. Stagecoach would exert pressure beyond its 20% stake because of its
experienced, commercially orientated management. This would be especially
important given the perception of other bus companies and Stagecoach's reputation.
The Government's response to this again was very significant. Without hesitation it
called for Stagecoach to divest its holding in SBH75; this followed a similar
pronouncement over the stake in Mainline Partnership in Sheffield." In that case the
MMC had only concluded that Stagecoach should not be allowed to increase its stake
with no requirement to divest. All the other processes outlined in the preceding
chapter were coming to the fore at this time. It is clear that the Government wanted to
make an example of Stagecoach to illustrate its new approach to the bus industry.
However this proposal was dropped in relation to the Glasgow market" as in June
1996 FirstBus bought SBH including Stagecoach's share. This brought a large profit
to Stagecoach and to the employees who owned shares in the company. It illustrates
the attitude of the large operators towards each other of mutual existence by drawing
74 These arzuments further confirm the benefits of an integrated bus network.
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up 'spheres of influence'." Yet even this did not cause stability, as the merger was
again referred to the MMC which then proposed that Firstbus divest itself of some of
the services in Strathclyde."
It is clear that the examination of the battle for Glasgow's bus market provides an
opportunity to examine a whole number of different processes: the initial glut of the
first "bus wars"; the threat of the emerging operators; the privatisation of the publicly
and municipally owned bus companies; the emergence of "employee-owned"
companies; the methods of acquisition and merger. In recent years only the North-
East of England's bus industry could have had more interest from the competition
authorities. 80
Overall it can be shown that after a decade of deregulation the 'competition' that
exists in Glasgow is largely potential rather than actual, a point which can be
expanded across the whole country. There remains an uneasy truce between the large
nation-wide operators and the dominant ex-municipal bus company. Yet this constant
threat has not resulted in major innovations but rather behind the doors deals to coopt
existing operators as in the case of the SBH, and even in the case of Kelvin Central a
very weak company. For Stagecoach it illustrates the problem it will have in breaking
into many more domestic markets, particularly given the Government's new stance.
Its target of acquiring employee-owned bus companies will prove difficult even if the
board is initially enthusiastic as seemed the case in SBH, for even the MMC
78 But Stagecoach launched yet another incursion into the Glasgow market in May 1997.
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concluded that the aims of Stagecoach were contradictory to the ethos of an employee
owned company. Stagecoach may realise (given the admission in the report on Kelvin
Central) that the MMC was concerned "that the process of privatisation, in Scotland
and elsewhere, was creating groups of bus companies with an unfair competition
advantage because of the favourable tenus of the employee buy-outs"." What the
Glasgow situation shows above all else is how removed from the deregulatory
paradigm put forward in the eighties the modem bus industry is.
CONCLUSION.
Ten years of deregulation in the bus industry has turned processes originally outlined
by its authors into the opposite. Monopolies have emerged from the bus wars with
little regulation aside from the competition authorities and increasingly the Traffic
Commissioners; this is quite ironic given their vilification at the time of the 1985 Act.
Perhaps this seems to be stating an obvious point: de - regulation apparently means
the absence of any regulatory structure. But as mentioned previously it is not as
straight forward as this. Privatisation of the utilities resulted in the creation of
regulators with quite substantial powers. In the nineties the notion of liberalisation
and the benefits of privatisation was sullied. In the bus industry this seemed to be
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reflected in the re-discovery of the concept of accountability" which as noted in the
previous chapter had little currency in the debate on deregulation.
Then the Government seemed to move in the direction of "beefing up the regulators"
in order to protect the consumer. A useful point of examination to support this view
is the rail privatisation programme." If anything this privatisation has an over-
abundance of regulators - something which many potential private sector franchisees
have attempted to point out. So although the bus industry was the only complete
liberalisation undertaken by either the Thatcher or Major administration it was not
immune from these developments. The calls for an element of re-regulation of the bus
industry support this, although as has been shown the Conservative Government
backed away from this.
The picture in the nineties is loosely analogous to that which existed in the twenties
immediately prior to regulation. Then controls were sought to prevent the dominance
of "fly-by-night" operators who gained dominance in their markets by using methods
of "cream-skimming" or flooding the market. Now, although the events take place in
a different era where the car is the dominant form of transport, similar methods have
been utilised.
Now there is an added factor, for the experience of an integrated bus network has not
passed the "new" operators in the bus industry by. Again this is hardly a controversial
point to make as most of the dominant operators are ex-publicly owned companies.
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The whole notion of a network operating with cross-subsidy was held in the eighties
to be the reason for the bus industry's decline. Yet now when studying the
justification given by large operators to the competition authorities and the reasons
given by management of smaller companies as to why they support their merger in a
larger company the arguments seem familiar. Evidence given by Stagecoach in the
recent flurry of reports by the MMC stated: "It was incorrect to assume that there were
not sizeable economies of scale to be made within the bus industry"." On the general
issue of a deregulated market, "It is recognised that wasteful competition between the
operators had been shown to be against the public's long term interest (emphasis
added)" .85
These views speak volumes as to the gap between the rationale of deregulation and
the actual practice. Derek Scott, when interviewed, stated that Stagecoach could make
sizeable econormcs of scale notably because of the supply of buses, engineering
services and parts. He argued that the Ridley model of the mid-eighties was
unrealistic and drawn up as a response to the dominance of the NBC. On deregulation
generally Stagecoach believe the effects of deregulation were relatively minor, "The
deregulation of the bus industry was intended to replace public capital with private
capital"."
The other side of the equation is equally illuminating; that is the reaction of the
smaller companies. In an earlier investigation of an acquisition of a company by
83 See relevant chanters.
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Stagecoach the MMC concluded, "[as]. .. part of a larger group it would benefit from
economies in purchasing and finance charges and capital investment could be brought
forward". 87 These words were echoed during the take-over fever of the mid-nineties.
Moir Lockheed, the Chief Executive ofGRT in its own merger with Badgerline stated
the overwhelming reason was "the substantial economies of scale?" which could be
made. It has become generally accepted that a larger group can make savings in the
purchase of buses, insurance and diesel fuel; further it has the benefits of a network.
This implicitly accepts the notion of cross-subsidy so much attacked in the nineteen
eighties. When this point is accepted it undermines the whole basis of deregulation
and indeed advances the argument for a co-ordinated transport service.
What, then, does this show? The attempt to break up the NBC and promote small
operators has failed. Rather, although there remain a large number of small
operators," the market is dominated by large firms which utilise the methods of a
publicly owned network with none of the safeguards. That is they use cross-subsidy -
although the phrase itself is never used - and use their size to gain economies. But
their overriding objective is to make profit. So although bus use has declined every
year since deregulation this has not prevented these companies establishing
themselves as financial players on the Stock Exchange. In many instances, to use the
words of one commentator, they are "eking out growth from static revenues"." This
shows the difficulties of separating the concepts of accountability and of ownership
because public ownership would not be concerned with producing dividends but only
87 MMl'fl qqn Cmnd nR? at n47
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III providing a public transport system - thus fulfilling a particular model of
accountability. Although there have been attempts to re-assert accountability as
outlined in this chapter it has not been possible as the bus industry is now largely
privately operated, even though the methods used by these companies mimic the
pattern in which the publicly owned bus companies operated.
This illustrates the argument put forward in the Introduction which was sceptical
about the delivery of accountability through a purely private service. One of the
justifications for privati sing was to let the market decide. In this way a form of
accountability would be delivered as the services would be more receptive to the
consumer. But even this extremely indirect form of accountability did not come into
existence in the bus industry. Deregulation did not prevent consolidation nor
integration, indeed the industries actively promoted this policy. The reintroduction of
the untrammelled private sector led to the pursuit of increasing shareholder value.
This result did not solve any of the problems of delivering an accountable bus
industry.
These developments occurred because the Thatcher/Major administration could not
prevent the general tendency of public transport to move to an integrated position
even when privatised. Yet this tendency can be damaging to the bus users and
employees if not coupled with an industry held accountable as was provided in part by
the Traffic Commissioners. Integration has occurred but in a distorted, fragmented
way where shareholders' dividends become the driving force. It may be argued that
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make no profits. Yet it has been shown that the dominant operators have
monopolistic or oligopolistic positions which can eliminate quite effectively any
emerging challengers. Through privatisation the Government could not prevent the
broader processes which were at work in the bus industry and had been since the early
decades of this century. A publicly owned bus industry could have had all the
economies of scale which the new operators now had and could have involved the
workers in the industry and bus users to great effect. This theme will be fully
explored in my concluding chapters.
Yet the experience of the deregulation of a large part of public transport was meant to
be an example not just of the benefits of the market but of future transport
privatisation: particularly the rail industry. In the next two chapters the model of
public ownership and privatisation adopted for rail will be examined as will how the
processes were affected by the experience of bus deregulation, and how the concepts
of accountability and regulatory control came to play such a large part in the model of
rail privatisation.
CHAPTER SIX.
BRITISH RAIL.
A MODEL OF PUBLIC OWNERSHIP?
If the bus industry in the early eighties was a broad mixture of publicly owned local
authority services, subsidiaries of a national operator and some private services, the
rail industry was very different. British Rail, the national and sole operator, became
synonymous for opponents of public ownership with the monolithic public
corporation; it was once argued that Thatcherism was born from the frustration of the
commuters of South-East England. Yet the privatisation of this industry was not
announced until relatively late in the Thatcher era and implemented several years after
that. However this maintenance of the rail industry in the public sector did not mark a
more benevolent attitude towards the industry. Indeed, as shall be shown, the
constraints put on the publicly owned railway could be seen as preparing the path for
a form ofprivatisation.
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Under the Thatcher/Major Governments there was much criticism of the absence of a
coherent transport policy. Although there have been Government responses to these
accusations 1 their attitude to the rail industry at times seemed to amount to disdain. It
is alleged that Mrs Thatcher, an ex-opposition spokesperson on Transport, at her first
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be here". Apocryphal or not, this story reflects the tensions felt by British Rail under
Thatcherism. But it could also be argued that the Thatcher era - rather than
representing a completely new attitude -marked an intensification of pressures which
always existed on the railway because of the structure ofpublic ownership adopted.
Certainly the institutional structures created by nationalisation concealed a number of
conflicting tensions which periodically rose to the surface. Thus in this chapter the
structure of the nationalised rail industry will be examined. As mentioned above this
structure was much closer to the public corporation model outlined in Chapter 2 than
that of the bus industry ever was. The test of accountability will be applied to this
organisation for, as explained in the Introduction, this concept is central for public
lawyers. As a public corporation much of British Rail's structural difficulties were
generic to all of the nationalised industries. However these were coupled with
specific difficulties of running a railway as part of the transport infrastructure.
This chapter will thus examine the structure adopted after nationalisation and the
problems attached to it. Further reorganisations will also be examined. It shall be
shown that these reorganisations took place right up to the eve of privatisation. After
this the background to the privatisation proposals will be examined. These adopted a
series of different models. This will prepare the ground for Chapter 7 which will
encompass a detailed study of the actual procedure for privatisation and whether it
delivered the elusive accountability.
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THE STRUCTURE OF BRITISH RAIL AFTER
NATIONALISATION
When the Labour Government of 1945-51 nationalised the railways it did so only as
part of a larger programme of providing a unified transport system in Britain. Part
one ofthe Transport Act 1947 established the British Transport Commission as part of
a "properly integrated system of public inland transporr.' Necessary as the idea of
co-ordination is in transport' the model created by the legislation caused problems.
The BTC consisted of a small supervisory board which existed alongside a number of
executives which dealt with the daily operation of each service. Such a structure was
clearly prone to tensions particularly between the Railway Executive and the BTC. In
1948 the Railways accounted for 77% of the BTC's gross receipts," and this
superiority may account for the haughty attitude to other forms of transport. Further,
some transport historians argue that an even greater reason for tension lay in the fact
that the executives, including the Railway Executive, were appointed directly by the
minister and not by the BTC: "The biggest obstacle was the fact that the Commission
did not appoint its own agents't '
So, rather than co-ordination, the Commission was almost in competition with the
newly unified four major railway companies. One participant in the process of
reorganisation in the railway industry said, "much feeling and heat was generated'" in
the conflict between Executive and Commission. For example expurgated minutes of
2 Transport Act 1947 s 2, on this section generally see Bonavia (1987) and unpublished thesis
McDonald (1987).
the Railway Executive were sent to the BTC while the Executive kept the uncensored
set," Such problems not only undermined co-ordination but further exacerbated the
problems of control; these were also apparent when looking at the structure of the
Executive itself.
These tensions are significant as they highlight the difficulties that the public
corporation had in working in a co-ordinated manner with other organisations. As
explained in chapter 2, one of the major reasons behind the adoption of the
corporation was because it allowed a degree of independence from central
government. However this independence became a hindrance when trying to promote
a co-ordinated transport system. There were also difficulties with trying to promote a
co-ordinated economic policy for the country when there was a number of competing
corporations. This poses two general questions of accountability, firstly the
Government could not use its own creation to promote a co-ordinated transport policy,
and secondly, the structure adopted prevented individual consumers holding the
industry to account. This illustrates both the multi-layered nature of accountability
and the failure of the public corporation to fulfil any ofthem.
As in the other nationalisations of the 1945-51 government, much experience was
derived from the Second World War. This was true for the structure of the railway
industry and the Executive which was "functional and highly centralised",8 functional
as each member of the Executive could give direction to officers within his function
anywhere in Britain ostensibly to "enforce standard practices'Y and centralised as the
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structure had "some roots in the military organisation model'?" and all regional
officers were directly responsible to the Executive. This dramatic centralised
structure for the railways undoubtedly had some advantages: it allowed
standardisation of rolling stock, created savings in the field of civil engineering and
gave benefits in the computation of accounts and statistics.l:
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Yet this masked tensions which existed, particularly with the regions. For the chief
Regional Officer was tom between two functions; that of co-ordinating his own
region and that of implementing centralised rules from the Executive. Moreover
departmental officers within the region were responsible directly to the Executive, not
to the regional officer. Previous opponents of public ownership exploited this at the
time. The then Director of the Chartered Institute of Transport (Lamb) in his
presidential address stated "Second thoughts are often best, and an arrangement
which gives full authority to the chief regional officer and makes him the medium for
all major directions of the Executive should... secure the advantages obtainable from
unification". 12
As so often occurs in British constitutional arrangements, diffuse chains of command
allow for an obfuscation of control and accountability. Thus the idea of using public
ownership as a means of controlling previously privately run concerns - which was
extremely popular among railway workers 13 - became discredited. "The Railway
Executive became as unpopular with those down the line, because of its central
10 NashJPreston (1993), p95.
11 7\,f.... roh ~T"I th~ C'Q;1'Y'l~ nT<:l"(7 ':IC' t'hp l-::tT"o-pT" holle' f'\1"\pr':ltf'\rc f"{)111rl hP c;;:.ppn to ("{)nc;;:.nlirl~tptlu:':lr noc;;:.iti()n in thf":
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commanding position, as with its master above".14 Meanwhile waiting in the wings
was the Conservative Party with its decentralising programme. This sought to build
on the alienation felt by the particular model of public ownership adopted, in a sense
similar to privatisation. Rather than opt for a return to the private sector - perhaps the
memories of the inefficiencies of this era were too recent - the Party opted for
reorganisation within the sector. It largely retained the public corporation form.
Thus the Party's ability to criticise wholesale this particular structure's lack of
'accountability' was limited. This is in line with the broad position adopted by
Conservatives in the post-war period discussed in Chapter 2 and later criticised by
Joseph and Thatcher.
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THE CONSERVATIVE RESTRUCTURING OF THE
RAILWAYS.
It has already been noted in Chapter 3 that in general the Conservative Party did not
reverse any of the nationalisation measures of the post-war Labour government. Only
when the structures interfered with profitable businesses like iron and steel and road
haulage did it put forward denationalisation measures. In general it was satisfied with
the structure of the public corporation and the generous measures of compensation
given to the private sector following public ownership. However as far as rail went
the Conservatives did want to restructure. This was envisaged in their pre-election
policy document "The Right Road for Britain": "British Railways should be re-
organised into an appropriate number of regional railway systems, each with their
own pride of identity, and co-ordinated as to broad policy alone by a central body
(my emphasis)". 15
This can be seen as exacerbating the internal difficulties of the newly nationalised rail
undertakings. However there was also a desire to use nostalgia for the old railway
companies 16 with an attempt to revamp the regional boards of the pre-war level. This
was aided by old members of the private railway management like Sir James Milne of
the old Great Western Railway who had much secret contact with the Conservative
Party.l" He had originally opposed state ownership and had put forward the
alternative of the existing railway companies being turned into local transport
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authorities.i'' Ironically enough he was also the original choice for the Chair of the
Railway Executive. I9 Perhaps the use of nostalgia sought to play on people's
dissatisfaction with the present but without promoting any substantive change such as
a change in ownership back to the private sector.
The Transport Act 1953 abolished the Railway Executive but retained the British
Transport Commission which was to implement transport policy. The White Paper
prior to the legislation'" had admitted that integration had not succeeded but the
Commission was retained so as to provide a focus for Transport Policy. The
possibility of any form of co-ordination was also weakened by the disposal by the
Transport Commission of the road haulage companies. The staff of the Executive
merged with the Commission which appointed the regional boards.i' Thus the
making of policy was still carried out within the 'corporate' structure. The question
of it being a distant unaccountable body was not debated at this time. Indeed it would
seem that these arguments were not used until the Joseph/Thatcher era.
However superficial these changes were in terms of ownership and accountability the
idea of recreating powerful regional boards with minimal interference from the centre
flew in the face of the experience of the railways in the last century. As mentioned in
Chapter 2 nationalisation nearly occurred several times in the nineteenth century and
the early decades of the twentieth. In fact in the words of a civil servant working in
the railways: "as time passed and the work of the centre grew, the abolition of the
Railway Executive became more and more difficult to understand. The centre of
gravity of the railways was very much the Commission's headquarters and it became
more so as the years went by".22 This reorganisation of sorts was coupled with the
Modernisation plan of 1955 which sought to upgrade the network and its rolling stock
which was still dominated by steam. Unfortunately these ambitious plans also
coincided with the railway facing economic catastrophe.
The original cost of the plan was to be £1660 million over 15 years, and the actual
expenditure between 1955-9 was £587 million.23 Yet the mid-fifties was exactly
when the use of the car exploded. Between 1950-60 the number of vehicles in Britain
doubled.24 This corresponded with a dramatic fall in railway receipts which failed to
cover working expenses from 1956 onwards.f Significantly for this work the fifties
also were the high point for the use of the bus as a mode of transport. Thus the
financial position of the railways was in a perilous situation.
In 1960 the Select Committee on Nationalised Industries compiled a report on the Rail
industry. It concluded that in the railways there was "confusion in judging between
what is economically right and what is socially desirable".26 There was also criticism
of the modernisation plan which a Treasury representative had described to the Select
Committee as "merely a hotchpotch of the things that the Commission was saying it
was desirable to try to achieve by 1970".27 There was no economic study of the
implications of the plan or the impact that road traffic would have on it.
22 ibid., p8I.
23 Barker/Savage op. cit., p221.
24 l\,f<l"r1'\l1<l lr1 nn "it -o«:
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These criticisms echoed the Select Committee's reports on other nationalised
industries; namely the failure to differentiate between commercial obligations and
social responsibility. This division is particularly pertinent for the rail industry with
its division between rural and urban services." Furthermore, the concept of peak
travel with different volumes of passengers at different times on the same route
affected the rail industry.r" Thus in the same way as the bus industry it would be
impossible to distinguish a particular commercial service from a particular social
service; the two overlap. The difficulty in drawing a line between commercial and
social is one of the reasons why it was so hard to devise a scheme for rail privatisation
(and even harder to put it into practice) as shall be shown in the next chapter. The
Select Committee report paved the way for another reorganisation with the Transport
Act 1962 which abolished the BTC and created the British Railways Board'" whose
first Chairman was Dr Beeching from ICI. His Reshaping of the Railways report
hardly examined the social implications of the Railway at all but concentrated on
which parts of the railway were commercially viable. The overall effect was to close
down 5000 route miles and close 2363 stations.
Thus within the public corporation form there were a number of reorganisations at the
management level. This did not coincide with either greater transparency in decision-
making or an increase in external accountability. Rather the inevitable growth of a
centralised structure was recognised yet with little control adopted over it. In a sense
the reversal of the modest moves towards decentralisation highlight the lack of
thought which goes into structural reform within the British state. The challenge to
the public corporation form from either the left or right did not manifest itself in this
era. Yet the lack of accountability and co-ordination with other modes of public
transport was transparently clear at this juncture.
The severe cutting of rail services was the effect of the divorcing of social
responsibilities from the rest of the railways. This in tum stemmed from the structure
of nationalisation and its subsequent reform which did not allow for any control or
accountability. Thus no users or railway workers could give their definition of a
'social' railway and arguably this structure even excluded Government ministers: it
was the Board which decided.31 The primary pressures on the Board were
commercial whereas the impetus for public ownership from the grassroots " and even
to some extent from Morrison himself was social. This contradiction was not solved
by the public corporation; rather its 'independence' encouraged the commercial ethic
at the expense of the social. Again in this tension we see the different ideas in how to
deliver accountability through different structures as outlined in the Introduction.
Alongside this the structure of the BTC did not allow for proper co-ordination by its
exclusion of road travel - which had this early stage of its development could have
become part of an integrated transport network.
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This perhaps was altered with the passing of the Transport Act in 1968 under the
Labour Government of Harold Wilson. As explained in the examination of the bus
industry, this established the PTEs which allowed a measure of co-ordination at a
local level with elected councils co-ordinating their services. With local government
reorganisation of the early seventies it also marked the era when subsidy began to be
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paid at a local level. This was an attempt to harmonise local transport, in a sense like
local BTCs. Yet although this was a worthy initiative it did not tackle the larger
problem of the structure of British Rail. There was no nation-wide Transport
Executive with elected officials to hold BR accountable. Perhaps it was felt that as a
nationalised concern there were enough controls. This is debatable given the
structural concerns and dissipation of accountability which was identified in Chapter
Two.
Public ownership if it was to fulfil the aspirations of all those who supported it in the
forties had to involve a system of providing socially necessary services. This reflects
the impetus mentioned above. The concept of commercially viable services from the
standpoint of these supporters was at best a secondary consideration and at worst
completely irrelevant. However coinciding with these demands for public ownership
was the state's adoption of a form of nationalisation which did not accept this. The
state's view was that these industries could be more efficiently run under the form of
the public corporation. The popular feelings did not come into it. This was
particularly true for the railways which prior to nationalisation in the forties had a
long history of state involvement. Thus the structure of the public corporation tended
to reflect the Government's priorities of efficiency and commercialism rather than the
socially inspired movement for public ownership. Indeed as previously noted its
structure was heavily influenced by the joint-stock company with its separation of
management and ownership. Thus it could be argued this further emphasised the
priorities of 'commercialism'. When these aspects of a transport service become
separated from its obligation to society problems occur, although a degree of
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linked - commercialism will follow a successful integrated transport system. Yet the
terms of debate during public ownership always focused on their separation. That can
be seen both in the period following the 1960 Select Committee Report and the
significant era of the eighties and the nineties under Thatcher and Major. Further if
the solution of that problem was the key to dealing with the rail network then why did
it exist for so long? What was never identified during this period was a structure for
the railways which involved the public and employees in the definition of a 'socially
necessary' railway. There was no external involvement of any group- thus in this
sense the question ofpublic accountability was placed to one side. However this was a
contradiction which could not be ignored indefinitely. Ironically during the
privatisation process as shall be identified there seemed to be more attention paid to
different concepts of accountability then there was during the long period of public
ownership.
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"COMMERCIALISATION" OF BRITISH RAIL IN THE
THATCHER YEARS
The Eighties were viewed as a critical time by rail management: an essential
programme of investment was needed to update the railway stock. Most of the
equipment had been brought in under the 1955 Modernisation Plan which as has been
seen ran into its own problems. In 1978 the Department of Transport had agreed to
review the electrification programme proposed by the board. This general upgrading
had begun with the West Coast Main Line in the sixties and seventies. A joint review
on the subject was carried out by the Department and the BR Board from 1979-81.
The management pinned its hopes for the new decade on a general upgrading of the
network.
However the strategy of British Rail depended on this investment being forthcoming
from the government. Although Norman Fowler was initially enthusiastic over the
electrification programme" he delayed making a decision throughout his time of
office claiming the rail network must become more productive. His successor, David
Howell, was even more frank. He claimed to be "committed in principle'?' to the ten-
year electrification programme. However, he would only consider it on a route by
route basis. Further, any investment proposed had to be measured against how the
previous investment had performed. This allowed one journal to compare Fowler's
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carrot and stick approach to being beaten by David Howell's stick." The same
approach was extended to the trains many ofwhich were very old. Modem Railways,
in 1982, under a headline "Toward the Geriatric Train?" wrote that British rail
"remains an undertaking whose assets are in some places visibly wasting away".
The Government's policy or lack of it toward the investment programme was
compounded by the Serpell Report of 1983. Serpell was a railway executive on the
BR board and it was widely hoped by the corporation that he would produce a report
generally supportive of its demands. This could not have been more wrong. The
report criticised British Rail for being inaccurate in its forecasts and claimed the
estimated costing of its investment was grossly inaccurate. Most importantly the
report specifically rejected the claim that a High Investment Option would result in a
financial return for the railways and so stated "we doubt whether the amount of PSO
grant required in 1992... need be higher in real terms than the present level, provided
the Board achieve the savings and efficiency improvements that are feasible".37 It
thus rejected any concept of improving central funding.
Most of the publicity around the report centred on its maps which examined the
possibility of rationalising BR's major routes. With astonishing lack of political
aplomb the report examined the possibility of a network of 1600 miles, claiming it
would be financially viable. However those plans were just hypothetical musing -
what was more significant was the way other elements of the report influenced rail
management's thinking over the decade. It was clear that no high investment was
going to be forthcoming. The emphasis was to be on restructuring BR to make it
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more productive in its management and labour force. As Margaret Thatcher put it
following the first series of ASLEF strikes in 1982: "If there is to be a future for BR
it has to be modernised in its labour practices"." Reviewing the report Dodgson, a
transport economist, claimed there were three main areas for BR to concentrate on to
have a future:" a determined management, a clear statement of objectives and an
initiative to deal with out-dated working practices. This would also necessarily
involve a targeting of subsidies to the most cost-effective areas. Giving a speech on 2
November 198240 Howell said large subsidies to rail were causing "transport
expectations to rise unchecked".
Such an approach signalled a tightening of subsidy rather than an extension of
investment. This would seem to be classic Thatcherism yet as, one academic put it, it
was merely an "intensification of existing trends"." Under the new Government the
Public Service Obligation, the grant given to the railway, was cut back and the
External Finance Limit was tightened. However both had also occurred under the
previous Labour Administration. Indeed, the EFL was an initiative of the 74-79
government. The roots may have lain in the period of the early sixties when the
notion of a commercial publicly owned railway began to be raised in the Select
Committee Report.Y Having less money British Rail needed to readjust in the areas
highlighted in the Serpell report: management and labour productivity.
37 Serpell Report DoT (1983), p85.
38 Modem Railways, April1982.
39 n~rl~o~~(1 011'1.\
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Thus the Thatcher administration, rather than initially tearing down the nationalised
structure, used it to influence the industries. This process has been noted in other
industries'" but in rail in a sense it is clearest. Some could argue that this experience
of the early years of Thatcherism and the last Labour Government shows that
ultimately there was a form of democratic control of the nationalised industries,
although a very convoluted and distant form. However rather than increase the
accountability of the industries this control underlined the absence of that
accountability. Strict financial targets and secret meetings carried out by ministers
hardly amounted to a new accountability. Furthermore, the use of an outside study
into the industry by Serpell in an ad hoc manner emphasised the lack of consistency
which was employed when dealing with the publicly owned industries.
The Reid's Reorganisations
The restructuring of the management of BR without investment in the rolling stock,
given the catastrophic vision outlined above may seem akin to rearranging the deck-
chairs on the Titanic. Yet one of these initiatives, the "sectorisation" of British Rail
management, was labelled by the Board, "the single most important organisational
change since nationalisation"." However as has been seen the notion of reorganising
the structures of the industry to cope with a crisis was not new, as the Transport Acts
of 1953 and 1962 testify. Along with a new corporate planning framework and
appraisal of investment proposals the changes allegedly hastened the
"commercialisation" of British Rail. In the words of the Board "(it) pays full regard
to the needs of the market and of competition"."
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As argued above this trend towards 'commercialisation' was not a modem trend, far
less was it due solely to the impact of Thatcherism. Since the sixties both Labour and
Conservative administrations have recognised the diverse nature of rail services. The
1968 Transport Act46 and the 1974 Railways Act47 emphasised the distinction between
commercial and social rail services, as also described by the 1960 Select Committee
report. The PSG was given to subsidise unremunerative but socially necessary routes.
Peter Parker the Chairperson of the Board from 1975-83, formulated the concept of a
"social railway?" which was not however entirely new. Essentially the sector
management approach took this further. Thus once again the problems of the railway
were put down to the elusive division between socially necessary and economic
services which as argued above was encouraged by the particular structure of the
public corporation.
The post-nationalisation model combined regional bases with functional separation.
This was altered to try and separate policy from management with the decentralisation
proposals of 1953, but it was not very successful as the nature of the railway
demanded a strong central authority as was recognised with the establishment of the
BR Board in 1963. The sectorisation of the eighties identified five main areas of rail
service: Inter-City, Freight, Parcels, Network Southeast and Provincial services. In
managerial jargon this was a matrix approach as the sectors intersected with function
and region." It also introduced the bottom-line concept whereby the director of a
46 1 ot;Q ~ 7~
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sector had complete control of his own field with a separate profit and loss account.
The separation into sectors also allowed the profitable areas of the rail network to be
identified. This led, inevitably, to a greater emphasis on financial targeting - which
had existed previously - with firm targets set in October 1983 and August 198450 for
Inter-City and Parcels. Again the concept of 'commercialising' these sectors of the
rail network was an old one but never before had such strict timetables been set. It
coincided with the Secretary of State setting clear objectives for the PSO seeking a
25% cut by 1989/90.
The general process towards identifying the profitable sectors of the railways thus
intersected with a tightening of subsidy. The underlying philosophy of the
management shake-up was a clear linking of objectives with financial support. A
central criticism in the Serpell Report had been that unrealisable targets were set by
management with the hope that government would endlessly subsidise them."
Throughout the eighties the sectorisation approach was widely acclaimed as helping
British Rail improve its general financial position, although a parallel factor may have
been the development and sale of the land owned by BR in alliance with the private
sector. Cynically, this allowed the Lex column in the Financial Times -following the
release of the corporation's results of 1989- to label it "a property company with an
irksome mass transit sideline"."
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Indeed, although the management restructuring was declared successful it did not
prevent a new plan being brought in under the next Chairman of British Rail labelled
"Organising for Quality". Two transport experts called this inevitable given "the
government's commitment to privatise and the low level of esteem with which BR is
viewed by the public"." But if the previous reorganisation had been successful why
did these two attitudes exist? Significantly this reorganisation began in the early
nineties and was completed in April 1992.
In discussion with a leading employee of Railtrack54 (Scotland) the OFQ initiative
was labelled the "shortest revolution in history". It was introduced the week before
the Conservatives won the 1992 election with a commitment to privatise the rail
industry. The period when the OFQ initiative was taken was when serious discussion
had started on the possible sell-off of the network as examined below. The claims
were of deepening the important changes of Sir Robert Reid in 1982 when he brought
in his "five fingers':" , that is the sectorisation project. Much of the same terminology
was used in the OFQ initiative with Bob Reid at the Transport Committee's
investigation into privatisation claiming the "buck would stop?" at certain
individuals' doors; bottom-line management. There was further decentralisation with
the main sectors subdividing into different routes" and greater transparency in
decisions allowing "simplicity and focus"."
One view of the OFQ initiative would be to see it as the final stepping-stone on the
process from "commercial" British Rail to outright privatisation. This is supported by
John Heath, a senior consultant to BR from 1978-93, who pointed out that the 27
52 Lex in the Financial Times 6 July 1989.
53 NashlPreston op. cit., p96.
54 Interview with Press Officer of Railtrack (Scotland).
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profit centres created by OFQ were the basis of the 30 potential franchises post-
privatisation." This allowed the image to be created that the changes of 1 April 1994
were "a cleverly contrived continuation of the fundamental organisational changes
introduced in April 1982 and April 1992".60 However we must always set this process
in context. In the fifteen years of Conservative Government there were three major
reorganisations at British Rail each claiming to stand on the shoulders of the other. It
could be argued that these reorganisations stand in a direct line from the Beeching
reorganisation of the sixties. However money became tighter and tighter, although
some projects were agreed to -notably the electrification of the East Coast Main Line -
other elements ofthe rolling stock continued their decay.
'Productivity' of the Worker.
The other side of the reorganisation equation was the attitude to the labour force. One
word above all illustrates the standard by which railway workers had to live by:
productivity. Indeed, it is remarkable to see the monotony with which this term was
utilised, from Sir Peter Parker's assertion that it was the "rock on which we must build
the future of the railway?" in 1976 to the Chief Executive in 1992, John Welsby,
explaining that during the OFQ process they had "looked at achieving much greater
productivity".62 The term has a variety of meanings. It amounted to a Trojan Horse
of a concept - allowing the management's own agenda to be brought in along with it.
For example, in the seventies productivity was allied to a wide electrification
58 He 246 II, P47.
59 T~ U~~th(l 00L1\ PT 7':l l\tf<tTf'h 100d
236
237
programme on the railways" stemming from government's investment and the
involvement of the PTEs.
However in the eighties the Government's - and to a large extent rail management's -
attitude to productivity was aimed at the workforce. Not that management itself was
inviolable, for during the 1982 shake-up a whole administrative sector was removed
(the divisions) and later performance related pay was brought in for some sections of
the management." Yet the main burden fell on the worker: over the decade flexible
rostering, extension of single manning and the introduction of guard-less trains all
affected the workforce. There was a remarkable increase in productivity; over 1979-
86/7,24.2% compared to 1970-9, 10%.65 But at what price?
It can be seen that there are two main areas where we can find the consequences.
Firstly the number of people employed by the railways fell dramatically from 1979-
86, by an estimated 23%. Again, this was a long-term wastage hastened by the
Beeching era but given added impetus under Thatcherism. No dramatic redundancies
were announced but slowly and steadily numbers left the industry. The second
consequence has been studied by academics in the industrial relations field but is of
particular relevance to public lawyers. That is the peculiar arena in which the
management of a nationalised industry operates. Much weight has to be given to the
political climate: "political considerations are an inherent rather than a contingent
characteristic".66
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Therefore the change of Thatcherism was that much more significant to British Rail's
management. In the field of industrial relations there was a shift from cooption to
coercion. For example a corporatist body had existed in the seventies called the Rail
Council; it involved both management and unions and regularly lobbied government.
This is in marked distinction to the management's approach in the disputes of the
eighties particularly the ASLEF action over flexible rostering. In this appeals were
made over the heads of the unions, threats were issued to the workforce and closed
shop agreements were unilaterally revoked. Ferner argues the entire dispute was to
appease a Government "demanding blood"; moreover, that it was carried out to
confront the corporation's political costs." Again, the change in BR's approach was
not a dramatic tum-round but rather a more extreme example of existing tensions. If
we accept that Thatcherism was an intensification of existing processes then we can
see the beginning of a hardening of attitudes prior to 1979. This is particularly true of
the document "The Challenge Of The Eighties" which listed a whole number of
productivity savings aimed at the workforce. Admittedly this did coincide with Sir
Peter Parker aiming for a "social partnership" in the railways but the seeds had been
sown. It could be argued that the entire concept of a commercial railway needs to
demand this from the workforce. Yet how this was compatible with a 'social' railway
- even though both these concepts had been explicitly stated for over thirty years - was
still not clear. In fact supporting the view that the structure of public ownership
encouraged these tensions in the six years after nationalisation the number of
industrial disputes escalated reflecting the disillusionment of the workforce in that
form ofpublic ownership.
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The root of all the changes outlined above - both in the workforce and the
management stem from a fundamental change. The emphasis from the mid-seventies
onward was against any large-scale investment. This meant any future for the rail
industry would largely be managing decline, management restructuring and
productivity deals aside. Government used all its powers to transform British Rail:
financial pressures, political attacks and industrial coercion. "Government control
over railway policy was exercised through the purse strings rather than through
legislation affecting the ownership and management of the railway system".68 This
was recognised by the management with Parker calling 1983 a "watershed" year for
the industry. However none of this gave BR a long-term future in the public sector as
the privatisation plans prove.
Thus the treatment of British Rail under Thatcherism was not completely new. The
concepts of commercial and social responsibilities continued to be used. Tighter
financial limits were used to pressurise the industry. Admittedly there was more
pressure on the management to challenge the workforce but even this had been sign-
posted by the previous Labour Government. What was missing again was the central
concept of accountability. The centralised structure of the nationalised industry
although criticised by Thatcher was certainly used to full effect, yet the idea of
promoting accountability was not heard. The experience of the publicly owned
network was a missed opportunity to introduce a form of accountability which could
have clarified what was meant by the 'social railway'. This, in a sense, paved the way
for privatisation, which as shall be shown tried to utilise the concept of more effective
accountability as one of its justifications.
THE PRIVATISATION PLANS 1988-1992.
In October 1988 when the Secretary of State for Transport, Paul Channon, announced
the intention to sell off British Rail to the Conservative Party conference it was not the
first time the idea had been floated. Following the 1983 election a report appeared in
the Daily Telegraph claiming that Mrs Thatcher had commissioned private studies to
examine possible sell-offs of the NHS and BR; this was strenuously denied. In the
autumn of 1984 the influential think-tank, the lEA, published an article called: "BR:
privatisation without tears?" by David Starkie.
However, 1988 was the first public endorsement. This was the period of the
immediate after-glow of Thatcher's third electoral victory when all seemed possible in
her 'revolution'. At this stage the plan seemed to consist of raising privatisation at
conference to gain a standing ovation. There was no worked out timetable. Indeed,
only one year later at Tory conference the new, and personally more Thatcherite,
Transport Secretary Cecil Parkinson said the BR sell off was not a "high priority"."
One of the reasons for the delay, apart from the prohibitive cost," was the number of
competing options for the privatisation model.
The management's plan was to transfer the industry wholesale to the private sector:
BR plc. One could argue that the endless changing of management throughout the
eighties was in order to make this option more attractive to the Government. This was
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supported by economists like David Sawers72 and the watch-dog body the Central
Transport Consultative Committee which claimed any fragmentation would damage
an integrated network. Many on the BR board believed their option would be the one
adopted. However this coincided with the problems of the privatised utilities of Gas
and Telecom - widely criticised as private sector monopolies. These criticisms
definitely affected the structure of electricity privatisation and probably played a
similar role in the embryonic discussions of rail privatisation. Further, the
government remained very sceptical of the rail management particularly with its
handling of the 1989 NUR dispute. This was emphasised in its search for a successor
to Sir Robert Reid as chair bringing in an outsider from Shell ironically called Sir Bob
Reid." The notion, then, that the government would support a wholesale transfer to
the private sector was based on weak hopes. In fact, as we shall see, during the course
of the legislation any attempt to present British Rail as a unified entity post-
privatisation was strongly opposed.
The two major Thatcherite think-tanks, the Centre for Policy Studies and the Adam
Smith Institute, both came up with plans to break the network up prior to
privatisation. The CPS plan by Andrew Gritten" sought to go back to the future with
the creation of regionally based rail companies. This "golden age scenario" was
suggested as being the Prime Minister's favoured option prior to the 1992 election."
Indeed it seems somewhat similar to the watered down proposals of the Transport Act
1953. The problem was that the result would be the creation oflocal monopolies with
a very limited amount of direct competition. The only distinction would be their
72 FT 8 June 1988 and 5 Feb. 1992.
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ability to measure their standards against rival companies: 'yardstick' competition as
adopted in the water industries in England and Wales. As far as accountability goes
it could be argued that making a service more local means it will be necessarily more
accountable in one sense as it is closer to the area and people it serves. Again this was
the argument of the Conservatives in the fifties and in a more concrete sense in the
later creation of the PTEs.
The Adam Smith Institute published a report by Kenneth Irvine" who developed the
argument ofDavid Starkie that infrastructure and operations should be separated. In a
certain sense, this corresponds with the model actually adopted and with
developments in European Law.77 The argument states that the entry costs to run a
rail network are very high. There are the sunken costs of track and signalling which
are difficult to identify, although an attempt to do this was made by the 'prime user'
approach in BR in August 1984. Further, the cost of trains is extremely prohibitive
and unlike the bus industry, there is hardly any second hand market. This being
accepted, infrastructure could be owned by one body either in the public or private
sector, which would then free the private sector to run train services paying a fixed
charge to the owners of the track and trains. The comparison is with the use of roads
with the driver paying taxes for the maintenance of the network. Although
identifiable now as similar to the 1994 privatisation model at the time it was not
regarded as viable.
Other options involved a hybrid of schemes with the possible complete sell off of
certain sectors; for example, the Freight network. This was supported by ex-Tory
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minister John Redwood" an ex-director of the CPS and leadership challenger to John
Major in 1995. It was also suggested that Malcolm Rifk:ind, another Secretary of
State, favoured the maintenance of all five sectors but selling them separately. It can
be seen that the march from conference speech to policy document was extremely
long and convoluted. The secrecy of British Government precludes a completely
accurate discussion of how the White Paper" was drafted, but what is clear is that
there was intense delay in making a decision. The Citizen's Charter assured an
announcement would be made at the end of 1991, then it was to be published prior to
the election of April. It actually did not come out until July 1992.
Conclusion
The radical nature of privatising the rail network is widely accepted. The Guardian in
its leader on the day of rail restructuring heralded the "harbinger of a privatisation so
controversial that even Mrs Thatcher recoiled from it"." As shown above the
Thatcherite approach to the railways entailed exerting strong pressures to restructure
the business without endorsing investment plans. Although there were changes within
British Rail and with its relationship with the work force, this did not eliminate the
contradiction of limiting investment in a run down rail network. Perhaps a transfer to
the private sector was the only option in these circumstances. Certainly John Major
stubbornly maintained this manifesto pledge to privatise even though he wished to
emphasise "caring Conservatism not permanent revolution?" in the rest of that
document. Perhaps the whole of the Thatcher/Major era was a preparation for
privatisation in some form. But the absence of an accountable structure in the public
77 See next chapter. The main legislation was 911440/EEC, OJ L237/25.
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sector was grist to the mill of the privatisers who can be seen as exploiting this
secrecy of the nationalised sector. In a detailed way the next chapter will explore
whether the privatisation proposals could be seen as producing greater accountability
than the previous model in the public sector.
One could also argue that the attempt to separate socially necessary services from the
rest is completely to misdirect the nature of a publicly owned railway. This could be
seen as developing from the faulty model of public ownership adopted by the 1945-51
Labour government. The proposals for rail privatisation reopened the debate over
whether the privatisation programme in general was a thought out plan or a pragmatic
response to events. It also intersects with the study of what constitutional
arrangements for industry can realise the notions of control and accountability and
importantly in transport, co-ordination. A detailed study of the new rail network's
structure will allow this.
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CHAPTER SEVEN.
RAIL PRIVATISATION - A LIBERATION THEOLOGY?
"We have evidence that the commercial framework is driving performance
higher than the command structure ofBR ever did".
Roger Salmon, Franchising Director September 1996.1
From the theoretical musings of think-tanks the privatisation of the railways took on
actual statutory form following the 1992 electoral victory of the Conservatives. This
privatisation, as observed previously, was unlike any other. Much of this was because
of the particular difficulties in transferring a completely subsidised public service to
the private sector. However another factor was the general shifting of priorities in
relation to privatisation. Ironically, as will be shown, at times during the privatisation
there was great emphasis placed on how little would change and on the strength of the
new regulatory structures in protecting the interests of the consumer. This has been
explored above using the example of the state's changing attitude to the bus industry
but the process of rail privatisation epitomises this theme. This chapter will explore
those issues.
The process of taking the Railways Bill through Parliament was a huge task in itself.
The tortuous process involved threatened back-bench rebellions, House of Lords
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achieved the Government would probably have wished that was the end of the matter.
Yet the whole process was just beginning and the difficulties in manoeuvring this Bill
through the quasi-mediaeval structure of the British state would be nothing compared
to the problems of actually trying to sell the railways.
This chapter intends to examine the model of Rail privatisation - which is a curious
hybrid of sales, leasing and franchises. Clearly this "fell far short of the conventional
pattern of privatisation of the last decade.,,2 Rather than just cataloguing the
arrangement, a degree of examination will be needed of the intellectual underpinnings
of this structure. This will advance the argument that the question of accountability -
vital for public lawyers - was not solved by the structure of privatisation adopted even
though this concept formed a large part ofthe justification for the sell-off.
This is probably best provided by examining the work of Sir Christopher Foster. His
appointment as special adviser to John McGregor following the 1992 election and
subsequent "elevation" to the Board of Railtrack - the "new" company controlling
infrastructure in the reorganised rail industry- as a non-executive director make him
most deserving of the title "architect of rail privatisation". Although the new model
has a haphazard feel to it there is a coherent intellectual current which drives it. It is
also useful to see how these thoughts are linked to developments on a European stage.
Following this initial examination it will be necessary to look in a degree of depth at
the structures of the new post-privatised railway, in particular the responsibilities of
the new creations: the Rail Regulator, the Franchise Director and Railtrack. Through
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this it will become clearer what the problems are and why the process of privatising
has been subject to so many delays. This then will illustrate the difference from (or
similarities to) other privatisations. Finally the tests of participation and
accountability originally laid down in this theses will have to be tested against these
new structures. A useful comparison could be the experience of the publicly owned
railway examined in the previous chapter. Overall, however, this chapter and indeed
the work exist in a changing environment - on almost a daily basis. It is hoped that
the main structures and processes can nevertheless be identified and explored.
248
RAIL PRIVATISATION : THE CHOSEN MODEL.
Although often heralded as a shambles - with some justification as the constant delays
highlight - there is supposed to be a method in the madness of rail privatisation. This
is perhaps best summarised by Sir Christopher Foster's claim that the whole process
is a "complex amalgam of privatisation, deregulation and incentivisation which will
result in productivity gains't.' This structure is a result of the dismantling of the
unitary corporation of British Rail which controlled all aspects of the rail industry.
This dissolution creates over one hundred new companies all ofwhich are expected to
contract with each other to provide passenger services, maintain and provide the
rolling stock and infrastructure and even plan the timetable.
The scheme was appropriately labelled the "exploding apple" by Modem Railways"
as the core of the railway industry became the train operating unit (TOU) which
provided passenger services by contracting with the myriad of new companies all of
which are in the private sector. B.R. maintained these TOUs until they were awarded
under a franchise agreement to a private sector operator. These new franchise
operators then are responsible for the leasing of rolling stock from three newly
privati sed companies. They also seek the best maintenance of their equipment by
tendering out services to competing companies which have emerged from the
structures of BR itself. To hasten this process BR set up a vendor unit and in the
words of its managing director David Blake: "the target I have is to have sold the
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majority of the businesses by December 1995".5 This target like many others in the
industry was not met; however by late 1996 the sale of these core businesses was
almost complete. Clearly the structure is a little convoluted and we are perhaps better
served by looking at each method of disposal to the private sector separately.
Prior to this it is perhaps worth mentioning how this new "privatisation" differs from
the prior use of private finance in the railway industry. Clearly there had been quite a
substantial interface between the two. The Channel tunnel was constructed largely
with private finance, while the proposed Heathrow rail link received 80% of its
finance from the privatised British Airways Authority. Around 40% of freight was
transported on privately owned wagons. Many argue from within the rail industry
that the Organising for Quality initiative which was discussed in Chapter 6 would
have resulted in some of their services being sold to the private sector, but as
mentioned above this initiative was cut across by the privatisation.
Even general opponents of the privatisation proposals like the trade journal Modem
Railways argue there are sensible parts of the industry to sell off: the engineering
sector, British Rail Maintenance Ltd (BRML) and the British Rail Infrastructure
Services (BRIS).6 Yet the Government's plans went way beyond this and attempted
to transfer the whole system into the private sector even where no significant private
sector interest existed. An ironic counter point to this was the development of the
'private finance initiative' under the Government. This was brought in by Norman
Lamont's mini-budget in the winter of 1992. It sought to stimulate infrastructure
development by combining private sector money with public sector incentives.
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When we examine how this plan has operated in the rail industry, the biggest "private
finance initiative" has been the awarding of the contract to build rolling stock for the
Northern line to GEC Alsthom," This was regarded by some industry commentators
as a 'revolution,8 yet the Northern line remains part of a wholly publicly owned
railway: the London Underground.9 Compare this with the delays and uncertainties
with the upgrading of the West Coast mainline in the new model railway - supposedly
another centrepiece of the private finance initiative. This franchise was originally
going to be among the first to be awarded but it was severely delayed largely because
of the scale of upgrading required. Although Railtrack has put in place a £500 million
modernisation of the line it has been admitted that this would improve the
performance of the notoriously unreliable track but would not have the effect of
dramatically cutting journey time so as to compete with the East Coast Main Line.10
Now, however, the owners of the West Coast franchise Virgin Trains are involved in
the redevelopment of the line and their rolling stock. It would seem that taking
private sector investment for granted in every section of the railways is misplaced
unless there is significant support from the public sector. However when the private
sector has got involved in the process it is mostly where there is an element of
certainty in the return. This will be examined in the process below.
Now it is possible to examine the amalgam of forms which this particular sell off has
combined.
7 This was heralded in DoT Press Release 110 of 7th April 1995.
8 Roger Ford in Modem Railways Feb. 1995, p80.
9 A 1+1-.......", .....1-. .... _1........... f"'......"r i-h.o. 'T'....'h.o.'" "t"1o-riU"3+~C'''3hr\"Y\ UT":IC' rh"-:.urn 11'1"\ .fOT tll.,:. rpntTp f(\r PC\11r,,\, ~tll(lip<::. hv
251
1 "Pure" Privatisation
The use of this label is perhaps a little inaccurate yet the popular VIew of the
privatisation process is a disposal to the private sector by offering shares to the wider
public. This underpinned the notion of a 'shareholder democracy' and popular
capitalism so beloved of Thatcher and discussed in Chapter 3. This did not seem to
be the case with rail privatisation as perhaps signified by Alfred Sherman's reaction
that he "could not see any point in denationalising or selling off an industry that did
not make money".': Certainly initially this was not the model that the Government
was to rely on. The more important dimension would be the awarding of franchises
which is studied below. Although the almost meaningless mantra of privati sation was
mouthed in answer to all questions'< in practice a more controlled gradual sell-off was
to take place rather than the 'big bang' ofprevious privatisations.
This is not to say that there were to be no disposals to the private sector sold off
simply, indeed that is the main purpose of the Vendor Unit as mentioned above. It had
a lengthy list of businesses to dispose Of. 13 Progress was not rapid prior to the selling
11 Quoted by Gwyneth Dunwoody MP in Parliamentary debate, HC Deb, February 7th 1995, col 213.
12For example this exchange occurred during oral questions in the House of Commons
Mrs Bridget Prentice:
Is it not an absolute disgrace that four out of five of our stations [Network S.E.]
are unstaffed after six 0' clock in the evening given at least two attacks take place every day in the
Network S.B. stations?
MrFreeman:
The honourable lady is right. I think that B.R. is losing revenue because of the perception
of fear. That is the situation in the public sector. Once we begin to franchise rail services matters will
improve because there will be more commercial activity at the stations and because private sector
operators will want to see more passengers using the train and will be more likely to have more staff
~_.J " ...........L, .... ....·H~ ..... +~ ...... ,.,.. ..... +.... ++-rvo. ..... -r"'" +la"'lT~hl"T
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of BRML in April 1995;14 the only other sale since the privatisation process began
had been of a small quarry in 1994. However throughout 1995 and 1996 there was a
concerted effort to dispose of all the branches of the rail industry.
The last of these was the Infrastructure Services which were completed with the sale
of Western Track Renewal on the 24th of July 1996. These attracted a fair level of
private sector interest with only four management buy-outs being successful.
Previously the Maintenance Depots had been sold in June 1995, the catering
companies in October 1995, the signalling and telecommunications services were
disposed of in January 1996 and the Train Engineering Service Companies (TESCOs)
were sold in March 1996. Of these 'peripheral' industries those most difficult to sell
were the Central Services ofBR such as the Rail Industry newspaper.
Some of the larger sales have been highly controversial. The sale of the Rolling Stock
Companies in November 1995 fetched £1.8 billion which was at that time the "most
lucrative part of rail privatisation't.f Also in the words of Modern Railways the sell
off of the ROSCOS was an "aspartame privatisation: so loaded with sweeteners that it
leaves a nasty taste in the mouth". 16 This was due to the guaranteed income they were
promised by having relatively long leasing agreements with the TOCs and a number
of subsidies. Even in this environment there was relatively little private sector interest
Freightliner
Rail Express Systems
Rolling Stock Operating Companies
British Rail Infrastructure Services
- Track Renewal Units
- Infrastructure Maintenance Units
BR Telecom
Various businesses in Central services.
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and two of the three companies were sold to MBOs which were backed by private
finance. In August 1996 Porterbrook was resold to Stagecoach for £825 million
making the owners £298 million profit. As shall be shown this event was closely
connected with developments in the franchising of passenger services where
Stagecoach has become one of the main bidders. It raised fears of mergers promoting
anti-competitive conduct within the industry. John Swift, the Rail Regulator, warned
of a possible reference to the MMC I7 and requested responses from the industry as to
what his course of action should be. However Stagecoach was not referred to the
MMC, providing it followed conditions laid down by the Government mainly to keep
the company at 'arm's length' from its rail franchise.l'' It is questionable if this
position will ensure Stagecoach's domination of the new rail industry or whether the
company has taken on too much with its investment. In its analysis of the ROSCOs
Modem Railways stated that "Porterbrook has more upsides but also the biggest
downsides" .19 This is largely due to the predominance of elderly slam-door stock in
the company's portfolio. This process highlights a significant trend under
privatisation towards a distorted form of integration and consolidation within the
industry, at times similar to the developments which were examined in the bus
industry chapters. This again raises the spectre of accountability within the
privatisation model which will be explored further when the franchising process is
studied.
16l\.1f_...:I__ T'l_':L l\./f 1{\f\C _'"\co
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Selling Shares: Railtrack
These disposals then were seen as part of the general move of the industry to the
private sector. What then of the great share sell-off? It was stated by a group of
lawyers relatively early on in the process that20 rail privatisation was a two stage
process with Government only receiving a financial return when Railtrack and the
rolling stock companies were sold. The law firm Theodore Godard predicted that this
would come sooner than later citing the end of the century as a possibility. Yet once
again the supposed certain plans of a privatisation were thrown up in the air by the
political manoeuvrings of the Government.
On the 24th of November 1994 Brian Mawhinney, who had only recently be
appointed Transport secretary, made a Parliamentary statement on his desire to float
Railtrack on the stock exchange during the lifetime of this current Parliament. 21
According to an interview carried out with a representative of Railtrack this day sticks
firmly in the memory of all Railtrack employees. Significantly no date was given but
a leaked mem0 22 showed that the first quarter of 1996 had been pencilled in. Why this
date took on a special significance for Railtrack employees was because the
announcement represented a complete tum around from the original plans for
privatisation. These plans had rested on the franchises being awarded to the private
sector whilst the infrastructure remained in public hands albeit at 'arms length'. Yet
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now there was a reversal "infrastructure first, operations last,,23 which is more than a
simple reordering of priorities; it amounted to are-structuring of the privatisation.
Railtrack was sold in May 1996 for £1.95 billion in one tranche. On the first day of
trading the price rose making an instant profit for initial purchasers, in line with other
utility privatisations." It was originally envisaged that there would be a two-stage
sale but this was dropped, largely to embarrass the Labour Party and to make it more
difficult for it to re-nationalise, but also to gain larger proceeds. The sale was in
doubt until the last minute due to the high level of debt which Railtrack held. It is no
accident that the original privatisation plans involved a substantial delay in selling the
infrastructure in the separated industry. This was not least because the whole railway
is a loss making service which requires large amounts of subsidy. In the new railway
this was to be paid out by the Franchising Director to the TOl.Is who would then pay
it back in access charges to Railtrack. Thus a sort of public sector merry go round
would operate - yet this circle is broken ifRailtrack goes private.
There were also worries that the heavy regulation of the industry as outlined below
would put investors off. Also as we shall see the industry is very heavily regulated
even though many of the cards are stacked in Railtrack's favour, in the sense that it
could use its monopoly position and size in negotiations with central Government and
smaller rail companies. However this attitude has provoked a reaction by the Rail
Regulator, as shall be illustrated, to the effect that with monopoly comes
responsibilities in the 'public interest'. In the end the Government had to wipe off £1
billion worth of debts in the run-up to privatisation. One minister said "We had to
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agree to the debt figure because we were right up against the wire".25 This illustrates
the extent to which the sale was affected by straight-forward political motives. This
makes it difficult to believe Christopher Foster's credo as outlined below was the sole
driving force of the entire privatisation. Indeed the very sale of the infrastructure
before the franchises were fully operating could be said to complicate the fulfilment
of his philosophy. In other words the supremacy of the contract culture was not given
time to develop before there was a complete disposal of the rail infrastructure. Many
franchises had not been let by that point and the dealings between the different
sections of the rail industry had not really been established. A useful counterpoint to
this is the privatisation of the German rail network which has a timetable of 10 years.
Although the Germans also separated infrastructure from operations there will be a
period of 3 years before the operating services are sold and there are no plans to sell
the infrastructure. This model is closer to that envisaged by the European Union and
indeed in Foster's own thought."
However the simple reason for selling Railtrack did not come from any Thatcherite
argument for widening share ownership, although the Secretary of State did try to
provide an historical link during his statement on Railtrack: "Privatisation has been
one of the greatest achievements of this government since 1979".27 Put bluntly the
money was needed from the Railtrack sale to pay for cuts in direct taxation. Kenneth
Clarke, at that time Chancellor, in another leaked memo stated that this privatisation
. I f b d . hm . ,,28was "an mtegra part 0 our u get ant etic". This contradicted earlier
government claims most notably by Roger Freeman (the Transport Minister who
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piloted the privatisation bill through committee) who had grven assurances of
Railtrack remaining in the public sector for the foreseeable future. Further, he
undertook that any proceeds from the sale of the infrastructure would be hypothecated
to the railway industry; an undertaking which was then wholly rejected by the
Government.
So this element of "pure" privatisation was reintroduced to this process to raise
finance. There were added bonuses in selling Railtrack. First and foremost no further
legislation was needed as the powers to dispose of Railtrack were already in the
Railways ACt.29 It also took on a new impetus when there was a climb-down on the
privatisation of the Post Office at the hands of a small number of backbench
Conservatives rebels in October 1994.
In summary, then, rail privatisation had used 'pure' disposals only for smaller
subsidiary businesses with a captive market with the exception of the ROSCOS. A
late U-turn, though, changed the nature of the whole privatisation by offering the
public flotation of Railtrack much earlier in the privatisation cycle than originally
planned.
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2 Leasing Agreements.
Leading on from an examination of the 'simple' sell-off are the arrangements which
are in place to provide rolling stock for the rail industry. The ROSCOs as mentioned
above were sold during 1995. These control a fleet of 11,000 and were separated into
3 different companies: Eversholt Train Leasing." Porterbrook Leasing Company"
and Angel Train Contracts.Y
But a problem in the leasing agreementsv' is that they are out of any regulatory orbit.
Thus the companies have no duty to maintain minimum standards of service in
supplying rolling stock. They need only concentrate on the most profitable areas and
not invest in newer rolling stock. This was a real problem when confronted with the
investment hiatus in the rail industry which resulted in the closure of the ABB works
of York in April 1995. In fact there were no new orders for rolling stock in 1994 at
all the first year in which that had happened. This started to change in 1995 and 1996
with some successful franchise holders promising to replace or renew some of the
rolling stock. One of the first of these was the successful franchisee on the Chiltem
line, which ordered 12 new trains with Adtranz" to be leased through Porterbrook.
The leasing agreements, then, will dictate relationships between the privatised
ROSCOs and the rest of the industry. This is in line with other industrialised
countries which combine leasing with publicly owned railways. As an aside this
combination of the public and private seems the model of Blair's New Labour Party
30 This will deal with solely electric trains.
31 This will have both diesel and electric and supply fast trains for former Inter-City services.
32 Again this has both diesel and electric and will deal primarily with the South East and the Great
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and indeed John Prescott has been credited with virtually "inventing" train-Ieasing.f
Any change which New Labour would make would involve placing the companies
under regulatory structures.
3 Franchises.
The form of the leases- as written contracts -will be very similar to the franchise
agreements which until late 1994 were seen as the lynch pin of the privatised railway
by the Government. It is also clear that they remain centrally important to this work
not least in the sense that they caused much delay and uncertainty in the whole
process of the privatisation. However by the spring of 1997 the whole passenger
network was operating under franchises.
In the words of the statute "it shall be the duty of the Franchising Director from time
to time to designate as eligible for provision under franchise agreements such services
for the carriage of passengers by railway as he may determine".36 He, Roger
Salmon.t' shall issue an invitation to tender 38 and then award it to "such persons as
he may ... think fit".39 The franchises will include such information as planned
services, provision for fares40 and the length of the period of franchise. If the
franchise is broken by the franchisee the Franchising Director can then terminate the
agreement and seek to secure the further provision of the service.
34 Financial Times, 7th September 1996.
35 Modem Railways May 1995, p258.
36 Railways Act 1993 c.43, s23(1).
37 Salmon resioned in the autumn of 1996 and was renlaced bv John O'Brien.
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The main problem with this whole process has been the complexities in negotiating
the franchise agreements which resulted in almost constant delays. For example the
major reorganisation of the railway came on April l st 1994; one week before this
crucial day it was announced that the six franchises41originally envisaged for fast sale
would not be disposed of until 1995.42 As Frank Dobson, then Shadow Transport
Secretary put it, "Rail privatisation is falling apart before they have even started,,43 or
at least that was the impression at that stage.
This did not prevent the Government sticking to its timetable, claiming that 51% of
passenger services would be franchised by spring 1996.44 Six months later the
regulator asked for expression of interest in these six with the addition of the Midland
Main Line and Network South East.45 On the 23rd March 1995 it was claimed that 37
different organisations were interested in running these franchises but that the
invitation to tender on three of these franchises would be extended to May. These
three- the Great Western the London, Tilbury and Southend and South West Trains
were labelled the "turbo track".46 These were the first three franchises to be awarded
in December 1995.
The process by which they finally came to be awarded is a useful microcosm of the
organised chaos of rail privatisation. The original announcement was delayed
because of a successful challenge by judicial review by the pressure group Save Our
41 These six were Scotrail, the East Coast Main Line, the Great Western Main Line, the London,
Tilbury and Southend line, South West Trains and the Gatwick Express.
42 FT 23rd March 1994.
43 r:.. ~yr!;~~ '")'":!yr! l\,f~y~h 100,1
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Railways.Y Although the details of this did not affect the actual first three franchises
it did delay the specific announcement. Furthermore, days before the announcement
it was discovered that the person heading the favoured bid for the Great Western
franchise had been the director of a bankrupt double glazing company. Then
immediately prior to the successful bidder for the LTS line, Enterprise Rail, starting
services it was subject to fraud investigations because of discrepancies in allocating
ticket prices. Thus the franchise had to be re-awarded. These developments illustrate
the pressure being applied to the Franchise Director to dispose of the franchises.
Even after months of preparation errors were found in the franchise documents which
further delayed the whole process.
However once the initial franchises were awarded there was steady progress - with
some exceptions - in granting the remainder of the franchises. This may be due to the
Office of the Franchising Director having a clearer framework for the franchises to be
awarded or from external political pressures which were also apparent to dispose of
all the franchises prior to the 1997 Election. Significantly, during 1996 when most of
the franchises were awarded a distinct trend could be detected which suggests
parallels with the bus industry. In particular it seemed that there was a core group of
bidders for the franchises. By the end of December 1996 one company, Prism, had
three franchises;" National Express," Stagecoach." and the French utility CGEA51
each had two. But these figures only tell part of the story, for every franchise list of
chosen bidders is very similar. As there is little interest in owning one franchise most
of the operators have put in bids for a whole series of them. As can be seen by a
47 For details of decision see Appendix.
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cursory glance at the above list the 'new' bus giants have played an important role in
this. Prism Rail is run by four senior directors from the bus industry and also by
Kenneth Irvine who was mentioned in the previous chapter as one of the original
authors of rail privatisation.Y What is also clear is the absence of successful bids
from rail management. Even where this was successful as in the case of the Great
Western and the Chiltern lines they have needed backing from outside institutions. In
the case ofthe GWR this was FirstBus.
This lack of success for management differs from the earlier privatisation of the bus
industry where it will be remembered that MBOs dominated. Through these buy-outs
and subsequent take-overs these companies grew to dominate the industry. The
process of franchising has allowed these large operators to move into the rail industry
preventing any similar developments on the part of rail management. Have the
franchise director, the competition authorities and Government allowed this to occur
unhindered? There had been recent developments with the new Labour Government
announcing a referral of National Express to the competition authorities for its
acquisition of the rail franchises of Scotrail and Central Rail in the Midlands. 53 In a
sense, this is linked to the limiting of competition in the initial stages of this
privatisation as determined by the Rail Regulator, which will be examined below.
Perhaps this has meant that the Franchising Director is less worried about awarding
the franchises to a few operators as there is no open access on the lines. The Rail
Regulator has recently spoken approvingly of the situation "the success of the
franchising programme... has been substantially dependent upon the previous
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Government's decision in the mid-80s to introduce competition and deregulation into
the bus industry'v" Alongside this development, though, is the way in which the
franchises themselves have developed.
Early on in the privatisation process it was thought that the franchises would be of
standard length: seven years. This however has not always been the case in practice
in many instances franchises have been lengthened on the guarantee of improving or
renewing the rolling stock. For example, on the Midland Main Line, National
Express has been granted a 10-year franchise providing there are "substantial service
enhancements" and new rolling stock." It has also won a 15-year franchise on the
Gatwick Express line conditionally on bringing in a new fleet of trains. Similar
developments have occurred on other franchises. This illustrates one of the reasons
for the success of the larger bus companies many of which are quoted on the stock
market. Put simply they have access to more capital to fund their proposals. This
also limits the amount of subsidy which each franchise will require.
As explained all passenger services on the rail network require subsidy. A critical
part of the franchise bidding process was the ability of the bidders to cut the amount
of subsidy which would be necessary to run the services. So for example Sea
Containers, the successful bidder for the East Coast Main Line, envisages an end to
subsidy by the year 2002/3, having started off with a £64.6 million pound subsidy
paid by the Franchising Director. This means subsidy will fall by £21.2 million a
year. Perhaps this line is an exceptional case as it has had substantial upgrading in the
late eighties and early nineties. But many of the other lines also make ambitious
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claims on subsidy. For Network South Central the French Company CGEA has an
initial subsidy of £85.3 million falling eventually to £34.6 million. Although this is
still a substantial subsidy the cut of £50 million is also substantial. As explained
above, much of the new franchise expenses will be in the form of fixed charges.
Although the Regulator would like to see this altered, for the time being this is the
state of affairs that will generally exist for the length of the first franchises. So any
wish to cut subsidy must be based largely on an increase in passenger numbers. Fares
cannot simply be increased because of the restrictions placed on these by the
Secretary of State in 1995. This means that the franchise holders are largely
"gambling on the British Economy'f" and discounting the possibility of a downturn in
rail use such as occurred in the recession of the early nineteen nineties in the South of
England.
In the course of 1996 when 13 franchises were awarded great claims were made for
the franchising process. The Franchising Director claimed it had revitalised the rail
network leading to new investment and that ultimately it would save £2 billion.57
John Major also hailed it as a success story apparently considering it as a model for
the privatisation of the London Underground" and the Post Office for inclusion in the
1997 Conservative Manifesto. But the apparent successes in ending the hiatus in
investment and cutting the amount of subsidy are all very conditional on growth in
passenger numbers and the success ofthe franchisees to maintain their tight targets on
cutting subsidy. Furthermore, it could be argued that the stringent demands on cutting
subsidy encouraged larger groupings such as the 'new' bus operators and discouraged
the railways' own management in bidding for franchises.
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The privatisation of the rail network, then, was originally seen as a testing ground for
the new concept of franchising. This was altered by the rushing through of the sale of
Railtrack, although throughout 1996 the alleged benefits of franchising were revived.
But "rail privatisation" is a "complex amalgam" of the above three categories. Some
could argue this is due to the innate difficulty in selling the railway; Foster has quoted
a Victorian thinker Chadwick "where competition on the ground is impossible, an
auction allows competition for the ground". Yet an auction supposes a large number
of interested bidders ready to compete against each other which was not generally the
case, as will become clear when we examine how the Franchising Director has been
working in this new environment. Foster's words also provide a useful starting block
for an examination of the intellectual support for this privatisation.
THE INTELLECTUAL BASIS OF RAIL
PRIVATISATION.
Sir Christopher Foster has been mentioned before in this work. Not only are his role
and his general writings crucial in studying the privatisation of the railways but he has
also provided a general overview of the entire British privatisation programme.59 He
has long been an adviser on transport including importantly the bus industry'" and this
covered periods of both Labour and Conservative Governments. As well as being the
main adviser on Rail privatisation and the 1993 Act he also advised Barbara Castle on
the 1968 Transport Act which created the Passenger Transport Authorities - quite
successful examples ofpublic sector bodies co-ordinating transport.
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This chameleon - like approach to policy is not entirely surprising; above all he would
probably consider himself a technocrat. For him the result of all privatisations has
been productive efficiency gains. This above all else is the reason to support
privatisations. He believes they work better than any other scheme such as incentive
plans within the public sector.61 These pragmatic views must be distinguished from
the political rhetoric of others where privatisation has become something of a mantra.
The latest example of this as explained above has come with the announcement of the
sell-off of Railtrack. Yet notions of 'popular capitalism' have no real place in the
thinking of Foster. Even a change of ownership is not critical providing the industry
has a "greater distance from resumed political intervention't.f This thinking is
difficult to understand given the complex regulatory structures which even the
privatised Railtrack is embroiled in as explained below. But, this aside, Foster's
thinking depends on an increase in "efficiency" within the rail industry which could
not be achieved in public sector arrangements.
Central to this efficiency increase is the notion of the importance of contract. One can
see this with the introduction of franchises and leases - both written legal documents-
into the once unitary rail industry. The underlying rationale is "the time has come to
open the railways up to competition as far as possible and at the same time for the
most part to replace command relationships within British Rail by contractual
relationships between free-standing autonomous bodies".63 This is the 'big idea'
behind the whole complex process of rail privatisation: a shift from command to
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contract. He claims the transparency of contract is the method increasingly utilised
for co-ordination by business especially with advances in information technology.
Thus the explosion of the rail industry represents an attempt to put all parts of British
Rail on a similar footing as potential contractors. Roger Salmon, the Franchise
Director, believed that his role alongside the Regulator is to "work out the areas
where the market, unaided, is likely to work poorly and in those cases make sure,
through regulation ofcontract that it works well" (my emphasisj/" Contract, then, is
not only a clearer method of carrying out business; it is a protection against the
shortcomings of the 'market'. Surely this is an ironic development given the alleged
centrality of contract to the market economy.
This thinking is in line with the general trend of current established thought on public
services. This has involved market testing, competitive tendering and general aping
of "private sector methods" in all spheres of the public sector: from the civil service to
the NBS. In a public law context this process has been studied by a number of legal
academics, perhaps understandably as the use of the contract within public services
provides the ultimate interface between public and private law.
Ian Harden65 in "The Contracting State,,66 writes of the benefits of "marketisation"
within the Health Service and also generally as part of competitive tendering. The
"values which underlie the symbolic appeal of contract should be taken seriously'V"
A contract can provide clarity and define rights and responsibilities for users of public
services. Thus Foster's argument has some academic weight behind it. But how
64 l\tf","PTn "R "ih",n,c 1QQf\ n 1 'i'i
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convmcmg a justification is it? Before we examme the problems of the "new"
railway in practise let us raise some theoretical criticism of the primacy of contract
notion.
Criticisms
Will the existence of a new era of contracting between parties produce a more
"efficient" rail service? Leaving aside the suitability of contract in this area one
should look at how many transaction costs have been generated. Several lawyers
have labelled rail privatisation the "biggest legal project ever undertaken in the UK"
and that a "paper mountain,,68 has been created. The phrase "lawyer's paradise" was
utilised a great deal in the second reading debate of the Railways Bill.69 In fact the
legal advisers on privatisation Linklaters and Paines claimed it to be the "largest and
most complex project that the legal profession has ever undertaken".7o
Modem Railways gave the example of one franchise, the Inter City Great Western
Main Line, whose contracts with Railtrack alone would amount to a Track Access
Agreement, 20 station leases and 7 Light Maintenance Depots (LMD) leases - this is
the tip of the documentation iceberg generated." Other documents include: 125
station access documents, 18 depot access documents, 3 rolling stock master leases
(with lease supplement for each train), spares procurement contract, intellectual
property licences. The possibility of protracted litigation paralysing large sections of
the rail business could be a real one. Yet Roger Salmon, the Franchising Director, has
68 Guardian, 10th Nov. 1994.
69 ~"'''' Hr. n",h F",hm:lrv )nd I Qcn col )04 The nnote came from Robert Adlev MP.
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claimed to have a "no-fault incentive scheme to keep the lawyers in their place".72
His belief is that commercial interests will dictate that alternative dispute mechanisms
will quickly develop. The Rail Regulator also hopes to encourage alternative dispute
resolution bodies which will allow Railtrack to alter conditions where necessary."
Sir Christopher himself argues that the best atmosphere for contracts is "where
relations can be clearly expressed, continuously monitored and are unlikely to need to
be altered'L'" It could be argued? that this is precisely the situation which does not
exist in the rail industry at the moment as is supported by the need for alternative
bodies to hear disputes. These recognise the inadequacy of the courts in dealing with
matters that could be dealt with in an alternative manner. If this is the case what
differentiates a contract from a more informal approach? Furthermore, it seems that
with the sale of Railtrack speeded up this diminishes the rationale of contract as there
will be a degree of instability - in the sense that it is not simply an organ of the public
sector albeit at 'arm's length' - in its relationship with other companies. The desire to
promote stability to counter this impression apparently lies behind the Regulator's
statements on through-ticketing and access charges and the Government's
announcement on train fares which will be fully explored later.
Equally the notion of a contract freely negotiated between two different parties is
hardly apparent in the rail industry. Early on in the process there was evidence of
Railtrack as owner of the infrastructure and signalling abusing its position in
72 Financial Times. 7th March 1994_
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negotiations" with TOUs. During the signal workers' dispute in the summer of 1994
when services were not provided there was a dispute over how much compensation
should be paid by Railtrack. The Managing Director of Network South Central stated
in a presentation his view that Railtrack should pay all lost income when it failed to
provide services77- whether through industrial disputes or damaged infrastructure.
This is clearly the thinking of the managers of all the TOUs yet has been rejected by
Railtrack which can exploit its monopoly in providing infrastructure.
The franchising process could also be said to reflect this. As has been shown above
there were initially severe hold-ups in awarding the franchises. In the Scottish context
the franchise for Scotrail is one that had been considerably delayed and by the end of
1996 still had not been awarded. The primary reason for this had been the existence
of the Strathclyde Passenger Transport Authority which had used its negotiating skills
and more importantly its financial weight" to delay the awarding of the franchise.
This was due to the demands of 'hard-wiring' of the agreement; that is written
guarantees of timetable requirements, the type of rolling stock required and other
demands made on the new franchisee. The demands frustrated the Franchising
Director's office, not least in the words of a senior SPTA official because Scotrail was
seen as an "ideal" candidate for an early franchise because of its geographical unity:
"an island linked with two causeways'v" and status within the old rail network. In the
event National Express was eventually successful in winning the franchise after
agreeing nearly all of the demands of the SPTA and providing more financial
guarantees than the existing Scotrail management did. What this illustrates in the
76 1<'1"' ') 1 ct l\tf",""h 1 GGLl
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context of contract is the lack of uniformity in awarding franchises. Negotiation has
depended on the 'specific weight' of the parties involved, again contradicting the
notion that contracts are 'freely' negotiated between the new players in the rail
industry.
In the environment of competitive negotiation it is perhaps unrealistic to introduce
complex contracts with the expectation that they will be placed in a drawer and
forgotten about. lt also underpins many fears of the management of the TOUs as
expressed by one member of a failed management buy-out (MBO), "The terms and
conditions clearly transfer all the risks and obligations of running a railway to the
franchisees". 80 lt seemed that this disparity was likely to increase as moves were
made to soothe investors in Railtrack. However the more aggressive role of the Rail
Regulator towards Railtrack's investment programme recently, as outlined below, has
increased the pressure on the owner of the infrastructure. Moreover, the development
of the franchises and the success of the bigger transport operators which can
successfully weather the risk has reduced their instability, although not completely so.
lt seems to be the case, then, that the idea of contract as something made between
equals is far from the case in the rail industry.
There are other problems with transplanting a contract culture into a once united
structure. Law firms have found difficulties in transferring "customised" information
into contracts. 81 Problems which previously may have been dealt with by internal
memos now become potentially litigious situations. So the three main problems with
the intellectual background to rail privatisation are the vastness of the task, the uneven
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playing field in drawing up a contract and the difficulty in transferring information.
In this environment it is unclear why Sir Christopher believed the 'primacy of
contract' was appropriate to the rail industry.
Beyond a reliance on contract in the 'new' rail industry is the separation of rail
infrastructure from operations. Of the privatisation models discussed in the late
eighties 82 the model most similar to that adopted is the Starkiel Adam Smith Institute
plan. For justification of this new structure reference is often made to the European
Union - but what is the background?
EUROPEAN DEVELOPMENTS
The European approach seems at first sight to be similar to the structural changes
adopted in Britain under privatisation. In a 1991 Council of Ministers Directive83 a
degree of separation is required between track and operations. This was to allow open
access across the European Rail Network, and was developed to be alongside a
common approach to charging tariffs for the use of the tracks. However, as a
Commission official pointed out the main emphasis was on a "book-keeping
operation plus management'V" That is to say, separate accounts and management
were required but any further physical separation was not compulsory - nor indeed
was a transfer of ownership.
In Sweden where there is complete separation between Banverket which owns the
infrastructure and SJ, which operates services, the situation is not analogous to that in
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Britain. SJ can bid for operations and is involved in investment plans for the rail
network. In fact SJ operates 99% of services in Sweden - a bus company won two
contracts but lost one back to SJ.85 In Germany where perhaps the situation is most
similar to Britain (but not as developed) the rail operation has been split into three:
passenger services, freight services and infrastructure. The debt of the railway
companies was also written off before the privatisation process began. However the
European policy can perhaps be seen in a different light from a move to privatisation.
On the whole it is part of a wider agenda to gain an integrated transport policy across
the entire European Union. The European Economic and Social Committee's report'?
on transport policy criticised the Commission for neglecting rail transport at the
expense of road haulage. Thus the separation of infrastructure from services can be
seen in this light - to give rail its proper place in the entire transport network. This is
markedly different from British policy which has very little idea on how to integrate
the railway into the general transport infrastructure. Interestingly, other countries
which have opted for privatisation have maintained a vertically integrated network.
For example, in New Zealand, Argentina, Mexico and the Czech Republic'" the sale
to the private sector was of both infrastructure and services. This demand was also
made by a number of potential bidders for rail franchises in Britain, notably
Scotrail'"- as the removal of control of infrastructure was seen as taking too much
power from the provider of services.
85 FT, 1st Feb. 1995.
86 90/C225/12. This partially formed the basis for the legislative proposals.
87 Financial Times l st Feh 199'1
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Thus, the European developments can be viewed to some extent as similar to Britain
although this is only superficially the case. They do not suppose a transfer of
ownership to the private sector but rather allow for an integrated European rail
network. A later set of directives in 1995 provide more details of the licensing of
international services on a European level.89 This again emphasises the nature of the
European initiative. Where privatisation is occurring it seems that the opposite is
happening with the rail industry sold as a vertically integrated network. It could be
argued in Britain that the two processes of separation and the selling of franchises are
contradictory. This could be tested by examining how the re-structured railway has
operated in practice.
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THE STRUCTURES OF THE POST-PRIVATISED
RAILWAY.
As well as the transfer to the private sector there have been a number ofnew creations
arising from the remnants of the old structure of British Rail. Apart from British Rail
being separated into the provider of infrastructure (Railtrack) and the providers of rail
services, there is the creation of a number of smaller subsidiary companies many of
which have been sold. Further, there is the creation of the Office of the Rail
Regulator and the Franchise Director is a further example. This massive restructuring
may account for the expense of privatisation. One estimate from the Labour Party
put this figure at £664 million." yet this figure was ever increasing in particular as
regards consultancy fees. In fact the figures for consultancy were deemed too
commercially sensitive to reveal in written answers in Parliament and details were not
. 91grven.
The official response to these costs are best summarised by the words of one DoT
official: "ministers believe this is money well spent because privatisation will lead to
a more efficient railway that will be less of a burden to the tax payer".92 However
this statement underplays the fact that significant subsidy will still be paid from the
state to the train operating companies. Indeed the existence of such expense was one
of the reasons for the Treasury's desire to privatise Railtrack in a hurried fashion to
get some financial gain. Yet the whole process has proved costly in the 'twilight zone'
between public and private ownership which now exists in the rail industry. Although
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the sale of Railtrack and 13 of the franchises was completed the regulatory structures
linked to the method of franchising make it very different from an 'ordinary' private
industry. The main creations of this structure need to be examined.
Office of the Rail Regulator
"I have been appointed by Parliament to promote the public interest in the new
restructured railway".93
John Swift Q.C. Rail Regulator.
One of the criticisms of rail privatisation is that the industry will be over-regulated;
that is a large number of different bodies will 'interfere' to some extent in the running
of passenger services. Clearly the leader in this field will be the Rail Regulator
himself: a creation of the 1993 statute, as the above quote signifies. In the period
following the restructuring of British Rail he has produced a number of controversial
documents which have been received in a very mixed way. For example Modem
Railways claims he is "exposing mercilessly the lack of precision in the privatisation
proposals'Y' while the Labour Party's Shadow Transport Secretary labelled the office
an unaccountable body "making extremely sensitive political decisions'V" These
mixed reactions are explained in some part by the ambiguous role played by all
regulators but in particular those for the rail industry.
As can be seen the Regulator was appointed before most of the privatisations took
place. His role, then, is central to the 'new' railway. Further, the Labour Party has
9\ This If-turn was announced by John Watts MP in a written answer. See He Written Answers, 14th
February, col 562.
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signalled that it will increase the 'accountability' of the railway by strengthening
central control of the regulator thus further enhancing his role. As shall be explored,
this was seen as an alternative to public ownership. Following the General Election
John Prescott issued a statement from the enhanced transport department that they
were committed to a "thorough review of rail regulation" and were looking to
increase the sanctions available." This lead to a Concardat between the Government
and the Regulator as to their respective rights and dutiea" Thus in the context of this
work the Rail Regulator is a good example of a model of attempting to Increase
accountability of a public service without requiring public ownership.
It is perhaps appropriate that this balancing act is carried out by a competition lawyer,
the previous occupation of the present Rail Regulator. 98 The position was created in
the 1993 statute" which also lays down his general duties. IOO The ambiguous role of
the regulators in the privatised utilities has been referred to before; however section 4
of the Railways Act attempts to define the "public interest" which the regulator is
expected to protect. In tandem with the Secretary of State the Regulator protects the
interests of railway users; promotes the use of the rail network; promotes efficiency
and economy on the part of railway providers; promotes competition in the provision
of railway services; promotes measures which facilitate passengers making journeys
over more than one passenger service; imposes minimum restrictions on operators and
enables railway service providers to plan their business with a degree of certainty.'?'
96 Press Notice 103, 21st May 1997.
97 Press Notice ORR/97/31
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These general duties are made more explicit and listed in the Department of
Transport's Annual Report 1995.102 The Office is to assist in the process of setting up
subsidiary TOUs by granting licences so they can bid for franchises; approve terms on
which the owners grant access to facilities; issue guidance following consultation for
track access charges and has issued guidance on the competitive framework for the
rail industry. In the commercial negotiations over access agreements the Regulator
promotes the public interest. This extensive list of duties reveal the conflicting
responsibilities of the Office of the Rail Regulator. Alongside these statutory defined
duties, the Secretary of State for Transport also had powers to issue guidance to the
Regulator which had to be taken account of 103 This lasted until the end of 1996.
In a sense the problems experienced by the Regulator through his publication of
documents expose the internal ambiguities of the British rail privatisation programme.
For example, take the Regulator's statement on competition; he has made clear that in
order for the franchises to succeed complete open access cannot be introduced all at
once. "I believe that it is necessary to introduce controls to limit the competition
initially to enable the process of franchising to be carried out successfully't.l'" His
solution would allow no significant competitive entry until 31st March 1999 with
substantial restrictions until 2002. These proposals are put forward with the caveat
that he remains "convinced that there are substantial benefits to both train operators
and passengers to be realised by an increase in competition't.l'" This eight-year delay
in allowing full competition was clearly always going to exist in some form; any
model of franchising would not make sense without a restriction on competitive entry.
102 Cnmd 2806, 1994-5.
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Future tensions in this area can perhaps be discerned in that, as mentioned above, the
franchises have been of varying length. Thus many of the franchisees will have a
vested interest in maintaining a limited competitive environment at least in their
franchise areas. However the Regulator has recently stated that he "will not hesitate
to use my enforcement powers" if any franchise fails to provide the service agreed
and does not form part of a national network. lOG
Ironically this structure contrasts with the deregulated bus industry from which (as has
been mentioned) many of the core of bidders of franchises come. There is no
immediate laissez-faire approach to the rail industry; instead the regulator's approach
seems to be similar to other utilities like gas and telecommunications where
competition was introduced slowly following the initial share disposal.l'" He writes
in his policy document that the franchisees will themselves promote competition
because they overlap in certain areas. I08 But this is clearly minimal; in order for
franchises to succeed they need a degree of assurance on the security of their route.
This is what the regulator is admitting so the statement could be seen as designed to
get the franchisees off the ground. But the other effect is to protect consumers from
the excesses of competition which is meant to benefit them. Thus a model of 'open
access' competition some way in the future looks unrealistic and indeed contradictory
to the overall model of the new rail industry.
Although the model of competition has been limited by the regulator, belief in the
'market' is still central to his principles. Thus in his written statement published in
105 'bid 2
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the Railtrack prospectus he states: "It is for me to seek to ensure that the working of
commercial incentives and market forces promotes the public interest and leads to a
better railway for passengers and freight customers't.l'" Further "I will aim to ensure
that market forces work effectively and harmoniously so as to benefit passengers and
freight customers and stimulate the development of innovative services".110 Thus the
essence of this privatisation as far as the regulator goes is to control and co-ordinate
the market. Beyond this he also sees his role as facilitating co-ordination with all
bodies involved with the rail industry. This is "of critical importance as without it
important public interest benefits would be denied to users".lll Indeed as mentioned
above any franchise operator who see their service from a "narrow and parochial
view" will be penalised. This may beg the question of why, if integration is critical,
was the entire network split up? Yet do these powers amount to real constraints or are
they merely aspirations as to the type of rail network the Rail regulator wishes to see?
One overriding power which the Rail regulator has is to approve track access
agreements under s18 of the Act. This is linked to promoting the 'public interest' and
ultimately gives him the power to determine the structure of charges made by
Railtrack. His review of track access charges was carried out in two documents
published in 1994/5. This scheme lays down the structure of charges for a six-year
period, and is a unique phenomenon in that the contracts were in place before the sale
as pointed out by the Rail Regulator.i'" On the 17th January 1995 it was announced
that there would be cuts in the charges paid to Railtrack by the train operators. The
initial reduction in the year 1995-6 would be 8%; for the next five years there would
1080RR (1994), p2.
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be a cut of 2% per year; overall this would amount to a 21% decrease. In financial
terms there would be an overall reduction of £1.5bn with a total of £12bn over six
years. The justification for such measures is to force Railtrack to cut costs and reduce
government subsidy. In another bout of self-definition Swift claimed that his message
to rail managers was "they had a regulator who is prepared to be tough".ll3
Indeed the price control does seem to benefit once more those engaged in bidding for
franchises. But where does it leave Railtrack? Sir Bob Horton, the Chairman of
Railtrack, called the cuts "exceedingly challenging'v'" but overall investment in
infrastructure becomes less certain. However the Lex column in the Financial Times
claims that it offered a benefit to privatisation because there would be less emphasis
on subsidy therefore the privatised industry will not be subject to political whim.
Thus with this move the Regulator tipped the balance in favour of the franchisees.
This occurred during the period when there were terminal delays in drawing up the
first of the franchises. However his criticism of Railtrack has not ended there; part of
his role is to prevent the company abusing its monopoly position. The Rail Regulator
has clearly stated "The role of regulation, therefore, is to provide, through systems of
control, what a competitive market should be expected to achieve through
incentives". 115 Further in his regime for track access charges he allowed for £3.5
billion to be used for additional investment in the rail network. To this end "with this
stability of funding, I expect Railtrack to deliver an effective investment programme
fulfilling its obligations to maintain and renew the network't.v'" To this end he has
monitored its performance and has gained agreement that Railtrack will publish
112 ORR (1995), p2.
282
quality indicators indicating its performance on maintenance and renewa1.117 Again
with this the balance is drawn between the market and social responsibilities:
"Railtrack has commercial freedoms and commercial incentives. But with these corne
responsibility". I 18 However since privatisation Railtrack has been heavily criticised
by the Rail Regulator for not meeting its targets on investment on a number of
separate occasions. This resulted in the publication of Bulletin which stated the
Office's regulatory objectives towards Railtrack and that the company had an
"historically unique opportunity to make a major contribution to the public
interest". I 19 To this end he claimed the present statement by management was
"disappointing in important aspects".120 Through this pressure the Regulator
negotiated an amendment of the licence which went into more detail on the question
of investment. 121
The Regulator thus has a role in harnessing the market and monitoring the behaviour
of Railtrack to ensure that the 'public interest' is upheld. Difficulties arise not only
through the contradictory nature of the public interest but in his powers to enforce his
intentions; these are certain to increase. However his constant monitoring of
Railtrack has garnered results even if the process has been drawn out.
The ambiguities of the 'public interest' already witnessed in the discussion of
competition policy were also present in his consultative document on ticket outlets.
The most controversial aspect of this was the option for there to be a core group of
116 Prospectus, p86.
117 Press Notice, ORRJ9617.
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only 294 stations which could provide tickets. This was one of the options within the
document and when presenting it the Regulator gave another interpretation to his
powers "I am seeking to use my powers to promote a better railway which provides
better value (my emphasis)".122
Thus, does the regulator protect the railway user as consumer or as taxpayer? The
ticketing proposals would not be welcomed by rail users but arguably in the long term
could save money. These proposals have been withdrawn and will not be reviewed
for another two years. 123 This shows perhaps that regulators are still very susceptible
to political pressures. This was not before the Secretary of State revealed his lack of
knowledge ofthe detail of rail privatisation when he declared he would not allow such
a plan. As mentioned above the Regulator only had to "take into account" the
guidance of the Secretary of State until the end of 1996; there is no compulsion
involved. This perhaps revealed the prospect of another base of conflict within the
new rail industry between Regulator and Government Department.
The problems of the Regulator then are both general and specific. General, in the
sense ofhaving to curtail severely the worst excesses of competition'<' to promote the
consumers' interest; specific because of the conflicting duties within the railway
industry. Does he protect the rail user by protecting all services or by reducing
subsidy or by hastening the introduction of the franchising of passenger services?
With the privatisation of Railtrack have the goalposts now been moved so as
completely to redefine his role? Has his role become mainly that of watchdog for the
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privatised Railtrack? His more recent pronouncements seem to suggest this and this
element has been underlined since the election of the Labour Government as will be
illustrated in the concluding part of this chapter.
The ambiguities of the regulator's role reflect the problems of privatisation which are
also seen in the work ofthe Franchising Director.
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The Franchising Director
The Franchising Director, Roger Salmon, is also a creation of statute. But he is much
more of a " 'creature' of the Secretary of State,,125 for he has no statutory duties to
uphold as the Regulator does. The Railways Act provides that the Office acts in
accordance with instructions and guidance and any objectives given to him by the
Secretary of State.126 These objectives concern the provision of passenger services in
the rail industry and the operation of any assets. He is also now in charge of the
distribution of rail subsidy to the individual train operators through the Public Service
Obligation (PSO) grant. The Office also oversees the drawing up and letting of the
franchises. Further one of his more controversial new powers is the setting of
Passenger Services Requirements (PSR) - these lay down the minimum services
required to be run by the new passenger franchises. If the requirements are not met
then the Franchising Director can withhold the PSO Grant.
The first publication of these PSRs was on the 31st January 1995 - they represented
an overall cut of 20% in services required compared to BR's service. 127 The
Government is quick to point out that it was the first time that rail services had to
have a published minimum services, but the cuts in the services could be seen as
giving the nod to franchise operators to run fewer services. In Labour's words not the
axe but a sight of the 'scalpel,.128 This is particularly the case with two of Scotrail's
sleeper services which was not provided for in the PSR for Scotrail. Yet in a
125 Characterisation used by Michael Meacher M.P. in HC Deb, February 7th 1995, co120l.
126 Railways Act 1993, s5(1)(a). This was the basis of the successful legal challenge by the Save Our
n _'l •••_ •• .._ ,_ n 1-.__ 1 00(: c~~ A __~_;I;~
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protracted legal battle the Court of Session held that Scotrail had not gone through the
correct consultation procedure in withdrawing the sleeper service. This was because
the sleeper was the only service to use a certain portion of track in Glasgow, although
Scotrail attempted to counter this by running a "ghost train" service on this track. 129
This case - which was lost on appeal by Scotrail- illustrates the potential for legal
battles in the new railway'<" and the nature in which the courts may intervene over
such administrative processes.
In a sense, the difficulties experienced by the Regulator with the shift in emphasis in
privatisation are felt even more severely by the Franchising Director- because he is
tied more closely to the Government. It could be argued that a counterpoint to the
Regulator's announcement on the cutting of access charges!" was the Government
and Franchising Director's capping of fare rises. The details of this were that there
were to be no increases above inflation for the next three years for certain types of
fares and in the four subsequent years the increases will be capped at 1% below the
rate of inflation. At the time this was seen as another delay in the franchising process.
It could be argued that this intervention further encouraged the growth of a group of
core bidders for the franchises, in that management buy-out teams who may not have
a great deal of capital 132 were further discouraged because of the limiting of one of the
few flexible costs left for a train operating company.
129 See Appendix.
130 Even though these actions were brought under judicial review provisions and not as a result directly
of a contractual battle. See Appendix.
131 <;;:PP "hrnTP
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Thus the 'successful' awarding of the franchises which took place in 1996 was aided
by measures which supported the growth of a core group of bidders for the franchises.
This meant that in general only existing larger transport interests could have the
resources to bid successfully for them. Following the process of bus deregulation this
led to the further consolidation of transport operators, and the Franchising Director's
office and indirectly the Government encouraged this, not only with the rules on ticket
pricing but with the requirement for franchise bidders to put up 15% of their expected
annual turnover as a guarantee against commercial failure. The difficulties outlined
above in the awarding of the Scotrail franchise also illustrate further the difficulty for
management bidding successfully. The 'hard-wiring' demanded by the Passenger
Transport Authority has been resisted largely because of the demands this would
impose on the franchisee. Within the agreement the PTA wanted an exact timetable
specified, a freeze on fares, guaranteed conditions for railway staff and the
imposition of standards of cleanliness etc.133 This is significant because Strathclyde
through the Passenger Executive controlled almost a third of Scotrail's income.i "
The franchise was successfully let in the spring of 1997 and in confirmation of these
trends a large transport operator was seen as the most suitable candidate for the
franchise: National Express. 135
Perhaps the problem lies in the nature of the franchise. As every passenger service in
Britain operated at a loss then every line initially received a subsidy. Therefore, the
entire franchise process reflects a system of subsidy-bidding - that is the team which
offers to run the service for the lowest amount of money will be likely to succeed.
~~~ FT, 17th Feb. 1995.
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But with so little control over the costs in running the Toe136 the scope for cutting
their expenditure seemed to be limited, although as has been mentioned some of the
franchises have extremely ambitious plans for cutting subsidy and moving into profit.
This system of franchising has been criticised even by supporters of privatisation.F"
Dnes argues that with inadequate competition for franchises, theoretically a successful
franchisee could simply bid £1 less than his competitors. This would lead the way to
the Franchising Director giving public subsidy to increase private profits. Dnes'
solution was a form of price bidding whereby franchisees would bid in terms of the
lowest fare they could charge.l " Any variation in this could be negotiated by the
Toe and the Franchising Director and an integrated system of arbitration which is the
norm in private sector franchise agreements. These initial proposals have been
superseded by the capping of fare rises as these cannot easily be varied by the
franchise operators.
The stringent timetable of 51% of services in the private sector by April 1996 was not
met. But the Franchising Director managed to let a series of franchises throughout
1996. For a number of reasons this lead to a 'consolidation' within the rail industry
which compounds further consolidation already experienced with the bus deregulation
experience. This again raises the question of the nature of this particular privatisation
and the arrangements for accountability.
135 But as mentioned above this caused the new Labour Government to refer this franchise to the MMC
and required it to divest its Scottish bus service.
136T'h ic i~ pdirn"tprI to hp ,,~ lour ,,~ ?fl i0j" of "o~t~ ~PP Mrirlern Railwavs Privntisntirm. Snprinl
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COMPARISONS AND CONCLUSIONS
After examining the structures of this most unique and peculiar privatisation and the
underpinning ideology - if it is still valid- of the supremacy of contract it is necessary
to refer back to the dominant themes of this thesis. Foster has written often of his
belief in the catharsis of privatisation. "Anyone who has been through the process of
privatisation will recognise the release of intellectual energy, even occasionally
euphoria that occurs when management recognise a better way of doing
something'r.F" Once management is liberated from the public sector a new energy is
created which produces new initiatives and benefits for the industry. In rail he
estimates that management will be able to concentrate on running train services whilst
an independent body controls infrastructure. But what of the central question for
public lawyers - accountability? Has this increased through this particular
privatisation?
Foster's almost theological approach towards rail privatisation is not justified by any
examples of similar rail privatisations internationally. Thus this idea of a 'liberated'
management has gained centre stage in the course of this sell-off. It reflects the
changing environment in which privatisation has taken place. No longer do the
arguments of popular capitalism or spreading share ownership gain such a wide
audience. Perhaps this is because ofthe excessive salaries and advantages enjoyed by
privatised utility chiefs or the scotching of the myth of the power of the individual
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shareholder in the face of institutional domination. 14o There has been a clear drop in
the level of support for privatisation over the last decade as reflected in opinion polls.
The Annual Social Attitudes Report" throughout the eighties saw a drop in support
for the question "should their be less state ownership?". From the 1983 high of 49% -
itself representing the alienation experienced at the hands of the public corporation- it
fell to 24% in 1990.142 Some could argue that this itself reflects the extent of
privatisation in the eighties. However this was prior to the privatisation of the
railways and the emphasis on protection of the rail passenger within the privatised
system in a sense reflects this. In a sense Government has even recognised this
implicitly with its re-orientation of regulation to protect the consumer rather than
"holding the fort" for competition as originally proposed by Littlechild. 143As both the
nineties and rail privatisation progressed an increasing alienation grew from the
private sector and 'fat cats'. In the 1996 Social Attitudes report a majority of people
believed "big business benefits the owners at the expense of the workers".144 In a
sense this explains the strength of the Rail Regulator's reaction to the monopoly of
Railtrack. What these figures represent above all is the lack of support for the general
propostions put forward in the mid-eighties of a 'popular capitalism'. As these ideas
became redundant and in the absence of any other reasoning, then, Foster's liberation
thought and his advantages of contract filled the vacuum of ideological support for
privatisation.
140 Witnessed at the 1995 British Gas A.G.M. The general process is outlined in SaunderslHarris
(1994).
141 Compiled by Social Community Planning Research (SCPR).
142 Q{,P"R (100')) n 115<
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Yet where does this leave the debate on enhancing accountability through ending the
monolith of state ownership? It is clear that in many ways the privatisation of the rail
network is unlike any other; no longer can one simply apply a deterministic attitude to
privatisation according to which it was carried out simply to reduce the Public Sector
Borrowing Requirement: "selling the family silver". In the opening stages of rail
privatisation it looked as if very little money would be raised initially leaving some
wondering why it was even being attempted. This has altered now with the rushed
sale of Railtrack and the Rolling Stock companies but this has hardly dented the
PSBR and was used largely to finance slower tax rises. It is important to remember
that the sale of Railtrack was never initially envisaged to take place as rapidly as it
did. In any case there has been a very large initial outlay to pay for restructuring and
consultancy costs in the new railway, leading Modern Railways to comment it was
like paying people to steal the family silver.145
The rail privatisation programme is not easily labelled: its structures are complex and
the justification multi-layered and to some degree contradictory. The splintering of
the unitary structure ofBritish Rail has divided the workforce and resulted in attempts
to introduce localised bargaining. Perhaps this is one of the more conscious
consequences of the sell-off as it matches developments in the other parts of the
public sector- notably in the Health Service. Ultimately though, the structures seems
to be determined by the clashing of a Thatcherite dogmatic belief in privatisation with
an attempt to limit the worst effects for the more regulatory nineties. Thus the
reintroduction of the profit motive by reintroducing the private sector in the running
of train services is extremely controlled. In a strict sense the companies are not even
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making profits; rather they are receiving subsidy which they are planning to cut over
several years. However the most successful bidders for subsidy as already noted are
those groups which control other industries which have profitable sidelines. The basic
claim of privatisation that the incentive of private profit is superior to the inefficiency
of state ownership is hardly proven by the rail privatisation model, as the privatised
rail network relies on the state for finance and regulation. There is no free
competition. The benefit of the private sector seems to be the ability to "rebrand" the
rail service.
This combination of public subsidy to private operators colours the nature of the
examination of accountability. Have the new structures ofthe rail industry provided a
more accountable network? Central to this work has been the thesis that ownership is
linked to enhancing accountability. In this case we have a predominantly privately
owned rail network with a relatively powerful regulator. However does the
complexity of regulation in the form of the franchises and the Office of the Rail
Regulator make calls for the re-nationalisation of the rail industry irrelevant?
The Labour Party's new approach to the rail industry should be examined here. Its
model of controlling the new railway has fallen far short of calling for full public
ownership. In a sense it is utilising the new structures of the railway to expand
regulation rather than get involved in the expense of re-nationalising the rail network.
In the prospectus for Railtrack the Party's policy was outlined.i'" the tripartite
structure of its policy involving "using the power to regulate, the power of the public
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subsidy and the power to acquire ownership".147 In part this was an argument against
those who wanted a firm commitment for the party to back public ownership. But it
rejected any "dogmatic views on ownership't.Y" It also was an attempt to bolster
external regulation as an accountable alternative to public ownership. The Party
conceded that the regulator already had "considerable powers to secure changes to the
regime as it applies to Railtrack". Indeed "the powers of the Rail Regulator are
central to the achievement of the objectives of a Labour Government".149 To this end
there would be statutory changes to make the Rail Regulator more answerable to the
Government. This seems to mean that the regulator will be made to be more aware of
the public policy preferences ofthe Government. The power to demand that Railtrack
reinvests in the network which the Rail Regulator already has to some degree (as
mentioned above) would be extended. This was prior to the agreement which the
Regulator received to alter the licence of Railtrack which occurred after a lengthy
period of negotiation as mentioned above.
The use of public subsidy, again a unique aspect of the rail privatisation, is seen as a
powerful weapon. This is quite clear from the lengthy dispute over the Scotrail
franchise. This would take the form of cutting the amount of profits that would be
available to Railtrack after disposing of property. "Railtrack is not a property
company. It should not be regarded as one".150 The Party also emphasises that,
unlike in the case of the other utilities, Railtrack does not have the option to refer the
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Regulator's decisions on price controls to the MMC. It will attempt to channel their
subsidy in a fairer way to "encourage more intensive use of the system".151
This example of the Labour Party's policy on the 'new' railway illustrates the
argument of the enhancing of accountability without any "dogmatic" reference to
ownership. In a sense it is easy to advocate this in the rail industry, most notably
because of the extensive subsidy which the state gives the railways. But the proposals
reflect a wider argument on the nature of public ownership and the state. This goes
right back to the earlier chapters of this work and the separation of ownership from
accountability. Can the railways be fully accountable ifthey are not publicly owned?
The Office of the Rail Regulator sees its accountability as commg through its
openness in coming to decisions. Further the Regulator is under the ambit of the
Parliamentary Ombudsman and "I am accountable through the courts if there is
illegality, irrationality or procedural impropriety't'<' i.e. through judicial review.
Ultimately, though, his regulatory decisions are accountable because of their
"predictability". These definitions of accountability are not very inspiring. Clearly
the Labour Party wants to extend political control over the regulator but is this
possible without a clearer statement of what the regulator is accountable for? Does it
not represent a return to the role of the nationalised industry board with the regulator
tom between governmental control and the operational decisions of the rail industry?
Thus Government can wash its hands of responsibility and put the onus on the
regulator.
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The strengthening of the regulator's role could not have prevented the move towards
consolidation within the franchises and the dominance of several operators. Thus any
prospect of co-ordinating passenger services on a nation-wide level has been lost,
although the Regulator has made it clear that this should be a priority. Perversely a
form of co-ordination has begun to develop with the bus industry becoming involved
in running train services. In Winchester, for example, in the South West of England
all train and bus services are run by Stagecoach. The referral of National Express to
the MMC because of its parallel transport interests in Scotland and the West Midlands
has been mentioned before. The notion of an integrated transport network is being
introduced in an arbitrary ad hoc manner. This exists alongside the Passenger
Transport Authorities which have delayed the process for awarding several franchises
including Scotrail. The Scotrail experience illustrates the power that elected
authorities have to hold an industry to account even though they could not halt the
change in ownership, although ironically the new owners of the franchises promised
more investment in the network than the Government was prepared to do. Whether or
not this materialises is a central question, especially given the referral to the
M 1· dM C .. 153onopo ies an erger omrmssion.
The Labour policy is also to respect any existing contracts within the rail network;
meaning that they will let the franchises run their course. But this is a considerable
gamble. As has been noted many of the charges for these franchises are fixed - what
if they cannot meet their targets for subsidy reduction? Surely the greatest test for any
structure is when something goes wrong. On this count franchises are largely
untested, although the experience of South West Trains' inability to run registered
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services offers an indication of what may develop. Perhaps it again illustrates why
most of the franchises have gone to a hard core of bidders. They can perhaps afford
to shoulder the losses because of their other operations.
In interview an employee of Railtrack labelled rail privatisation a "story without
end".154 To some extent this creates difficulties for a work of this nature yet it does
allow the spectator time to examine processes which have developed under the aegis
of privatisation. In the rail network there has been a complete restructuring but with
continuing government subsidy and extensive regulation it would be easy to believe
nothing had changed. The 'accountability' of the nationalised industry has been
replaced with 'accountability' through contract and the regulator - the latter will
remain with Labour albeit with a more centrally directed regulator. For all the various
definitions of accountability outlined in the Introduction ironically this is closest to
that proposed by the proponents of the public corporation. This is because any
accountability will be between the Government and the regulator of the industry, as
accountability was meant to be delivered in the relationship between the Minister and
the board of the public corporation. What is missing is a direct link in accountability
between the public and the public service. As this chapter has illustrated the
labyrinthine structures of the "new" railway are difficult to follow generally. This is
also true for the users of the rail service. However, as in the bus industry, operators
have found a way round the system to provide in part a locally integrated service.
The state seems to have missed the opportunity of providing a more broadly
integrated national transport service with an awareness ofpublic accountability.
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In the concluding chapter the dominant themes of this work will be tied together. The
process of privatisation and deregulation in the transport sector raises important issues
for the student of the modem state. It also illustrates the debasing of the notion of
accountability and how this basic term for public lawyers must be redefined. An
attempt to carry this out will be made in the following chapter which will also expand
on the direct comparisons with the bus and rail industry.
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CHAPTER EIGHT: CONCLUSION.
The trend in modem public law is to create an academic structure with reference to
some external source. This has proved necessary because of the dated approach of
Dicey and the many new institutional developments in the British state. In a broader
context it is also derived from the absence of a written British constitution or any
definitive principles of administrative law. This trend was supported by specific
examples in the introduction of this work. In the field of state intervention in the
economy, one of the main areas of study for the 'new' public lawyers, the push
towards both privatisation and deregulation has provided a form within which public
lawyers have constructed their work. As described, Ian Harden and Norman Lewis in
particular have argued that accountability, a central concept for public lawyers, can be
delivered through the use of contract and the 'market'.
It has been the contention of this work that this belief is flawed. Furthermore, it is
suggested that the peculiar experience of public ownership in Britain has separated
accountability from ownership. This is in contrast to the actual reasons for which
many industries were nationalised in the forties. In the field of public transport the
disconnection of accountability from ownership has been witnessed in the recent
privatisation of the rail network' and the deregulatory structure of the bus industry?
By using these examples the purpose of this work is to argue that, specifically in the
field of transport, accountability can only be fulfilled through a model of public
ownership; thus the experience of deregulation and privatisation has shown that
accountability is not more likely to be delivered using these latter methods.
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This conclusion will seek to underline these arguments by highlighting the
consequences of these models as outlined in earlier chapters. Firstly the problems of
dealing with the concept of 'accountability' will be restated following the
examination of competing models in the Introduction of this work. Then the particular
trends of both bus deregulation and rail privatisation will be measured against any
definition of accountability which is forthcoming. The similarities between these two
developments already examined briefly will be restated and developed. Finally the
question of ownership will be faced looking at the failure of the British model of
nationalisation. If public ownership is central are there any structures which can be
adopted for transport which will not face the difficulties that have been experienced
previously?
ACCOUNTABILITY: A SINGLE CONCEPT?
Before this work examined both deregulation of the bus network and privatisation of
the rail industry the Introduction attempted to place both these processes in the
context of public law. For public lawyers examining the multifarious ways in which
the state operates, models of accountability are a central concern. Alongside this in
the area of nationalisation and privatisation disciples of each would claim they could
deliver an accountable structure. The central problem here is the variety of meanings
ascribed to accountability. Some of the different models looked at included
accountability through the public corporation, through being a shareholder and
through the new regulators. Between public law academics there is even more
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that there is no unified model of constitutional or administrative law within the British
tradition. Again the tensions between these different academics was outlined in the
Introduction.
It could also be argued by some legal academics that another way in which
accountability can be delivered in public law is through the process ofjudicial review.
Such a model has not been examined at length in this work. There are various reasons
for this. Although judicial review has dramatically expanded its ambit in recent years
the courts have always been reluctant to determine how government intervenes in the
economy whether via nationalisation or privatisation. Furthermore, it is not clear
whether the courts would be a suitable forum in which to debate such issues given
that judicial review is ostensibly concerned with procedural rather than substantive
matters. There is also a school of public law thinkers who are extremely critical of
using judicial review as a means of delivering accountability in any administrative
context. This argument has been put by Harlow and Rawlings in their work on
administrative law recently published in a second edition.3 This relates to the
arbitrary nature ofjudicial review both in the way in which an action is raised and the
standards applied by the judiciary. However even in the field of transport
deregulation and privatisation there have still been some significant legal cases.
These are examined in the Appendix which also looks at how the cases relate to the
general concept of accountability.
If it is accepted that accountability cannot be given one definite meanmg in the
context of privatisation which definition is relied upon in this work? Again an outline
301
of this was attempted in the Introduction. On the basis of this discussion it was
argued that the model of the public corporation was flawed because of its lack of
openness and the absence of a structure which was capable of delivering any model of
accountability. This was exacerbated by the architects of the public corporation being
very vague over how accountability would be delivered in the new creations.
Privatisation, on the other hand, created a partially open structure through the use of
the regulators. However the flaw here was the reintroduction of the profit motive - in
particular the creation of value for the shareholder. This prevented a genuine
accountability for the many and instead redirected it towards the "few": the limited
number of shareholders. Thus a new structure is needed which combines an open and
accountable structure, which is designed to deliver accountability for the "many" and
which does not rely on the profit motive.
This awareness of the importance of the public when delivering an accountable
structure was summarised in the Introduction as the "public's perception of
accountability". In the context of transport what does this mean? Both bus services
and rail transport play a vital public role, and thus many people are dependent on
them as their only means of transport. Through the years this has been
acknowledged; for example through the creation of Public Service Requirements" in
rail privatisation and the continued existence of subsidised bus routes. Thus, for the
public, accountability can perhaps be derived from their perception of services. An
accountable service, then, is one that in part provides a service that the public is
satisfied with. Firstly, in substance that is the service is reliable, fast and relatively
cheap. Furthermore the public should have a forum which they are aware which can
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hear complaints and inquiries about the service operators and in a direct way hold
them to account.
In a sense this argument echoes the argument of Stagecoach and other private
operators in the transport industry that for them accountability is best defined by the
customers. If they are not happy with their service they will not use it. Thus by
responding to their needs the company is accountable through the marketplace. This
is a standard argument in favour of the 'market' deciding but is now largely
inappropriate here. This is because such an argument rests on a large degree of free
competition. This is not what is happening in the rail industry, as far as passenger
services go, until at least the next century as outlined by the Rail Regulator. Even
then the amount of competition will be extremely limited. Furthermore, in the bus
industry a process of consolidation and acquisitions has made the prospect of free
competition extremely difficult to apply. So in summary many customers will have
little choice, particularly those who have no other means of transport. Thus, using
this simple definition of 'market' accountability, it does not exist at present in public
transport. But that definition on its own is too sparse.
What of a more legal approach? Accountability through contracts and ultimately the
courts was clearly the model preferred by Sir Christopher Foster and echoes the
approach of Hardens and Lewis.6 Rather than a public perception of accountability
this relies on accountability stemming from a document backed with legal sanctions.
The argument is that the clarity of contract will distinguish rights and duties and sets
out clear standards in a way that the Morrisonian structures never could. Again this
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form of accountability rests on the equality of the contractors7 and the likelihood of a
sanction being used. Through the example of rail privatisation the inherent inequality
of contracting has been shown in the form of the size and weight of Railtrack and its
negotiating powers, and the group of 'core-bidders' for franchises many of whom are
backed up by large companies. Furthermore, the prospect of lengthy court cases
relating to the voluminous contracts which exist has spurred the creation of alternative
dispute resolution fora. Admittedly, this is not a development unique to the rail
industry as there is immense pressure on the civil justice system in all contractual
disputes. This suggests that legal actions will be a last resort, or that the new fora's
deliberations should be binding.
Either way there seems to be little unique about the use of contract. Rather, if it loses
its ultimate 'legal' sanction and it is not freely negotiated, what differentiates it from
the 'command' structure that was much maligned in the old British Rail? Moreover,
although many of the franchises may be published, many other contracts will not.
Enforcement and hence accountability will be removed from the public in that
customers will not be able directly to enforce any of the agreements. True
accountability through contract in any context may be a chimera'' but its use as
holding public services accountable is especially unconvincing, particularly in the
case of public transport. It was illustrated that in the course of rail privatisation the
rush to franchise all the lines by May 1997 caused an enormous amount of pressure
on the franchising office. Thus complex negotiations were rushed. It is yet to be
shown what the full consequences of that will be - particularly if a franchisee
collapses - but perhaps a precursor was the intervention of the Rail Regulator to fine
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South West Trains for its withdrawal of services. This holding of the rail company to
account was carried out after the fact. Moreover the use of a financial sanction carries
less weight in the context of all train operators being supplied with Government
subsidy which ultimately funds the fine. So the case for using contracts as the main
means of delivering accountability in public services is unconvincing, but especially
in transport, because of the particular political problem and the way in which the state
still intervenes.
The problems of this structure of accountability aside, contractualisation does not
solve the problem of remoteness from ordinary people using transport. It is likely that
most of this 'accountability' would take place behind closed doors and the initial
secrecy surrounding the documents of rail privatisation during the awarding of the
franchises would also support this. However, there is another model of accountability
that encompasses both the public perception of accountability and the contractual
dimension: accountability through the Rail Regulator.
As was shown in some of the most recent work of the Regulator, he has been prepared
to hold Railtrack to account as regards the implementation of its investment
programme. Most recently he renegotiated its license to ensure it is more specific in
its investment plans." It has also been argued that recent interventions such as this
have shown that he wants to be seen as the friend of the consumer. 10 In truth his role
is more complex than that as s4 of the 1993 Railways Act shows with its multiple
definition of the 'public interest'. However the central question remains; if the Rail
8 See Macaulay (1963). This was developed in a recent study of the use of contract in the public sector
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Regulator holds Railtrack to account to whom is he accountable? His own definition
of this in the prospectus for Railtrack is unconvincing; including as it does 'judicial'
standards of accountability: "illegality, irrationality and procedural unfairness".!!
This is an extremely indirect form of accountability for a regulator. As was argued
the Labour party sees this gap and wants to fill it by making the regulator more
accountable to the Government. Even after the General Election these plans are still
quite vague'' although the praise given to the Regulator's recent success with
Railtrack suggests that this approach towards Railtrack is one the Government wants
to encourage.i ' Again it remains to be seen if in the present Parliamentary structures
whether this will work any better than the 'arm's length' relationship which ministers
had with the nationalised industries.
So accountability is yet another concept riven with ambiguity. This problem is a
particularly important one for public lawyers. Different definitions of accountability
produce different solutions, sometimes with structural implications. Using the
framework of the introduction of this work, Allan saw the courts as key/4 Harden and
Lewis the use of contract and the market, Prosser tends towards the structure of
regulators. Each in a sense has his own model of accountability. This thesis argues
that a concept of accountability needs to be directed to the public. This includes their
perception of the delivery of services but would also involve them in holding the
providers of services to account. That is particularly true in the field of transport as it
remains a vital service for much of the community. Even apart from the views of
10 Another example was the tough standards he lay down for the train operating companies. See ORR
Press Notice 97/29.
11 This is taken from Lord Diplock's reasoning in the GCHQ case: Council ofCivil Service Unions v
~,r,: ._....__ • r~ __ ...L~ /""'~'~'1'1 ("I~1~'';'''''''''' rl{\O<::l A 0 'J''7A
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those who rely on it, much government research has shown the need for a more
integrated transport structure that encourages the use of public transport. IS Thus
accountability here must relate directly to public perceptions. This is not to ignore the
more legal forms of accountability; these will have their place. Nevertheless, the
central purpose is to remove the alienation people feel from transport services or
transport providers; 16 the model of public ownership did not achieve this nor did the
developments of deregulation and privatisation.
To develop these themes the two areas looked at in this work will be measured against
the competing standards of accountability.
14 For the use of the courts in delivering a form of accountability during privatisation and deregulation,
see Appendix.
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'ACCOUNTABILITY' THROUGH BUS
DEREGULATION.
During the course of this work there have been significant developments in the field
of the bus industry. From 1993-1996 there were a large number of acquisitions,
stock market listings, references to the competition authorities and much
consolidation within the bus industry. In some important senses this contradicted the
original rationale for deregulation. However these developments were not surprising
given both the structure of the privatisation of the various bus operators and the
general nature of public transport which tends to a form of monopoly, as has been
shown. These developments have important implications for the concept of
accountability.
The first justification for deregulation in the Buses White paper was the inadequacy of
large bus operators in providing an acceptable service for users of bus transport. The
use of cross-subsidy meant that consumers were paying too much and the allocation
of services was inefficient. When free competition was established new operators
would use innovative methods to cut fares and raise the number of passengers. The
accountability envisaged here would be accountability through the market - the
Stagecoach argument outlined above. Under these standards as outlined in Chapters 4
and 5 deregulation has failed. Passenger numbers have fallen at the same rate as
occurred during the regulatory period under the Traffic Commissioners. Although the
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report by the UK Round Table Group on Sustainable Development.i ' This
specifically criticised the lack of co-ordination between rail and bus transport stating
deregulation did not allow for this type of co-operation. Moreover, the rapid
consolidation of the market has in many areas prevented a real choice of services as
the large numbers of referrals to the competition authorities in the mid-nineties shows.
Thus this model of accountability has proved not to be suitable for the bus industry.
However this market rationale for deregulation does not allow for many of the other
concepts of accountability mentioned above to have any application. If the purpose of
the 1985 Act was simply to lift the burden of regulation, some external body whether
that is a regulator or a franchise agreement could not be used to hold the bus industry
to account. Indeed, franchising was specifically rejected in the White Paper for
services outside London. 18 However 'pure' deregulation was not completely achieved
because of the existing role of the Traffic Commissioners and perhaps more
significantly the role of the competition authorities. It was illustrated in Chapter 5
how these remnants of regulation were used in an attempt to make the industry more
accountable. This process was haphazard with no uniform effect across Britain.
Furthermore, the nature of the competition authorities prevented a coherent approach
from being taken to the bus industry. The nature and powers of both the MMC and
the OFT tends to support a case by case approach. This approach did not reflect the
rapidly consolidating bus industry structure of the mid-nineties as was indeed
understood by the competition authorities themselves with their reports often calling
for a new approach to the bus industry as explained in Chapter 5. In a sense this
approach culminated in the demands by the Transport Committee for a Regulator in
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the bus industry in December 1995, yet this was rejected by the Government in strong
terms.
Another consequence of the market approach was that it prevented the development
of a coherent and persistent method of accountability. This is understandable because
it would have been fiercely resisted by bus operators who were used to operating
within minimal restraints. Thus within the bus industry it is difficult to apply any
concept of accountability. This is because of the absence of any structured regulation
and the growing consolidation within the industry which has made consumer choice
more difficult. Perhaps the creation of a specialist regulator would have solved this
but this was not implemented. In fact the idea was denigrated in the Government's
response to the Transport Committee's report even though it would not have been far
removed from previous shifts in Government policy, such as the referrals to the
competition authorities and the change in the remit of the Traffic Commissioners. 19
This may be because to admit that this form of accountability was needed would be to
say that the policy of accountability through the market, inherent in the Buses White
paper, had failed.
For public lawyers the consequences for accountability is clear. Completely
removing the state from the regulation of bus industry does not seem to be possible.
Further, to the extent which the element of state control was completely removed, the
absence of public operators also permitted the general trends of acquisition and
consolidation, which is how the National Bus Company had originally corne into
being. Thus deregulation coupled with privatisation did not enhance accountability
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either through a regulator or the 'market'; rather it removed the state from involving
itself with an important area of transport policy. Once again accountability was
defined by its absence.
'ACCOUNTABILITY' THROUGH RAIL
PRIVATISATION.
On the face of it similar problems of accountability should not occur with the rail
industry. As was outlined when examining the structures of this privatisation there
was much emphasis on how accountable to the consumer it was to be. All elements
of the new railway from the Franchising Director to Rail Regulator to the Train
Operating Companies emphasised their commitment to being accountable to the
public. Moreover the use of subsidy still provides a strong link to the state, a point
often made by New Labour in its desire not to make a commitment to renationalise
Railtrack. The introduction of franchises and leases is a clear example of co-
ordination by contract envisaged by Sir Christopher Foster. Thus a number of
concepts of accountability could be realised with this structure.
Unlike the supposed competition in the deregulated bus industry which, it could be
argued, existed in some form in the initial period following the 1985 Act, the Rail
Regulator has frozen the concept of free competition for at least five years, except for
freight. Choice where it does exist is between operators whose services overlap.
There is evidence that this has proved difficult to implement because of the reluctance
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a study by the Consumers Association." However the claim would be that the
accountability of the market would be through the franchise agreement and the
bidding process prior to the awarding of those agreements. Built into the agreement
would be undertakings on service innovation, rolling stock etc, which in theory
competitors would have to meet to establish themselves in the market place. It has
been shown that some franchises have been granted for a longer period on the basis of
some or all of these criteria being fulfilled. In part this reflects why the Franchise
Director believes himself to be protecting consumers as the franchises are supposed to
encourage innovation and not a 'cosy' monopoly.
However this does not fully deal with the public perception of accountability. For rail
passengers choice of service is probably not as important as regular services and
absence of delay. However this requires investment in the infrastructure which is the
preserve of Railtrack, although as mentioned the Regulator has gained assurances
recently on the investment programme with the amendment of Railtrack's licence.
Public perception could also relate to industrial disruption which has not perceptibly
decreased following privatisation. Indeed rail workers are the one group which is
completely alienated from the new structure" having lost national bargaining
structures and gained new rail operators who expect more flexible practices from the
workforce. In 1996 there were industrial disputes in 13 train-operating companies
with the RMT; some were particularly bitter as in the Scotrail dispute. However
ASLEF, the train driver's union, has managed to negotiate quite strong settlements
with the new train operators. This reflects their members' skilled status which is not
easily replaced.
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So splintering the network will make creating a public perception of accountability
very difficult to implement. The dispersing of this accountability over a number of
different institutions does not allow for any close identification from the public;
moreover there is no direct link with any of these bodies and the public. This is why
the struggle over the Scotrail franchise is very important.v' It could be argued that by
being an elected body the SPTA is more aware of the importance of the public
perception than other players in the 'new' railway hence its reluctance to sign away its
sizeable subsidy without "cast-iron" guarantees on standards for travel. The difficulty
of this is that the SPTA has been left almost alone in attempting to guarantee this
public accountability, Scotrail being one of a handful of franchises that was not
awarded until the spring of 1997.23
So the achievement of a public face of accountability will prove difficult. This is
particularly true in a fragmented structure because there is no direct line of
responsibility. Thus although it is relatively early days for the new structure of the
railway there are few encouraging signs of enhanced public perceptions of a more
responsive accountable rail service for passengers. The parallel argument often used
that privatisation enhances accountability automatically through introducing rigours
of the market also cannot be applied here. As previously explained, the Rail
Regulator has already outlined the limitations on open access, which in any case
whatever model of rail privatisation was used would have been difficult to establish.
But with the additional model of bus deregulation to learn from and the way in which
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the bidding for franchises has developed, perhaps the prospect of free competition
being introduced even after the regulator's restrictions end is a little distant.
Nevertheless, it could be argued by supporters of this model of privatisation that
although there may be an absence of a public perception of accountability in the 'new'
railway this was doubly true of the nationalised sector. Alienation from British Rail
was legendary with even John Major during the process of privatisation stating he
wished to end the tradition of the rail network being part of "the stand up comedian's
joke book,,24 and make it the "envy of the world".25 So perhaps privatisation is not as
important as the change in the culture of accountability behind the scenes. In Sir
Christopher Foster's model this meant a shift from "command to contract". Reflecting
modem public law thought this re-emphasises Harden's respect for the "concept of
contract". The creation of a Rail Regulator, who uniquely was appointed before the
privatisation took place, should also enhance the prospect of accountability for other
public lawyers.
Yet the success of contracts as a tool for enhancing accountability is yet to be proved.
The inequality of contract negotiations has been mentioned but there are other
difficulties. In the field of passenger franchises, the speed with which they were
awarded after a series of long delays suggest that there was an element of "standard
form" contracting here, that is the framework of each franchise agreed might not be as
uniquely crafted to the needs of a particular franchise as originally hoped. In
contradiction to this, the terms of each franchise relating to length and rolling stock
required have been quite variable, more variable than was originally envisaged. This
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illustrates that the method of negotiation became standard allowing for some
deviation but overall fulfilling the main task of awarding the franchise. This could be
put down to the external political pressures on the Government which wished all of
the franchises to be sold before the General Election in 1997. However it may also be
interpreted as a statement on the complexity of transferring the operation of an
important service like rail transport into a contractual document. In this sense
standard terms are a relatively easy fall back position. Again to refer to the SPTA
case this is perhaps the only real example of a true reflection of the complexities of a
rail service being negotiated into a contractual form. Of course if this process had
been repeated across the franchises the whole process would have taken years longer.
But even if the franchises and other contracts are of a 'standard form' does this
provide an accountable structure? Again there is little evidence to support this
contention. Furthermore, if a serious problem develops in the operation of a franchise
will this not be too late to test the validity of the thesis? Is it not like having a lifeboat
on a ship that has not been checked for leaks? The nature of contracts would suggest
that any enhanced accountability relies on the documents being legally binding; that is
being backed by legal sanction. But again the nature of the railway makes this
prospect cumbersome and time-consuming. In a sense this has been recognised with
the development of alternative dispute resolution procedures. The Rail Regulator has
stated his wish to develop these mechanisms and indeed they have been developed.
This process is understandable given the multiple contracts which exist but does it not
negate the benefits of a 'contracting state' if the end result is co-operation without
direct legal sanctions?
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Alongside 'accountability' through contract lies the role of the Rail Regulator. It was
noted in the previous chapter that the Regulator has his own conceptions of his
accountability. These were seen to be limited. His future role was dependent on the
outcome of the General election but Labour wants to make him more 'accountable' to
the government. Again this method of enhancing accountability is flawed because of
the nature ofParliamentary structures. In a sense it revisits an element of Morrisonian
public ownership with a splitting of responsibility between the minister and another
body. This inevitably will lead to tension between the two institutions. This change
would also not solve the problem of the multi-layered role that a utility regulator is
expected to play. The present definition is cumbersome and, arguably, contradictory.
Will it be his role to promote competition or support the customer? The nature of the
rail industry means that introducing open competition will not be easy. It may
involve a degree of disruption which would affect the ultimate consumer. The link
between introducing competition to this market and the rights of the customer are not
completely clear. These elements are in a state of flux but without them there is no
direct structure of accountability.
The structure of rail privatisation, then, contained attempts to tackle the question of
accountability. The early creation of the regulator to apply the 'public interest' is in
contrast to the appointment of regulators after the privatisation of other utilities. The
fracturing of British Rail and the method of franchising rested on the intellectual
belief that contracting between independent legal persons was a more 'accountable'
method of running a railway. For the reasons outlined above the case for the increase
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although a different structure was adopted to that of the deregulation of the bus
industry, where franchising was specifically rejected, the two processes have
overlapped quite considerably. The impact of this for an 'accountable' transport
industry will now be examined.
SIMILARITIES AND OVERLAP.
The awarding of the majority of the franchises in 1996 was greeted with audible relief
by the Government. However the eventual result was not what was originally
envisaged. The dominance of bus operators in winning franchises solely or in
agreement with other companies reflected an intersection of the consolidation of the
bus industry and the haste with which the franchising process was carried out in rail
privatisation throughout 1996. This also highlights the contradictory approach
adopted by the state.
Chapter 5 of this work outlined the changing way different parts of the state
responded to the deregulation of the bus industry. Central to the approach in the mid-
nineties was to make a large number of referrals to the competition authorities. This
is unsurprising as it coincided with the period of intense acquisition and consolidation
within the industry. But it is noticeable that these referrals tailed off as the rail
franchising process took speed.i" One must view the words of Stagecoach with
caution in this context because of its vested interests but in interview Derek Scott -
who was sceptical of the authorities' independence - believed this to be no
coincidence. In a sense the entire success in awarding most of the franchises in 1996
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was due to the processes which had occurred in the bus industry. Without these
emerging giants who would have dominated the franchising process? Obviously
management buy-out projects would have remained but for reasons previously
outlined, predominantly their lack of access to the finance needed and the potential for
cross-subsidy, it would have been difficult to award large numbers of franchises to
these groups. Other transport operators like Sea Containers, operators of the Orient
Express, and Virgin, with its airline, could have been involved (and were) but the
deregulated, privatised bus companies were vital.
It could be argued that the Government swallowed its pride and allowed these
consolidated operators to succeed. This may now be revised with the new
Government as the speedy referral of National Express to the MMC mentioned above
illustrates. However even the previous Government took the unprecedented step of
warning Stagecoach it would be referred to the competition authorities if it succeeded
in gaining the Scotrail franchise. Generally, however, though the bus companies
were seen as ideal franchise holders. The question could be asked: why? It cannot be
simply a question of finance as there were other companies with extensive finances
interested in running franchises. Could it possibly be that they are used to operating
in an intensively regulated environment? This may seem ridiculous to suggest of
Stagecoach which have been a successful operator in exactly the opposite situation.
But the other emerging operators to a greater or lesser extent came from the public
sector either owned municipally or at a national level. As outlined in Chapter 4 in
that system there was a developed structure for regulating bus routes by the Traffic
Commissioners. However their experience of state regulation is perhaps not as
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important as their ability to run buses. Does not the success of the bus companies
reflect to some degree the benefits of the same operators running the buses and the
trains?
If this is a method of integration it is an extremely haphazard one. Perhaps it does not
reflect a deliberate policy but it does represent an inevitable policy shift. The
experience of public transport has highlighted the difficulties in separating the
socially necessary from the profitable routes; this applies to both rail and bus services.
Arguably all transport legislation since the 1930 Act has been an attempt to tackle
this. The intricacies of the franchising processes reflect these tensions with the
Scotrail experience being a good example of dictating the 'social' needs of a railway.
Deregulation of the bus network could be seen as the one attempt to challenge this
view of combining social provision with economic success, particularly with the
onslaught in the White Paper against the concept of cross-subsidy. This last model, in
theory, supported the emergence of a number of small operators which had no desire
nor ability to run a variety of routes. As outlined this is not what developed and the
process of acquisition and mergers created a number of giant operators which did run
a variety of services using their economies of scale and the dreaded concept of cross-
subsidy. In retrospect, then, the Buses White paper and subsequent legislation was a
Canute-like attempt to tum the tide on the process of consolidation within the
transport industry, which is how the National Bus Company and Scottish Bus Group
had been established themselves.
The consequences of this for rail privatisation are clear. Although the legislation
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sense it also paved the way for further consolidation and integration. This was also
witnessed within the rail industry with Stagecoach's purchase of one of the ROSCOs -
Porterbrook. There has also been an element of consolidation within the maintenance
companies. This was definitely not planned but because of the particular historical
juncture and the desperation to dispose of the franchises the emerging bus operators
filled the breach. But does this process confirm or undermine the central tenet of this
work that ownership is central to the concept of accountability? Do the events
outlined in this work not show that ultimately privatisation does result in an
accountable structure?
Leaving aside the debate over whether the new structure of the railways are
'accountable', which has been examined above, this work would put forward the
proposition that all the processes of deregulation and privatisation show the necessity
for public ownership in the transport sector. The partial integration of transport
services which has occurred during the franchising process of rail privatisation is
ironically an attempt to mimic the public transport concept of an integrated transport
service, but this time by the private sector. The memory of the British Transport
Commission following the Second World War may be distant but the concepts
underpinning it are being revisited notably by the large bus operators. The difference
here is that the driving force behind these stock-market listed companies is increased
profits and dividends. This ultimately is their raison d' etre, The haphazard
unaccountable form of integration now emerging can only develop so far because of
the dominance of the private sector. This is because the driving force is not to
provide an integrated service but to increase shareholder value for their listed
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able to concentrate on providing an effective and integrated service, Thus full
integration and true 'accountability' can only occur when public ownership is restored
to the transport sector. But what model of public ownership could achieve this given
the failure ofthe Morrisonian structures to carry this out in the post-war period?
MODELS OF OWNERSHIP.
Those public lawyers who argue that the 'market' and contract provide a clearer
structure of accountability than the archaic structures of the British state have an
arguable case given the experience of public ownership. But to reject public
ownership in all spheres because of this rests on an idealisation of the potential for
accountability in the private sector and an exaggeration of the inefficiencies of public
ownership. Norman Lewis, although advocating a case by case examination of
whether privatisation is appropriate", argues that "private enterprise may be generally
preferred" because "internal control by the shareholders and external control by the
capital market provide incentives to avoid inefficiency'V" Thus accountability is
delivered because of the necessity of making profit. As shown in the consolidation of
the bus industry and latterly in the rail network this method of accountability is
extremely dubious. Particularly in the sphere of transport it downplays the
importance of public perceptions of accountability. Moreover, with the examples of
the Passenger Transport Authorities there is already a model of ownership which
utilises integration rather than the separate independent structures of Morrisonian
public corporations. The 'indirect control' here is carried out by the local electorate
as it elects their councillors who are then appointed to the Authority - thus there is a
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link between the populace and the body which controls the transport network. This
complements the direct control of Government which comes from the subsidy which
is directed to the Authority.
Created in the sixties by the Transport Act 196829 these bodies were established to run
a "properly integrated and efficient system of public passenger transport'V" These
authorities fitted in well with the local authority reorganisation of the seventies
particularly with the larger regional council structure in Scotland. In Strathclyde the
size of the geographical jurisdiction meant the Passenger Transport Authority did
create a real identity which was strengthened by the use of travel cards available
across the whole region. That such bodies survived Thatcherism is perhaps surprising
although it could be argued that local government reorganisation in Scotland and the
abolition of the Metropolitan counties in England limited the bodies' effectiveness as
they were not tied to one particular authority but an amalgamation of many. The
obstacles which were put in the place of the privatisation of Scotrail by the Authority
shows the potential strength that the PTAs had. According to a leading official in the
SPTA this was a surprise to the Conservative Government which apparently was
unclear as to what the precise role of the Transport Authority was. The strength of the
PTAs was based not simply on their focussing on integrated transport but also through
their additional legitimacy by being made up of elected representatives, although they
were elected as councillors not as members of the Transport Authority. This provides
a form of accountability - albeit imperfect - which could be built on in a future model
ofpublic ownership.
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An integrated publicly owned transport structure could provide an accountability that
would be acceptable to public law standards. Elected authorities on a local basis
which controlled bus and rail services could potentially provide a public perception of
accountability. If this was coupled with the use of Traffic Commissioners and a
regulatory structure for the rail industry services would also have another source of
accountability external to that of the transport authorities. Moreover, these directly
elected authorities could provide delegates to a national agency for transport services.
In contrast to the existing PTAs the direct election of representatives to the transport
authorities would provide a form of accountability in that it would give members of
the public a feeling of participation in the process. It would remove the indirect
nature of appointing an elected councillor to another public body. This action would
seek to combat the public perception of the lack of accountability of services and
providers which breeds an alienation from the provision of transport services, still
prevalent in bus and rail services.
This concept needs further support. How does alienation differentiate from a general
lack of interest? In the case of transport, users often complain of uncertainty in
timetabling, irregularity of service and conditions of the buses. All of these factors
cause frustration and more significantly where possible a return to the car. The public
has no perception that it has any power to control or alter the situation." Thus a
wedge is placed between public transport and the public. Would the simple act of
electing local transport authorities get round this? The idea of being accountable to
the electorate is an overused concept particularly in the field of local government yet
it could take on meaning here particularly if the representatives were drawn from
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transport workers and users of the network. If those who are involved in an industry
can have a direct link with its control then this will begin to diminish the dominant
trend of alienation. These directly elected Transport Authorities would still have a
close relationship with Central and Local Government as regards finance. Subsidy
would still be dispersed through the Passenger Transport Authorities.
In the field of bus routes the old role of the Traffic Commissioner could be
resurrected with its detailed examination of any potential new routes. This allows a
specialised agency to judge whether particular bus services are needed and gives the
operators a chance to justify the need for their proposed service. Holding operators to
account this way would be more appropriate than the commercial 'accountability'
alleged to have been created after deregulation. The old Traffic Courts, although
openly scorned by the deregulation gurus of the eighties, did provide a fairer way of
awarding routes than the free for all that emerged initially after deregulation, in the
sense that they allowed a degree of participation and took many different factors into
account before deciding if a route was necessary or not. Such awarding of routes
could insist on standards of service much like the SPTA did in the awarding of the
Scotrail franchise. This open, transparent structure is an external structure of
accountability but clearer and more appropriate to transport than contract. Rather
than using a detailed document backed by legal sanction, the institutional structure
provides an open forum to discuss a specific transport service. This openness is
perceptibly different from a written document listing both rights and duties. As a
document has latent power in that one can rely on it but only when things go wrong.
An open structure which allowed discussion and participation would prove stronger as
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It could be argued that these structures are only an elaborate system of control where
ownership is irrelevant. In a broader sense Lewis amongst others argues that the role
of the state needs to be redefined in all spheres. Diffuseness is what is required in the
delivery of public services whether it is "the state, the parish, the co-operative, self-
help groups".32 But as the transport experience has shown there is no support for the
notion that small 'micro' operators will fill the gaps unprovided by the monolithic
public operator. This was the model that underpinned Ridley's notion of bus
deregulation':' which was completely disproved by the later consolidation in that
industry. If authorities are to have real weight in co-ordinating transport, public
ownership has to be re-established in the dominant bus operators in each locale and
the rail infrastructure. Again this responsibility could be shared among local
authorities and at a national level. This would remove the private operators and their
desire to increase shareholder value. In a sense this was attempted in the forties with
the process ofnationalisation but failed due to the nature of the institutional structures
adopted. The reason for ownership rests on integration which as the private sector
realises makes sense for transport operations. Integration only works, however, if it is
accountable, that is it is truly responsive to the needs of the passenger and the people
who work on it. For reasons outlined above this accountability cannot be delivered by
the combination of deregulation and privatisation used at present in the transport
sector.
Whilst an elected system of control on its own would be an improvement, without
dominant services being taken back into public ownership there would still be a
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confusion of priorities. For as witnessed in the last few years in the bus industry as
companies gain a stock exchange listing and expand into other areas" the priority is
profit. As the above reference to Lewis35 shows that the primary way in which the
private sector can avoid 'inefficiency' is by reference to its shareholders. This
presumably means the dividends that are payable to the shareholders are a spur to the
company's success. This surely is an example of putting the few before the many.
Arguably companies can only be profitable if they serve the consumers. But this
notion rests on an idea of free competition which it is hoped this work has illustrated
operates neither in the rail nor the bus industry. In this context, therefore, profits can
be maintained and expanded once a dominant grip on the market is created. Taking
away private ownership of the dominant transport operators may not necessarily
remove this immediately. The experience of Morrisonian public corporations
illustrates the difficulty of simply changing the model of ownership and believing all
flaws will be eliminated. But in the case of public transport public ownership would
emphasise that the only purpose of the services would be to provide an integrated
transport network and that control stems from the electors and users of transport not
the shareholders ofprivate companies.
In the public law debate on accountability this work would lean towards the public
perception of accountability as being the most relevant. This is particularly true of an
important societal resource like the public transport network. Thus any element of
public activity could only be thought of as accountable in this sector if the public -
transport users and workers in the industry - perceive it as so. This is an element
which at the time of the nationalisation project of the forties was largely ignored as it
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was thought that the public corporation form and Parliament would look after the
interests of the public.i? Moreover, the study of transport privatisation and
deregulation has illustrated that the private delivery of these services has also
overlooked this concept of accountability.
During this work representatives of the rail and bus industry were interviewed. Each
had an agenda of crisis management, the best had to be made of a bad situation. In a
sense modem public law follows a similar agenda. State ownership in Britain has
failed so there can be no return to this method of public ownership. Thus a model of
accountability has to be born outside the traditional institutions of the state whether in
the 'market', through regulators or through post-modem legal theory. This may be in
tune with current political debate with none of the major parties supporting an agenda
of public ownership or if they do only within a limited framework with the innate
belief that the private sector is superior.V But in an academic discipline this should
not be the end of the story for public lawyers. By utilising the structures of
privatisation and new public management the concept of public accountability has
been compromised to the extent that its meaning has been turned on its head. That is,
accountability seems to assume a 'market' dimension even in the delivery of public
services. The link between this accountability and the public is at worst completely
removed and at best extremely distant. The role of 'new' public lawyers" should
consist in bringing accountability back to the 'public', not placing more obstacles in
the way. In a sense the earlier work of Harden and Lewis recognises this with their
application of the concept of 'immanent critique' which sought to draw on the
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perception of accountability with the reality of the modern British state.39 Yet the
introduction of the 'market' and contract obfuscates any perception of the public
interest. These concepts have their own definition of accountability which as
explained rests on different premises from public accountability. In the realm of
public services this is not an adequate framework. Private companies work to their
own agenda which in the case of transport requires an element of integration; contract
on this scale is an untried method which is exclusionary and not linked to the broader
public. That is why in the case of transport it is time to remove these obstacles and
involve the public. This system of elaborate control would be coupled with the public
sector becoming the predominant operator in rail and bus services as it would remove
the private sector's agenda and priorities. There may be a case for these in some
elements of the delivery of public services. But it is the conclusion of this work that
this is not the case in public transport. An unbridled intervention of the market in the
bus industry and a more managed introduction of contractual relationships in the rail
industry have been unsuccessful in delivering a more accountable public service.
The consequences of this are not purely academic. Transport has an important social
role as explained but it also has a major environmental one. This perhaps increases
the importance of a reassessment of public ownership. The future requires a learning
of lessons from the past. Law as a discipline recognises this and in particular public
law has almost had to reinvent itself from its Diceyan days whilst maintaining that
which was worthwhile from that period. It would be a flaw to lose this overall
perspective; public law thinkers should not get stuck in the present believing it holds
the ideal solutions. This in a sense was Dicey's mistake in believing his view of
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society to the exclusion of others. Tying a model of public law to the 'market' or
contract may prevent dynamic development and may seem as archaic as Dicey in
twenty years. Accepting its controls prevents a full examination of public ownership
because it tends to assume a priori that the private sector is superior. This ignores the
diffuse nature of accountability and the inability of private sector mechanisms to fulfil
completely the 'public' aspect of accountability. It has to be tied to a model of public
ownership with full involvement of those affected by this important public service.
Linking the public law concept of accountability with a method of public ownership
has been neglected for too long. But in the field of public transport at least it needs to
be rediscovered. This work is hoped to be a small step on that road.
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APPENDIX:
PRIVATISATION CASES.
One important concept of accountability is dependent on the courts.
This "legal" model would see the courts and the judges as providing a
forum whereby institutions could be held to account. In public law
this notion has underpinned the development of judicial review. Yet
in the field of this work the provision of public transport the courts
are probably not the most appropriate vehicle through which to gain
an accountable service. However this appendix illustrates that the
courts have intervened at a number of significant occasions in the
privatisation process.
Throughout the course of this work a number of significant court cases have taken
place which have dealt with aspects of both rail privatisation and bus deregulation.
These are worthy of comment for a number of reasons. Firstly all raise current public
law themes as all were actions of judicial review. Moreover in the rail privatisation
cases the decisions actually had an impact on the development of that process. The
bus decision is significant as it illustrates the recognition of the new institutional
structures in the bus industry as outlined in the preceding work.
Importantly for public law academics the courts -with one exception - seem quite at
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Their ability to utilise the process of judicial review to deal with the relevant issues
perhaps illustrates their flexibility. However, this ignores the arbitrary manner in
which judicial review cases are raised through the rules of standing or title and
interest. Furthermore, the different way in which the courts view their powers of
review, as witnessed in the case below brought by Save our Railways. Finally, the
state's response to their decisions illustrates some of the integral inequities of the
British Constitution.
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Highland Regional Council v British Railways Board
1996 SLT 274.
Heard on 7th June 1995.
This Scottish case was raised at a critical time for the whole process of rail
privatisation. Alongside the delays outlined in Chapter 7 it added to the impression
that the project was about to self destruct.
The original action was one of judicial review brought by the Council in the Outer
House of the Court of Session. The decision to be reviewed related to the publication
of the Passenger Service Requirements for the train operating companies in the run-up
to the letting of the franchises. The Requirements for Scotrail made no provision for
the sleeper service from Fort William to London. This service was thought of by the
Council as providing a necessary link with the Highlands.
This sleeper service was the only scheduled passenger service on three short sections
of track in the West of Scotland. Thus, the removal of the sleeper would amount to
the closure of these sections. However the closure of lines needed to follow a set
procedure as outlined in ss 37-50 of the Railways Act 1993. This provided for a
process of public hearings to justify their closure - in the words of Lord Hope these
sections were designed to secure "the public interest" in any closure. To avoid the
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sections of track. These services had no merit or purpose other than allowing Scotrail
to circumnavigate the closure procedure.
These actions were challenged in the judicial review. It was argued that Scotrail acted
irrationally and unreasonably in running these services to prevent it having to use the
closure procedure. In the Outer House Lord Kirkwood did allow an interdict against
Scotrail withdrawing the sleeper service but on the grounds of illegality rather than
the Wednesbury test of reasonableness. This was because Scotrail's purpose was the
need to find economies which they could do by cutting the sleeper service and
running the 'ghost trains' - this itself was rational and reasonable. However it had
committed an error as to the legal requirement of the Railways Act. This reasoning
was upheld on appeal by the Inner House led by the Lord President Hope.
The Board had acted illegally because the services initiated by them had no
conceivable use "apart from avoiding closure of that section of the line". In the
reasoning of the court it did not amount to a 'railway passenger service' which under
the Act it needed to prevent the closure procedure. In Lord Hope's judgement it
would "lead to an absurdity" and would not give effect to the "true intention of the
legislature" i.e. invoking the public interest when closing lines. Although this action
was the "logical next step" as far as saving money goes it was a breach of the Act and
was illegal. Thus it fell under one of the headings of judicial review given by Lord
Diplock in the GCHQ case, illegality: Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister
for the Civil Service [1985] AC 374.
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As a result of this decision the sleeper service was eventually saved so the decision
had a long-term effect. However it came down to a question of direct statutory
powers rather than a use of discretion which ultimately Scotrail could not challenge.
In a sense this case reflected at an early part of the process the limitations of the 'new'
railway. Thus for all the talk of flexibility and allowing the private sector to have
discretion in running their services ultimately there were still limitations on removing
services established by Parliament. In tum this reflects the role of the railway as a
social services. In this way it shows the environment that a privately run railway will
have to be administered. This illustrates the absence of free competition seen as so
important by the proponents of privatisation in delivering accountability.
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R v Director of Rail Franchising ex p Save our Railways &
Others
The Times 12 Dec 1995.
Queens Bench Division.
The Times 18 Dec 1995. Court of Appeal.
As in the above case this litigation took place at a critical point in the process of
privatisation, literally in the week before the first franchises were awarded. Unlike
the sleeper decision the appellate court disagreed with the reasoning of the court of
first instance. Both of the decisions have significance for this work and public law in
general.
Again this action of judicial review concerned the Passenger Service Requirements
(PSRs) of the new franchises. It was argued that the PSRs published by the
Franchising Director contradicted the Instructions issued by the Secretary of State for
Transport. Under s5 of the 1993 Act the Director had to "fulfil any objectives" of the
Government in accordance with any "instructions and guidance" given.
The instruction in question was issued by the Secretary of State as part of a single
document - his Objectives, Instruction and Guidance to the Franchise Director - on
22nd March 1994. Paragraph 18 stated that all PSRs published for the franchises
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franchise". It was argued by Save Our Railways that the PSRs issued for several
franchises represented a cut in services and not a service "based on" previous
services. Thus the Franchising Director had acted outwith the instructions.
These arguments received short shrift from Macpherson J. at first instance. He was
clearly uncomfortable dealing with the issues raised by rail privatisation. He stated it
was extremely difficult for a judge to perform his duties in "an atmosphere which is
full of disagreement over the merits". Judges must apply themselves "simply and
solely to the law". In rejecting the case he wondered "in conclusion whether a case of
this kind is at all suitable for ventilation in this court". Issues raised by cases like this
may obfuscate the true purpose of the court which is "to detect and deal with obvious
and clear abuse ofpower or maladministration in terms of unlawfulness".
In Macpherson J's eyes the Franchising Director did not fall into this relatively
narrow category for a number of reasons. He rejected the applicant's attempt to use
Parliamentary statements by Government Ministers in the case, as it was only the
instructions which were under scrutiny. Moreover ifthe instructions were viewed as a
whole they stressed the flexibility of the Franchising Director to "tailor services...
more closely to demand", Instruction number 18 was also flexible and was not
subject to the narrow reading that it would only allow for minor reductions to existing
timetables. On the phrase "based on" the judge even used the examples of films that
are "based on" books - a statement which usually means they greatly differ from the
original text. Further he stated that as the Franchising Director worked so closely to
the Secretary of State the instructions were clearly being carried out to his
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satisfaction. Thus if the courts intervened the Minister could simply alter the
instruction. For all these reasons the action fell.
Unusually an appeal on this decision was allowed and the Court of Appeal overturned
the reasoning of Macpherson J. In marked contrast to his ambivalent approach to the
nature of this review the Court led by Sir Thomas Bingham M.R. stated that the case
raised "serious, difficult and important issues". It also felt the document containing
the instructions merited close inspection as although not primary or secondary
legislation - a point overemphasised by Macpherson - the document was a
communication to a senior public official. It was also laid before Parliament. The
document "defines and circumscribes the Franchising Director's statutory duty" thus
it places limit on the official.
The members of the Court did agree that the controversy raised by the decision was
"wholly irrelevant to the problem we have to rescue". The substantive issue did not
interest them. They also rejected the use of Parliamentary statements as a basis of a
legitimate expectation. However they believed the limitations placed on the
Franchising Director by the instructions were real. Thus any "changes ... must be
marginal, not significant or substantial, as one deponent put it". They noted evidence
from the Office of Rail Franchising which stated that the PSRs were cautious in
including all loss making services. This did not follow the instructions given by the
minister. The Court also explicitly rejected any legal effect of the fact that the
Minister agreed with the actions of the Franchising Director: "the Secretary of State's
approval cannot alter the effect of his predecessor's instructions".
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In conclusion the Court held as unlawful the PSRs for a number of franchises:
London, Tilbury and Southend line, the East Coast Main Line, Gatwick Express,
Midland Main Line and Network South Central. The political effects of this were
limited as the Secretary of State - Sir George Young - changed the instructions issued
to the Franchising Director. 1
In this case rail privatisation was thrust into a broader debate on judicial review. It is
clear that the two courts adopted very different approaches to the decision making
process and the court's role. Of the two Macpherson J's seems the most contradictory
for although he claims to have been unaffected by the substantive context one of his
grounds were that the instructions could simply be changed by the Minister. Thus the
Court of Appeal apply a more consistent approach even though the ultimate effect
shows the truth ofMacpherson J's reasoning.
For rail privatisation it again shows the social ethos behind the railway service in
Britiain. The Government originally felt the need to use such language in its
instructions because of the sensitive nature of rail services. In the process of
privatisation, as noted in Chapter 7, much care was taken to emphasise how little was
to change - this included timetabled services. However this contradicted the
establishment of PSRs designed to attract the private sector. These contradictions
clashed in the court room. Again this perhaps highlights the nature ofjudicial review
as a surrogate political process - an idea not welcomed by Justice Macpherson.
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R v Monopolies and Mergers Commission ex p Stagecoach
Holdings pIc.
The Times 23rd July 1996.
This case does not directly concern the process of privatisation and deregulation in the
same way as the preceding cases do. In many ways this case is more significant in the
context ofjudicial review. However it is also important as it reflects the nature of the
state's involvement in the bus industry even after deregulation. In that sense it
underlines the conclusions in Chapter 5.
Stagecoach's action was of a judicial review of the MMC's two reports on their
purchase of a 20% stake in Mainline and Strathclyde Buses. The facts of the latter
case were examined in this work's case study. Stagecoach argued two grounds for
review. Firstly that a merger had not occurred in either case therefore excluding the
authority of the MMC. This ground was abandoned. The second was that there had
been material unfairness in producing the reports because of basic procedural
impropriety. That is the process of inquiry did not follow the process of natural
justice.
The reports are compiled on the order of the Corporate Affairs Minister under the Fair
Trading Act 1973. The MMC makes recommendations in the report which can be
followed or expanded on by the minister. In the case of Strathclyde as mentioned in
the case study Stagecoach was ordered to divest itself of its 20% holding. In the case
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minister went further than this and also ordered it to divest. These decisions of the
minister were challenged on two grounds. Firstly on the basis that no reasons were
given for his decisions. Stagecoach argued that this was required because both the
reports had been compiled prior to the formation of FirstBus which had made a
'fundamental difference' to both reports. This ground was again dropped even though
the judge stated that it would have raised "interesting questions" as to the duty to give
reasons. The ground they pursued was the reliance on the MMC reports which they
claimed amounted to procedural impropriety.
The basis of these allegations were that Stagecoach was not made aware of other
major operator's opinions in each of the hearings. Thus in this sense it did not know
the case against it. The court agreed with Stagecoach that the standards of natural
justice should be determined by the court and not by the MMC although the latter had
some discretion, following the decision of R v Take-Over Panel ex p Guinness
[1990] 1 QB 146. However they both believed in no way did the procedures in
question amount to manifest unfairness and certainly "any unfairness was not capable
ofleading to judicial review".
Thus the more aggressive approach which the Government took to the bus industry
throughout 1995 also had legal implications. Although the case here was quite weak
it represented Stagecoach challenging its status within the bus industry; as revealed in
Chapter 5 this centred around Stagecoach's belief that it was being singled out in the
consolidation process for criticism. Again this echoes Macpherson J's criticism in the
previous case of the process of judicial review being used for a surrogate political
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private transport sector which in tum reflects the important social role of transport.
That is the sheer number of investigations into the bus industry by the competition
authorities reflected the developments within public transport but also the knock on
effects this had in society in terms of the environment and also for bus users. It also
emphasises again the problem of accountability in the deregulated sphere. It showed
clearly that the bus industry could not do as it wished. For the nature of the
deregulated market meant that the competition authorities had to fill the vacuum.
Their lack of suitability for this role is further emphasised by the attitude that this
court took to these decisions. Although it ruled that it could not set its own standards
of fairness the way in which the MMC had corne to its conclusion in this case was not
challenged. Thus judicial review as a method of achieving accountability is further
restricted and another method of improving accountability is closed down. This
clearly has important consequences for public lawyers in their pursuit of
accountability. It illustrates the limitation of using the courts to decide substantive
issues on deregulation and privatisation. This shows the need for alternative
structures to determine the accountability of public services.
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